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Justice in Guatemala
After Chávez
Shenandoah • Isabel Allende

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Front cover: The Arch of Santa Catalina and the Agua Volcano, Antigua, Guatemala.
Photo by Dave Wilson.

Comment

"The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice," as the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. famously said. A three-judge Guatemalan tribunal seemed to bear him out, when Chief Justice Jazmín Barrios announced a guilty verdict on Friday, May 10, against former general and head of state Efraín Ríos Montt on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. The 86-year-old former dictator was sentenced to 80 years in prison. History had considerable help from Judge Barrios, her colleagues, Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz, their respective teams, expert witnesses, and 90 courageous Ixil eyewitnesses who had experienced the indescribable wrath of these crimes.

We begin this issue of the Review with two articles about the trial. Berkeley professor Beatriz Manz was an "expert eyewitness" who sought to document the crimes of the Ríos Montt regime during the height of the genocide in the Ixil region of Guatemala. She weaves her expert testimony into the story of her decades-long personal journey among the people of Guatemala. She concludes with an exceptional set of seldom-seen photos of the Ixil area and of refugee camps in Mexico as well as excerpts from her 1985 congressional testimony on human rights in Guatemala. Anthony Fontes explores the at-times contradictory way in which some Guatemalans have come to terms with the violence of the country's past. "The past cannot be undone," he points out, "we can only hope to rewrite its remembrance."

As the long-running immigration debate moves towards a conclusion in the United States Senate, Erica Hellerstein reports on a showing of "Shenandoah," with David Turnley, the documentary's Pulitzer Prize-winning director. This film focuses on a hard-scrabble former coal town in eastern Pennsylvania and explores what holds the community together in the wake of the beating death of a Mexican immigrant by four star high-school football players. The documentary poses a troubling question: What causes decent people to do unspeakable things? The film is deeply moving when you see it and haunting afterwards.

Finally, we conclude with a conversation with Isabel Allende about her new novel, *Maya's Notebook*. Much of the book takes place in Berkeley and on Chiloé, an archipelago at the end of continental Chile. The distance between these two locations is "about the same as a trip to the moon," Allende writes. The conversation was a bit like Allende's writing itself: personal, witty, perceptive, lyrical, and, at times, profound. When asked about the notion of legacy, she commented, that it can be "the contribution to the collective culture, to the collective unconscious, to our collective dreams."

Not a bad way for us to end!

– Harley Shaiken

Harley Shaiken speaking after the screening of "Shenandoah," April 2013.



Photo by Jim Block.

GUATEMALA

Bending the Arc of History

by Beatriz Manz

It has been said that in Guatemala, ethnic cleansing was practiced on a scale beyond even that of Bosnia, and yet it has been kept hidden — until today. What took place in Guatemala was a frightening and ghastly system of state terrorism — the most gruesome human slaughter in Latin America's violent cold-war period.

General Efraín Ríos Montt came to power in Guatemala through a coup in March 1982 and was deposed by another coup in October 1983, 17 blood-drenched months later. The most heinous state-sponsored violence of Guatemala's civil-war era took place during the brief period he was in power. While President Reagan famously said in December 1982 that the dictator was receiving a "bum rap" and was "a man of great personal integrity and commitment," for Guatemalans those months were a living nightmare from which many would never awaken. The elites and military eagerly tapped a willing United States for economic, military, and political support, even while it was known that atrocities were being committed against the defenseless civilian population.

The scale of the carnage is difficult to comprehend. The onslaught led to over 600 massacres, left over 10,000 people dead, displaced 1.5 million people from the countryside, and drove more than 150,000 refugees into Mexico. This trauma occurred in a country of seven million people. All told, an estimated 200,000 Guatemalans were killed over three decades of escalating conflict, 45,000 of whom simply "disappeared." Tens of thousands of children were left orphans by the slaughter.

Now, the former head of state and all-powerful commander of the armed forces stands convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity in a historic verdict of global significance. "We are completely convinced of the intent to destroy the Ixil ethnic group," Judge Jazmín Barrios told a packed courtroom as she summarized the guilty verdict rendered by the three-judge panel. "We consider that the accused, José Efraín Ríos Montt, had full knowledge of what was happening and did nothing to stop it, despite having the knowledge of the events and the power and the capacity to do so." Judge Barrios and her

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Beatriz Manz being sworn in before her testimony.
(Photo by Mary Jo McConahay.)

Photo by Rich Lipski/Bettmann/CORBIS.

Efraín Ríos Montt with Ronald Reagan, December 1983.

two colleagues as well as Claudia Paz y Paz, Guatemala's Attorney General, and her team, exhibited singular courage both in bringing the initial charges and skillfully conducting the trial during turbulent proceedings in a country where an aggressive and self-righteous elite and military still demand and expect to call the shots and forcefully insist on compliance. They did not get that this time, not from this court, and that may have changed the country forever.

Aryeh Neier, the founding executive director of Human Rights Watch and for many years the president of the Open Society Foundation, called the trial an "extraordinary development, having immense significance for human rights globally." More than 100 people testified for the prosecution, including the relatives of ravaged Ixil families, some of whom are themselves permanently scarred by the criminal acts committed by the military. In addition, a number of key experts from Guatemala, the United States, and elsewhere presented crucial written testimonies providing searing insights and analysis into what had taken place.

It was an honor to have been asked to testify in the trial as an eyewitness on April 8, 2013. My first-hand testimony covered my documentation of events during that period from deep in the Lacandón Rainforest of Chiapas, Mexico, and from the Ixil area high in the mountains of Guatemala. I was one of the very few anthropologists — perhaps even the only one — who continued going to the area during the most intense period of war. I did this because I felt that these horrific crimes needed to be documented for a broader audience. A number of acquaintances, and a few friends, were targeted and killed in the widespread slaughter. In the aftermath of that terror, my friend and colleague Myrna Mack was assassinated almost a decade later on September 11, 1990.

Human rights colleagues have told me that this involvement might be the first time a social anthropologist has testified in a genocide trial. "For you, as an anthropologist, this must be reaching the apex," several people told me. The distinction I would make is that testifying was a moral apex rather than the capstone of a professional career. For me, the experience of testifying was not an act apart from anthropology but rather a central part of the responsibility of being an anthropologist.

My experience in Guatemala during this period underscored a unique dimension of social anthropology. It is a discipline that allows us to interview, document, record, reflect, analyze, and above all, observe deeply through participation. It is an approach that allows us to stay in a community, to live among the people, to be engaged, and to experience part of their lives. We experience their joys as well as their pains, their aspirations along with their defeats.

But with that deep immersion comes deep responsibility. We chronicle the lives of people, but we also should be willing to speak out accurately and forcefully when necessary. In a very real way, it is not simply our responsibility, it is truly a moral obligation and a requirement to speak out, to inform. Guatemalan anthropologists Ricardo Falla and Myrna Mack called it "*antropología comprometida*" (committed anthropology).

I first went to Guatemala in 1973 as a graduate student for what I thought would be a summer of research. That summer somehow turned into a lifetime of involvement. On that remarkable trip, I went deep into the dense rainforest called the Ixcán — virtually impenetrable in those years — to see the founding of a village, Santa María Tzejá. I was there for the first arduous steps that those courageous pioneers took to settle a new place, a place they referred to as paradise, as the Garden of Eden.

These determined, confident K'iche' Maya visionaries embodied

the hopes and dreams of those who would follow. They were willing to face uncertainty, exhausting work, and sickness to clear the thick rainforest and establish their own place, their new stable community.

They said they were able to do it because, in their words, they had a "consciousness of community." They had formed a cooperative; they were united; they were resolute and filled with confidence. They wanted to be liberated from the dreaded seasonal labor migrations to the plantations and the unbearable impoverishment; liberated from the historic exclusion, contempt, repression, exploitation, and anguish; liberated from scraping a meager existence from the ever-diminishing land — liberated from the past they loathed. Though the challenges were extreme and daunting, they had no doubt that they would succeed in their new community. And they did.

Little did I expect then, as I stayed in that optimistic, emergent village in 1973, that within a decade, the village they had called paradise would be reduced to ashes, many of its people massacred, and the rest fleeing to hide in the jungle and mountains for months and even years, fleeing their own country for refuge in Mexico. Everything, the animals, the corn, every possible source of sustenance, was destroyed. If they wanted to run away from the army, they would have to starve to death.

Even less did I imagine that, 40 years later, I would be facing the architect of that unspeakable atrocity, General Efraín Ríos Montt, as I testified in a Guatemala City courtroom on April 8, 2013.

The prosecution wanted to introduce some of my photographs of that period as evidence, but they were not allowed to do so due to legal procedural issues. [Some of these photos follow this article.]

Photo courtesy of Siglo21.

Beatriz Manz testifies for the prosecution, April 2013.

Guatemala is a country that has historically preferred amnesia when it comes to injustice. Those in power have tried to suppress inconvenient memory at all costs and to label any efforts to unveil historical memory as an affront to the centuries-old status quo.

Ultimately incalculable credit goes to the 90 brave Ixiles who testified and the many experts — from forensic anthropologists to authorities on military command doctrine — who confronted the regime's crimes. This trial is a transcendent milestone internationally as well as for Guatemala. It signals to the world that war criminals can be prosecuted in their own country, which is always preferable. For Guatemalans, the trial signals that crimes will not go unpunished, no matter who commits them, and that the country now has the capacity to fulfill the rule of law. The surviving victims have had a moment to speak, to reveal their heartfelt experiences, and to confront their persecutors.

After the verdict was read, 12 police officers escorted General Ríos Montt out of the tumultuous courtroom and into a prison cell, past his victims and the relatives of survivors. This humiliating exit was seen by people in Guatemala and throughout the world. While the verdict will likely be challenged and true justice may be impossible given the enormity of the crimes that Ríos Montt committed, at least the veil of impunity has been lifted.

"We still have a long way to go," said Edwin Canil, an attorney who helped build the case against the general. As a young boy, Edwin was the sole survivor of the 1982 massacre in Santa María Tzejá, the same village where my own Guatemalan journey began so many years ago.

Beatriz Manz is a professor of Geography and Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley and the author of *Refugees of a Hidden War* and *Paradise in Ashes*. She testified in the Ríos Montt trial on April 8, 2013. This article is based on a Keynote Banquet address she gave at the Southwestern Anthropological Association's annual meeting in San Jose, California, on April 20, 2013.

Photo by Derrill Bazzy.

Beatriz Manz, with Juan Osorio, a K'iche' Maya from Santa María Tzejá, on the trail to that village in Ixcán, Guatemala, circa 1986.

Remembering the Past, Looking to the Future

by Beatriz Manz

In July 1973, I first walked the muddy, arduous path to the village of Santa Maria Tzejá in the Ixcán rainforest. Little did I realize the journey would last 40 years.

> "If the bones of the dead speak,
> why should the living keep quiet?"
>
> – Humberto Ak'abal, K'iche' Maya poet

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

Paratroopers in a Catholic Church building, Nebaj, Guatemala, March 1983.

I took this photo in the Ixil region in March 1983 to show how soldiers were occupying buildings abandoned by the Catholic Church. Bishop Juan Gerardi had closed down the diocese of El Quiché in 1980 because of the escalating number of priests, nuns, catechists, and health and education promoters who had been murdered. It was the first time that the Catholic Church had left a region as a result of violence since the Spanish conquest.

Years later, this photo proved much more important than I could have imagined at the time. Survivors claimed that parachutists operated in the Ixil area, but the military repeatedly denied that there was any such unit. This photo, which shows a soldier wearing a T-shirt bearing the insignia of the parachutists' unit, proved that the unit did indeed exist.

In the last several years, the military has conducted a widespread counter-insurgency campaign designed to disrupt the base of support for the guerrillas. An important part of this campaign involved terrorizing the defenseless civilian population through individual disappearances and assassinations and the massacres of entire communities… Overall the results of this military campaign were staggering.

– Beatriz Manz, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Developments in Guatemala and U.S. Options," Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1985.

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

Rancho Puerto Rico Camp, Lacandón rainforest, Chiapas, Mexico, November 1982.

News was filtering out of Guatemala that thousands of *campesinos* were fleeing to southern Mexico to escape the violence. In November 1982, there were already 36,000 Guatemalans in refugee camps along the border and tens of thousands more spread across Mexico. I decided to find these refugees and take their testimonies. I knew that the Mexican government was not keen on anyone going into the Lacandón rainforest and that officials had made this very clear to Mexican reporters. The government's attempt to make the refugee camps off-limits made me even more determined to attempt to enter the Lacandón.

I hired a small plane in Comitán, a city in the state of Chiapas, near the Guatemalan border. We headed east, and I photographed the border from the sky. The pilot landed in a grass clearing in the jungle. When I got out of the plane, I asked him to return in a week. From there, I hiked into the dense rainforest, where I found a Mexican with a dugout canoe who knew how to navigate the Lacantún River. He took me to a makeshift camp that housed thousands of Guatemalan refugees. Seeing the suffering of the refugees — many of whom arrived in the camp hungry, wounded, and near death — was the most wrenching experience of all my years doing fieldwork in Guatemala.

> The insecurity of the peasants is reflected by the continued presence of an estimated 150,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, 46,000 of whom are in officially recognized camps in southern Mexico. These peasants did not abandon their homes, land, and communities lightly. Many were the survivors of massacres in their own villages or witness to the destruction of neighboring villages. An official Guatemalan census lists 51,144 children who have lost one or both of their parents in the departments of El Quiché, Chimaltenango, and San Marcos. The total figure of children who lost parents is estimated to be 100,000 for the country.
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> – Beatriz Manz, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Developments in Guatemala and U.S. Options," Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1985.

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

On the road to the Ixil region, Guatemala, March 1983.

I knew the road to the Ixil region from my first trip to Guatemala in 1973. When I returned in 1983, after the military had begun its scorched earth counterinsurgency campaign, everything had changed. Where there had once been homes and cornfields, there were only ashes. It felt like not an insect was left alive.

Mostly, I photographed from the road, but at one point, I decided to go up to a burnt house. There, in the rubble, I saw a girl's black shoe. A jolt went through me, a visceral realization of the desolation, the devastation. To whom did this shoe belong? What happened to her?

Hundreds of villages and thousands of homes like this one were burned to the ground.

> Terror has become an accepted part of the arsenal of the military.
>
> – Beatriz Manz, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Developments in Guatemala and U.S. Options," Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1985.

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

The "model village" of La Pista, Ixil region, Guatemala, March 1983.

Since the Spanish conquest, the Mayans have been viewed as an available labor force. The military offensive into isolated areas in the 1980s produced hundreds of massacres, destroyed homes and fields, and displaced more than one million people. Many survivors hid in the mountains and rainforest. Some of these desperate people, often driven by hunger and poor health, decided to put their fate in the hands of the military, which forced them to live in highly controlled settlements ludicrously dubbed "model villages." In addition to the controls and the psychological operations they endured, the men had to perform forced labor. They patrolled the countryside, looking for insurgents, and they built roads, literally moving mountains with picks and shovels.

> A further component of this occupation are the "model villages." These settlements are designed by the military to be strategic concentrations of peasants whose movements can be closely monitored and controlled. In addition, the army is seeking to transform the attitudes and living patterns of these indigenous peoples through "reeducation."
>
> – Beatriz Manz, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Developments in Guatemala and U.S. Options," Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1985.

> … the lifestyles and traditions, in fact, the culture of the indigenous population [are] being forcefully transformed…
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> The civil patrols are especially noteworthy both because of their pervasiveness and their disruptive effect on communities. There are about 900,000 patrolmen… most of the patrols are concentrated among the 4 million people of the highlands who are overwhelmingly Indian… [this] system of compulsory policing and vigilante service… is unpaid and obligatory.
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> – Beatriz Manz, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Developments in Guatemala and U.S. Options," Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1985.

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

A civil patrol (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, PAC), Ixil region, Guatemala, March 1983.

Men forced to build a road, Ixil region, Guatemala, March 1983.

Photo courtesy of Beatriz Manz.

Photo by José Antonio Castro.

Former dictator Efraín Rios Montt is led away following his conviction.

GUATEMALA

The Firm Hand Loses Its Grip

by Anthony Fontes

On May 10, 2013, ex-general Efraín Ríos Montt, who as military dictator oversaw the bloodiest years of Guatemala's long civil war, was found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity in a Guatemalan court. Human rights activists in Guatemala and the world over have pushed for this sentence for more than a decade. The case finally gained momentum in January 2012, when Ríos Montt lost the judicial immunity he had enjoyed as a member of Congress. The trial began in mid-March 2013 and continued in fits and starts, with Ríos Montt's defense team trying to derail the proceedings at every turn. During the trial, they filed more than 100 appeals, and despite the recent court ruling, the legal process could drag on for months or even years.

Those who wanted to see Ríos Montt charged say his supporters tried to make a mockery of justice by catalyzing procedural drama that insulted and sometimes even overshadowed the human tragedy this trial was supposed to bring to light. As the lawyers for the prosecution said in their opening statement, the trial was about making public the "truth of the Maya Ixil" in the hope that it would become a national truth. Many commentators deeply invested in the triumph of human rights over the impunity and prejudice that continue to dominate Guatemalan life also see the trial as setting an important precedent. After the court found Ríos Montt guilty, the president of the International Center for Transitional Justice called the trial "…a great leap forward in the struggle for justice in Guatemala and globally. Today will be carved into the history of the fight against impunity for mass atrocities as a victory for victims in this country, and for all who care about the state guaranteeing, rather than abusing, the fundamental rights of citizens."

While many celebrate what the guilty verdict could mean for the future, this trial is fundamentally about how Guatemala remembers and judges the violence of its past. It is about changing what counts as "truth." Shortly after the official conclusion of the civil war in 1996, the United Nations and the Catholic Church each published reports that found that the Guatemalan military had perpetrated

more than 90 percent of the conflict's atrocities. Most international observers and human-rights advocates consider these reports incontrovertible. Guatemalan human-rights groups have for years pushed the slogan "*Sí, hubo genocidio*" (Yes, genocide happened) to convince the Guatemalan populace of the military's guilt.

Despite these efforts, a dominant "truth" in Guatemalan society today is that the two parties to the conflict — the military and the guerrilla — victimized the poor indigenous population caught between them. War is hell, and both sides did terrible things, and that's that. By highlighting the Guatemalan military's incredible excesses — and the depth of indigenous suffering — the trial may destabilize this entrenched misperception. We shall see. But what has been lost in the fanfare surrounding this historic event is another legacy of war that continues to rupture the present: the everyday violence and poverty that dominate large swathes of the country and that color people's perception of what this trial means. As a waitress working in a Guatemala City restaurant said, "I'm more interested in the gangster who killed my cousin last week than in something that happened 30 years ago." Worse still, some individuals implicated in the past atrocities today are widely regarded as Guatemala's best chance for diminishing the out-of-control crime and violence that have been the most conspicuous gifts of so-called peace and democracy.

Violence Past and Present

Roberto is 54, though he is bent and withered and looks much older. During the worst years of the civil war, he served in the Guatemalan military in El Quiché, the region where the indigenous witnesses in the Ríos Montt trial lived. Like many Guatemalans, Roberto is convinced that the Ríos Montt trial is ridiculous, orchestrated by former *guerrilleros* who want vengeance and foreigners interfering with Guatemalan politics.

And yet, in the course of the interview he exclaims, "We suffered, too! We suffered, too." He remembers it clearly, like a nightmare that won't go away. "It was terrible what happened up there. We had to kill everyone. Everyone. Using machetes. We would go into a village, and there would only be women and children, and we would start killing everyone. The lieutenant sat with six bodyguards in a jeep behind us, all of them with guns. If we didn't do it, they would shoot us. It was the law. It was the orders of Ríos Montt, so we had to carry it out. I remember there were two little children I found. The lieutenant told me to

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The courtroom audience watches the trial proceed.

Photo by Anthony Fontes.

kill them, and I said no. Perhaps they could be taken from this village. Perhaps they could be raised by another family and grow up to be good Guatemalans. The lieutenant made us tie them to a tree, and then he shot each of them in the head. They were stained with the guerrilla, he said. They had to be killed with all the rest. It was terrible."

A clearer indictment of the military's atrocities — and the guilt rising up the chain of command — would be difficult to find. Still, Roberto blames the guerrilla for teaching today's criminal gangs how to run extortion rackets. "These gangs do the same thing to poor people as the guerrilla once did," he says. "Extorting and brainwashing them for their own destruction." The belief that the military is still the best safekeeper of Guatemalan society is why he, like so many Guatemalans, supported Ríos Montt's party for the decade after the war. It is why he voted for ex-general Pérez Molina — one of Ríos Montt's former commanders in the field — and why this trial appears to him to be a political act of vengeance by disgruntled leftists rather than the stunning justice so many perceive it to be.

El Portal, Zone 1, Guatemala City

They say Che Guevara came to this bar when he visited Guatemala. Photos of the revolutionary adorn the walls alongside images of Guatemala's most famous author, the Nobel laureate Miguel Ángel Asturias, known for his opposition to dictatorships. However, the bartender is wearing an orange Partido Patriota (Patriotic Party) T-shirt in support of President Pérez Molina. It features the clenched fist of the Mano Dura that has come to define anti-crime hawkishness in Guatemala over the past 10 years. Before backing Pérez Molina, he supported Efraín Ríos Montt in his campaigns for the presidency. The reason? He voted for them because they are military men.

He tells me the story of a neighbor who called him at 2:30 a.m. begging for help. The man's whole family was standing outside the bartender's house with their bags and mattresses in a crazy pile. Extortionists claiming affiliation with the Mara Salvatrucha had demanded payments that the family could not afford, so the thugs shot up their house in a drive-by. They had to flee in the middle of the night. "This would never have happened when Ríos Montt was leader of this country," he said. "Back then, a *marero* seen was a marero dead. They would see a guy wearing gangster clothing, ask him for his papers, and if he had a serious record, blam, they would disappear him. The military and paramilitary organizations that wielded such power during the conflict would not tolerate the present situation."

Today, even among the communities most violated by civil war atrocities, the fractures and overwhelming concerns of the present moment often trump the crimes of the past. As political analyst Megan Thomas observed, in El Quiché, "people from the left, who suffered massacre and continue to be dirt poor… they went over to [General Pérez Molina's party] because the [opposition] mayor left them out in the cold. You look at their faces, and they are so worn. They are so desperate and tired of all this."

Ríos Montt's defense team has pandered to this sentiment. Once Judge Barríos finally forced the defense to begin their opening statements, Ríos Montt's lawyer went into a tirade at the prosecution's effort to "confuse" the Guatemalan people by blaming his client for violence that occurred when he was in power. He drew a parallel between civil-war violence and today's criminal threat: "Who today isn't afraid to walk in the street? Who hasn't felt that fear? Do we call this genocide? Are we going to indict President Otto Pérez Molina for genocide because we fear to go in the street? …Let's not confuse ourselves!" The illogic of this courtroom hyperbole does not stop it from ringing true for the millions living under the pressure of extreme insecurity today.

Meanwhile, rallies and marches against the trial have been staged in the capital as well as in the Quiché region, home to the indigenous population Ríos Montt is accused of massacring. Anonymous donors have paid for 20-page inserts to be published in the country's most widely read newspapers defending the general's wartime policies. Conservative politicians and pundits have denounced the trial for bringing up the old hatreds and divisions that inspired years of civil war violence. Better to bury the past, they claim, than to reenact its nightmares on the national stage.

Finally, there is the painful fact that, for a great part of the middle class, this trial and this fight over history simply does not track. After the opening day of the trial, I asked a group of Guatemalan university students whether they thought Ríos Montt should be found guilty. They gave me blank looks, and one replied. "Sorry, who is Ríos Montt?"

The Limits of Justice

Óscar Romero — the Catholic archbishop who stood up for El Salvador's poor during the worst years of that country's civil war and was assassinated by the Salvadoran military — once said, "Justice is like the snake: it only bites the bare foot." While the Guatemalan justice system is weak and corrupt, especially when it comes to confronting the moneyed powers-that-be, it has a rather surprising track record of incarcerating public officials who abuse their powers. For instance, former President Alfonso Portillo (2000–04) is currently in jail awaiting extradition to the United States on embezzlement charges. In the past decade, five ministers of government — who oversee the

Photo by Johan Ordoñez/AFP/Getty Images.

Residents of this Guatemala City neighborhood formed their own armed gang to protect themselves from the Mara Salvatrucha.

police and prison systems — have been thrown in jail for corruption and criminal negligence. Like Ríos Montt, none of these men can be considered "barefoot." However, upon their arrest, they all found themselves cornered, virtually friendless, and scapegoated for committing crimes that are widely considered to be normal behavior for powerful public servants. Their punishment, then, must be understood as more symbolic than precedent setting — public spectacles that allow the law to pay lip-service to justice while the everyday abuses of power continue unabated. Given this context, the question becomes: Is the Ríos Montt indictment and trial any different?

In some ways, of course, it is. Ríos Montt has been found guilty of genocide, not mere corruption. And through him, the entire military establishment, and perhaps even the oligarchy itself, come under attack. Perhaps. But in some ways, Ríos Montt has himself become a victim of history — though many would argue that he richly deserves his fate — in that he seems to have been abandoned by his former comrades. As the conservative editorialist and witness for the defense Alfred Kaltschmitt noted weeks before the trial opened: "*Callados están los agroindustriales y empresarios que celebraron con tanta fanfarria el final de una larga noche bélica y el inicio de una era de paz ganada a pulso contra el terrorismo subversivo.*" (Quiet are the agro-industrialists and businessmen who celebrated with such great fanfare the end of a long night of war and the beginning of an era of peace won with bare hands against subversive terrorism.) In this sense, Ríos Montt, the doddering octogenarian who frequently had to ask the judge for permission to use the bathroom before all the world, is a victim of a symbolic justice whose ultimate "truth" remains up for grabs.

In the end, the law is a mere calculation — a means of measuring guilt and innocence — while justice itself is incalculable. Ríos Montt's crime, as Hannah Arendt wrote of the Nazi's everlasting crimes against humanity, "explodes the limits of the law… no punishment is severe enough." Ríos Montt's victims know this. The past cannot be undone. We can only hope to rewrite its remembrance.

Anthony Fontes is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley.

VENEZUELA

¿Un Maduro Más Duro? Venezuela After Chávez

by Javier Corrales

When Hugo Chávez took office in 1999, most Venezuela-watchers set their eyes on one major question: What was Chávez going to do with the political regime he inherited? This year, as Venezuela inaugurates the first post-Chávez administration under Nicolás Maduro, the question is the same: What will Maduro do with the political regime he inherited?

There is no doubt that Chávez transformed Venezuela's political landscape. Back in 1998, there was near-universal consensus that Venezuela's democracy was in trouble and that political reform was urgent. Chávez capitalized on this widespread clamor for change and fundamentally altered almost every single law in the country. Supporters believe that the end result was an alternative, more meaningful form of "participatory democracy." Others see nothing but full-fledged autocracy. Still others, myself included, argue that Chávez delivered a mixed bag. That is, he built a regime in which some democratic tendencies were reinforced while at the same time, many existing autocratic features were enhanced, and new ones were introduced.

Regardless of one's position on Chávez's legacy, the question remains: Under Maduro, will Venezuela see more democracy, better democracy, less democracy?

One way to gauge the evolution of a political regime — and specifically, its degree of democracy — is to focus on: 1) the existence of checks and balance on the majority (and thus, the presidential powers); and 2) the state's treatment of political minorities, which in most presidential democracies consist, by definition, of members of the opposition. These are, of course, not the only (or even the most important) aspects of democracy, but most scholars agree that without these two features, no regime can genuinely qualify as democratic.

Photo by Luigino Bracci.

Hugo Chávez's funeral procession.

I will argue that there is a high risk that the political regime in Venezuela will undergo some type of "hardening" along these two dimensions. By "hardening" I mean that the executive will attempt to concentrate even more power in his own hands and adopt an even more antagonistic attitude toward the opposition. This change might not be permanent or ultimately irreversible. Maduro may run into severe obstacles, and the administration might never want to turn fully authoritarian. But here are my reasons for thinking that the conditions are propitious for the new administration to feel tempted to move in a more autocratic direction.

A New Symmetry and Several New Asymmetries

A turn toward more autocratic rule is possible because of the new balance of power between the ruling party and the opposition. This new balance is predicated on a new political symmetry and several new asymmetries that have emerged since the April 14, 2013, election of Nicolás Maduro.

First, a few words on the new symmetry. Following the shocking April 14 electoral results, in which Maduro won by a mere 1.5 points, the conventional wisdom among analysts has been that there is a new balance in state–opposition relations. This is the first presidential election since 1998, when Chávez first ran for office, that there is an electoral tie between *chavistas* and the opposition, the so-called "*dos mitades*" (two halves).

There is no question that this new symmetry is historic, for *chavismo* as well as for Venezuela. Maduro essentially squandered the large majority that Chávez had built over the past 14 years. And while this chavista majority had been shrinking, it was still quite large and showed signs of rebounding in October 2012, when Chávez was reelected for the third time, with a comfortable 11-point margin, and again in December 2012, when most states elected chavista governors, often by much larger margins than Chávez himself obtained. That the distance between Maduro and the opposition

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Photo by Cristobal Alvarado Minic.

The Venezuelan capitol building.

shrank so dramatically has created a type of government–opposition symmetry that never existed under chavismo, or in Venezuela for that matter, except during the heyday of the two-party system, which lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1970s.

However, focusing on this new symmetry is not enough to predict how the new administration will respond to the opposition. Some theorists contend that close symmetries prompt officials to be more accommodating toward the opposition: the ruling party realizes that it is weak, or at least, not that much more powerful than its opponents, and so, to borrow from the late economist Mancur Olson, it finds itself in a condition of mutual checkmate in which the rational move is to engage in pact-making, the so-called conciliatory position. But other theorists argue the opposite. Situations of political ties can cause enough panic among the shrinking group — in this case, the ruling party — to compel authorities to be more extreme. To borrow from political scientist Kurt Weyland, who used prospect theory to study risk-taking by presidents, a situation of desperation (or checkmate) can compel actors to do risky things, which could mean, among other things, not recognizing the power of the opposition and attempting to weaken it with more hardline approaches, despite the risk of unleashing a backlash.

The key point is simply that electoral symmetry between two camps, however new, is not enough — theoretically at least — to predict how each camp will behave toward the other. Thus, to get a better idea of what to expect, it seems necessary to examine other factors. Looking beyond this electoral symmetry, there are also new political asymmetries in Venezuela, and these new asymmetries are likely to push the administration in the direction of a regime hardening.

The first significant new asymmetry has to do with political energy. The ruling party emerged from the close election demoralized, maybe even terrified, while the opposition emerged absolutely energized. A demoralized ruling party behaves in predictable ways. Namely, leading figures become prone to question whether the leader in charge is making the right decisions. This questioning in turn gives rise to competing ideas and leaderships. Increasing competition can then lead to internal disarray within the ruling party. In contrast, an energized opposition gets the feeling that time is on its side. In fact, the opposition feels that there is no real symmetry: they think they have a slight majority that would have been visible on election day if the government had not engaged

Photo by chavezcandanga.

Symbols of chavismo dominate Maduro's announcement of his candidacy for president.

in electoral irregularities.* The opposition may not be in power yet, but they feel the time is near. They see the Maduro government as a "*mientras tanto*" or "meanwhile" administration, to quote Henrique Capriles, the leader of the opposition, who invoked that precise phrase to convey that chavismo's dominance is on the wane. For the first time since 2004, the opposition feels that it can defeat chavismo by way of elections, and chavistas, to their chagrin, agree.

This leads to the second major asymmetry to emerge after April 14. Chavismo after Chávez is experiencing centrifugal forces, whereas the opposition is experiencing centripetal forces. Almost since the day that Chávez designated Maduro as his successor (without any type of internal party consultation), chavista leaders have raised questions about whether Maduro is up to the task. Since his poor election results in April, this questioning has intensified. The point is not so much whether these questions are justified but rather that they are indicative that forces are moving away from the center rather than towards it. This centrifugalism is perceptible among labor groups, which are protesting in record numbers; among the military, which is not as pro-Cuba as Maduro; from the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, who called for "*auto-crítica*" (self-criticism) shortly after the elections; and soon, it will start coming from the 20 chavista governors elected in December, all of whom obtained margins of victory far larger than Maduro's. These governors can claim to have more connection with the *pueblo chavista* than Maduro by simply comparing their electoral results with his. If there is one major new story from the April 14 election, it is that chavista governors are emerging as a new political cleavage within chavismo, in addition to the two existing cleavages: the civil–military cleavage and the radical–less radical cleavage among civilians.

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* For the April 2013 election, the opposition did a more thorough job of keeping tabs of irregularities than in the past. The opposition contends that: 1) 535 voting machines broke down, possibly affecting 189,982 votes; 2) opposition witnesses were removed by force from 787 voting stations, affecting possibly up to 2 million voters; 3) the electoral registry contains 600,000 names of voters who are more than 100 years old; 4) Maduro obtained more votes than Chávez did in the last election, sometimes by more than 500 percent, in 1,176 voting stations, possibly affecting 1.48 million voters; and 5) violence and/or excessive ruling party pressure was reported at more than 800 polling stations.

Photo courtesy of Globovisión.

Opposition candidate Henrique Capriles campaigns prior to the election.

In many ways, chavismo under Maduro is the exact opposite of chavismo under Chávez, in that the ruling party leadership is becoming more questioning rather than more obsequious toward the party's central figure. If anything, it is the opposition that now is experiencing centripetalism — albeit not to the unusually high degree that was the case with the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) under Chávez. Capriles emerged from the April 14 election with a level of respect from all sectors of the opposition that has eluded any other opposition figure at least since the ascendance of Chávez and perhaps since the 1970s. The opposition has been working hard at unity since 2005, but with so many ideological and strategic differences within its ranks, this quest for unity always seemed arduous and tenuous. At key moments, especially after some embarrassing elections (the presidential election of 2006, the constitutional referendum of 2009, and the two elections of 2012), this unity was strained. But Capriles' comeback in the April election essentially reversed these centrifugal tendencies. He emerged as the undisputed leader of the opposition, if not the country, in contrast to Maduro, who has yet to prove his leadership.

Nevertheless, Capriles has one major disadvantage, and this is the third new asymmetry: the ruling party remains in control of virtually all the institutions of the national government and the vast majority of subnational institutions, while the opposition is virtually deprived of institutional power. The opposition has only 39 percent of the seats in the National Assembly — not enough to block legislation. It controls only two governorships, and even there, it has to share a lot of political space with chavistas, who have a strong presence in all subnational institutions, including state legislatures, mayoralties, and state-sponsored communes. It is odd for an opposition to do so well electorally and still be left out in the cold institutionally.

These asymmetries produce the conditions for a potential hardening of the regime. The asymmetry of political energy is producing serious insecurities within the ruling party. The asymmetry of disunity/unity is producing panic in the "nominal" head of the ruling party, Nicolás Maduro. And the asymmetry of institutional power is likely to be the most important asset available to the ruling party to deal with the political challenges posed

by the other asymmetries. So it is worth asking: How much power do Venezuelan political institutions provide to those who control them? The answer is: a lot.

The Institutional Legacy of Chavismo

Since the passing of Chávez, most of the press has focused on his economic legacy. Reports have detailed how Chávez left an ever-more expansionist state. For example, according to the Caracas think tank Econalítica, public spending increased from 25 to 47 percent of the domestic national product under Chávez. While the expanding state generated lots of patronage, which is positive for coalition building, it also led to large deficits; high inflation; chronic productivity problems across the public sector but especially in the state-run oil company; and a weakened private sector that hardly invests because it lives in fear of expropriation, tax audits, and the imposition of new controls. All these ailments are negative for development, and they mean that for the first time since 2003, we are witnessing a chavismo in economic trouble. The economy is not facing imminent collapse, but it is not booming either. Maduro's ability to throw money at every problem — which was Chávez's typical solution to any problem he confronted — is now a question mark rather than a certainty. Maduro is facing declining reserves and has already presided over a massive devaluation, which Chávez warned against before his death; cut back on spending, which violates a basic dogma of populism; and had trouble raising new loans, even from Venezuela's most "reliable" creditor, China. Maduro simply does not have the freedom to maneuver economically that Chávez enjoyed since 2004. In short, chavismo under Maduro is not just politically insecure but also economically constrained, at least for now.

What instruments can Maduro employ to deal with this dual challenge? Borrowing from David and Ruth Collier's classic work on populism, which stresses that the populist's typical policy toolkit is a combination of inducements and constraints, we can conclude that if the inducement side of the state is circumscribed, constraints are likely to take center stage.

And it is here that Chávez's political — rather than economic — institutional legacy comes in handy. Chávez has left Maduro a series of political laws — and approaches

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One of the health clinics established by the Chávez regime.

Photo by Ariel López.

to the law — that are unquestionably autocratic. This is not to suggest that all the laws approved under Chávez are undemocratic. What I want to highlight is that within the broad amalgam of laws that Chávez left behind, a good number empower the executive branch to act punitively against political rivals. The following are nine such laws.

1. The Constitution (1999) bans public funding for "associations with political objectives" (con fines políticos) one of the terms in the Constitution for political parties (Article 67). This article has consistently been applied to opposition forces but never to the ruling party.
2. The Law for Social Responsibility (2004) bans broadcasting of material that could incite or promote hatred and violence. It was extended in 2010 to apply to the Internet. Accordingly, electronic media may not transmit messages that "foment anxiety in the public or disturb public order," "incite or promote disobedience of the current legal order," "refuse to recognize the legitimately constituted authority," or "incite or promote hatred or intolerance."
3. The Reform of the Penal Code (2005) makes it illegal to be "disrespectful of government officials" and seriously restricts the use of public space for protests.
4. The Reform of the Organic Law of Telecommunications (2010) allows the government to suspend or revoke broadcasting concessions to private outlets if it considers such action to be "in the interests of the nation, or if public order and security demand it." In Venezuela, the size of the private media has shrunk considerably. The license for one television station, RCTV, was not renewed in 2007. A second television station, Globovisión, has been fined repeatedly, and the owners have decided to sell the company to a pro-government millionaire. The two private television stations that remain have made a tacit pact with the government not to cover politics.
5. A series of laws governing "communal councils" (the Organic Law of Popular Power, the Organic Law of Public Planning, the Organic Law of Social Auditing, and the Organic Law of Communes) provide public funding and legal prerogatives to these ill-defined councils. None of these laws require the councils to hold competitive elections for their representatives. Councils are required to work with the state to offer services, carry out public works, and participate in community development, often superseding the role of elected mayors and municipal councils.
6. Enabling laws: Under Chávez, the ruling party (via the legislature) granted the executive branch the right to legislate by decree — the so-called enabling laws — on four occasions: 1999, 2000, 2007, and 2010. This suggests that the ruling party is fairly comfortable granting the executive branch ample powers for extended periods, even during good economic times. The granting of extraordinary powers to the executive did not begin under Chávez, but historically, those powers were never as expansive or as easy to obtain as they have been under the PSUV.
7. The Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination (2010) blocks Venezuelan human-rights defenders from receiving international assistance. Nongovernmental organizations that "defend political rights" or "monitor the performance of public bodies" are barred from receiving any foreign funding. Foreigners invited by these groups can be expelled from the country if they express opinions that "offend the institutions of the state, top officials, or attack the exercise of sovereignty." Organizations could face stiff fines, and their directors could lose their right to run for public office for up to eight years.
8. The Law Against Illicit Exchange Transactions (2010) grants the government a monopoly over all currency trades, including government bonds. Foreign currency from exports must be sold to the Banco Central de Venezuela at the official exchange rate. The law also bans "offers" in foreign currency made between Venezuelan entities or individuals for the sale of goods and services.
9. The Law of Partial Reform of the Law of Political Parties, Meetings, and Protests (2011) bans deputies from any conduct that departs from the "political orientation and positions" adopted by their party during election times. This law is intended to discipline deputies who consider deviating from the party line.

These laws and legal precedents alone constitute a remarkably autocratic institutional legacy. They give legal authority and justification for restrictions on the activities of opposition figures, NGOs, business groups, media personnel, media users, and even national assembly members, if they turn too uppity. Many democracies employ some of these legal restrictions, but few have all of them in place, and none that I know of has a constitutional ban on public funding of parties.

Equally worrisome is Chávez's legacy in the Supreme Tribunal, Venezuela's highest court. Most of his appointments went to open "revolutionaries." Loyalty to the ruling party's ideology was a prerequisite for a top position in the courts. This became patently clear when, on the 10th anniversary of the 1999 constitution, the

president of the Supreme Tribunal, Luisa Estella Morales, argued for a change in the constitution to abolish the separation of powers, in line with what Hugo Chávez was accomplishing de facto. In her words: "We cannot continue to think about separation of powers because that is a principle that weakens the state." Leaving aside the paradox of an office-holder advocating for a principle that would essentially undermine the fundamental role of her office, the key point here is that the Supreme Tribunal is no longer informed by the doctrine that it exists to serve as a conduit for social actors and other branches of the state to challenge executive power, but rather, the other way around. While a new president of the Supreme Tribunal, Gladys Gutiérrez, was elected in May, it is unlikely that she will depart from the current doctrine of subordination: she is a member of the ruling party who served twice in Chávez's cabinet.

Conclusion

Chávez left behind both a set of laws and an approach to the rule of law that can be easily used for autocratic rule. While it is true that Chávez did not make full use of many of these laws — Chávez tended to "bark" far harder than he bit — there is no reason to suppose that future presidents will exercise the same restraint, especially if circumstances turn dire. The new electoral symmetry, compounded by the political insecurity felt by President Maduro and the country's declining economy, make it very tempting for the new administration to resort to these instruments.

In fact, as of this writing, Maduro has already begun to move in this direction. As interim president, he imposed new fines on Globovisión, made the exchange rate system more obscure and controlling, and repeatedly said that he was not interested in conciliation. As president, he ordered the arrest of a young U.S. filmmaker, Tim Tracy, for covering the election; backtracked on conducting a full audit of the electoral results; issued stern warnings to the private sector that they are not to engage in politics; and allowed Diosdado Cabello to block the opposition deputies, who were challenging Maduro's electoral victory until the completion of an audit, from speaking

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Venezuelan opposition leader Julio Borges after a fistfight in the Venezuelan parliament, April 2013.

Photo from AFP/Getty Images.

and voting in the legislature. He has also started a legal investigation of Capriles and others in the opposition for "inciting" the violence that took place the day after the election. The Minister of Prisons has said publicly that she has a prison cell ready for Capriles.

My fears could prove wrong. The process of self-reflection that seems to have started within the ruling party could lead to more conciliatory responses. Members of the ruling party — and who knows, maybe even Maduro himself — could conclude that further radicalization of politics (including more belligerence toward the opposition and too much discretion in the hands of the president) are no longer as electorally rewarding as they once were. Most polls in Venezuela suggest that citizens of all stripes are fatigued by the perennial confrontation between the government and the opposition. Times have changed since the heyday of chavismo in the early 2000s, when both sides of the political divide believed that promoting hardline policies toward political rivals was an optimal electoral strategy. After 14 years of semi-civil war, Venezuelans might be feeling tired of it all, and this sentiment alone could explain why Maduro, who campaigned as a hardliner, did poorly in the April elections. These are signs that could induce Venezuelan authorities to ease the confrontation.

Nevertheless, this public fatigue with confrontation still coexists with panic among radical groups within the ruling party. It also coexists with the centrifugal forces within the chavista leadership and rising momentum within the opposition. Panic and centrifugalism are making Maduro feel politically insecure. Maduro could conclude that his best hope for survival is to forcefully counter that panic and centrifugalism rather than worry about public fatigue with confrontation. This could lead to yet another crusade against political infidels, within and without. The fundamental paradox about Venezuela's new symmetry and asymmetries is that they might compel Maduro to launch such a crusade but, at the same time, deny him the advantage needed to prevail.

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VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

"Danger: High Pressure" reads this sign outside the Banaven Center in Caracas.

Photo by Alejandro Forero Cuervo.

Photo courtesy of Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes with Dalina, one of her key Brazilian informants, in 1987.

BRAZIL

No More Angel-Babies on the Alto

by Nancy Scheper-Hughes

It was almost 50 years ago that I first walked to the top of the Alto do Cruzeiro in Timbauba, a sugar-belt town in Pernambuco, Brazil. I was looking for the small mud hut nestled in a cliff where I was to live. It was December 1964, four months after the coup that toppled the left-leaning President João Goulart.

That day in December 1964 marked the beginning of my life's work. Since then, I've experienced something between an obsession, a trauma, and a romance with the shantytown. Residents had thrown together huts made of straw, mud, and sticks, and lacking that, lean-tos made of tin, cardboard, and scrap materials. They threw together families in the same bowdlerized fashion, taking whatever was at hand and making do. Lacking husbands, weekend play fathers did nicely, as long as they brought home the current baby's powdered milk, if not the bacon. Households were temporary, and babies and fathers circulated among them.

In a hillside shantytown without water, electricity, or sanitation and facing food scarcity, epidemics, and police violence, premature death was an everyday occurrence. My assignment was to immunize children, educate midwives, attend births, treat infections, bind up festering wounds, and visit mothers and newborns at home to monitor their health and refer them as needed to the district health post or to the emergency room of the private hospital — owned by the mayor's brother — where charity cases were sometimes attended, depending on the state of local patron-client relations.

I spent several months cycling through the miserable huts on the Alto with a public health medical kit strapped on my shoulder. Its contents were pathetic: a bar of soap,

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Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

The Alto do Cruzeiro.

scissors, antiseptics, aspirin, bandages, a glass syringe, some ampoules of vaccine, several needles, and a pumice stone to sharpen them. Those needles were used over and over again for immunizations. Children ran away when they saw me coming, and well they might.

But what haunted me then, in addition to my own incompetence, was something I did not have the skill or maturity to understand: Why didn't the women of the Alto grieve the deaths of their babies? Why did people, who I knew to have a richly endowed emotional life, not grieve their dead babies? I tucked that question away. But as Winnicott, the British child psychoanalyst liked to say, "Nothing is ever really forgotten." If I had not been traumatized by the seeming indifference of Alto mothers toward some of their infants, I would never have returned, years later, to study the phenomenon.

Sixteen years elapsed before I was able to return to the Alto do Cruzeiro, this time as a medical anthropologist. It was in 1982 — during the period known as the *abertura*, the beginning of the end of the military dictatorship — that I made the first of the four trips that formed the basis for my 1992 book *Death Without Weeping*. My goal was to study women's lives, specifically mother love and child death under conditions so dire that the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano once described the region as a concentration camp for more than 40 million people. It was not a gross exaggeration. Decades of nutritional studies of sugar-cane cutters and their families in Pernambuco showed hard evidence of slow starvation and stunting. These nutritional dwarfs were surviving on a daily caloric intake similar to that of the inmates of the Buchenwald death camp. Life on the Alto resembled prison camp culture, with a moral ethic based on triage and survival.

If mother love is the cultural expression of what many attachment theorists believe to be a bio-evolutionary script, what could this script mean to women living in these conditions? In my sample of three generations of mothers in the sugar plantation zone of Pernambuco, the average woman had 9.5 pregnancies, eight births, and 3.5 infant deaths. This was a classic pre-demographic transition pattern, one in which high fertility was driven by untamed infant and child mortality. The high expectancy of loss and the normalization of infant death was a powerful shaper of maternal attachments.

Mothers and infants could also be rivals for scarce resources. Alto mothers renounced breastfeeding as impossible, as sapping far too much strength from their own "wrecked" bodies. I was once scolded by an Alto

neighbor, "Why grieve the death of infants who barely landed in this world, who were not even conscious of their existence? Weep for us, Nanci, for their mothers, who are condemned to live in order to care for those who do survive."

Scarcity made mother love a fragile emotion, postponed until the newborn displayed a will to live, a taste (*gusto*), and a knack (*jeito*) for life. A high expectancy of death prepared mothers to "let go" of and to hasten the death of de-selected babies by reducing the already insufficient food, water, and care. The angel-babies of the Alto were neither of this earth nor yet fully spirits. In appearance they were ghost-like: pale and wispy haired; their arms and legs stripped of flesh; their bellies grossly distended; their eyes blank and staring; their faces wizened, a cross between startled primate and wise old sorcerer. They were kept at arm's length by their mothers.

The experience of too much loss, too much death, led to a kind of patient resignation that some clinical psychologists might label an "accommodation syndrome" or the symptoms of a "masked depression." But the mothers' resignation was neither pathological nor abnormal. Moreover, it was a moral code. Not only had a continual exposure to trauma obliterated rage and protest, it also minimized attachment so as to diminish sorrow.

Infant death was so commonplace that I recall a birthday party for a four-year-old in which the birthday cake, decorated with candles, was placed on the kitchen table next to the tiny blue cardboard coffin of the child's nine-month-old sibling, who had died during the night. Next to the coffin a single vigil candle was lit. Despite the tragedy, the child's mother wanted to go ahead with the party. "*Parabéns para você,*" we sang, clapping our hands. "Congratulations, good for you!" the Brazilian birthday song goes. And in the Alto it had special resonance: "You survivor you — you lived to see another year!"

Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

A nun rescued this girl, who received free tranquilizers but not food from local authorities.

When Alto mothers cried, they cried for themselves, for those left behind to continue the struggle. But they cried the hardest for their children who had almost died but who surprised everyone by surviving against the odds. Wiping a stray tear from her eye, an Alto mother would speak with deep emotion of the child who, given up for dead, suddenly beat death back, displaying a fierce desire for life. These tough and stubborn children were loved above all others.

Staying alive in the shantytown demanded a kind of egoism that often pits individuals against each other and rewards those who take advantage of those weaker than themselves. People admired toughness and strength; they took pride in babies or adults who were cunning and foxy. The toddler that was wild and fierce was preferred to the quiet and obedient child. Men and women with seductive charm,

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Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

Free baby coffins from the municipal coffin maker, 1982.

who could manipulate those around them, were better off than those who were kind. Poverty doesn't ennoble people, and I came to appreciate what it took to stay alive.

It was never my intention to cast blame on shantytown mothers for putting their own survival above that of their infants. These were moral choices that no person should be forced to make. But the result was that infants were viewed as limitless, a supply of souls that could be constantly re-circulated. There was a kind of magical replaceability about them, similar to what one might find on a battlefield. As one soldier falls, another takes his place. This kind of detached maternal thinking allowed the die-outs of shantytown babies — in some years, as many as 40 percent of all the infants born in the Alto do Cruzeiro died — to pass without shock or profound grief. "Well, it's just a baby," Alto women would say. Here we reach the most deeply protected of all public secrets — the violence of everyday life.

A woman who had lost half her babies told me, "Who could bear it, Nanci, if we are mistaken in believing that God takes our infants to save us from pain? If that is not true, then God is a cannibal. And if our little angels are not in heaven flying around the throne of Our Lady, then where are they, and who is to blame for their deaths?"

If mothers allowed themselves to be attached to each newborn, how could they ever endure their babies' short lives and deaths and still have the stamina to get pregnant and give birth again and again? And they were conscious of this. It wasn't that Alto mothers did not experience mother love at all. They did and with great intensity. Mother love emerged as their children developed strength and vitality. The apex of mother love was not the image of Mary and her infant son, but a mature Mary, grieving the death of her young adult son. The Pietà, not the young mother at the crèche, was the symbol of motherhood and mother love on the Alto do Cruzeiro.

In 2001, I was invited to return to Timbauba to help a new judge and a tough-minded prosecutor identify the more than 100 victims of the death squad I wrote about in *Death Without Weeping*. In the interim, the extermination group, the Guardian Angels, had infiltrated the town council, the mayor's office, and the justice system. Several members of the group had been arrested and were undergoing trial while my husband and I worked with local activists to track down the victims whose relatives had not come forward. Many came from the Alto do Cruzeiro.

During the trip, I played a cat-and-mouse game with the manager of the public records office. I was trying to

assemble a body count of suspicious homicides that could possibly be linked to the death squad, focusing on the violent deaths of street kids and young black men. Since members of the death squad were still at large, I did not want to make public what I was doing. At first, I implied that I was back to count infant and child deaths, as I had so many years before. Finally, I admitted that I was looking into youth homicides. The manager nodded her head, "*Sim, triste*. But," she asked with a shy smile, "haven't you noticed the changes in infant and child deaths?" Once I began to scan the record books, I was wearing a smile, too. Could it be true? Four?

A single afternoon going over infant and toddler death certificates in the registry office was enough to document that something radical had taken place: a revolution in child survival had begun in the 1990s. By 2001, the records showed a completed birth rate of 3.2 children per woman, and a mortality rate of 35 per 1,000 births — a drop from 110 per 1,000 in the 1960s. Subsequent field trips in 2006 and 2008 showed even further reductions. The 2009 data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics recorded 25.2 per 1,000 child deaths for Timbauba.

This could not have happened without a radical transformation of the mothers. Timbauba had experienced what population experts call the demographic or epidemiologic transition. Births and infant deaths had declined so precipitously that it looked like a reproductive workers strike. The numbers — though incomplete — were startling. Rather than the 300+ infant-child mortalities of the mid-to-late 1960s and the 200+ mortalities of the early 1980s, by the late 1990s there were only 38 childhood deaths recorded. And each had a medical cause of death — none was listed as *cause unknown* or simply: *heart stopped, respiration stopped, third-degree malnutrition*, or the mythopoetic: "*acute infantile suffering.*"

Though working on other topics, I interviewed several young women attending a pregnancy class at a newly constructed, government-run clinic. The women I spoke with — some first-time mothers, others expecting a second or third child — were confident in their ability to give birth to a healthy baby. No one I spoke to expected to have, except by accident, more than two children. A pair — that was the goal. Today, young women of the Alto can expect to give birth to three or fewer infants and to see all of them live at least into adolescence. The old stance of maternal watchful waiting accompanied by de-selection of infants viewed as having no "talent" for life had been replaced by a maternal ethos of "holding on" to infants seen as likely to survive. There was still



Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

Street kids targeted by death squads in Timbauba, 1993.

a preference for girl babies. Boys, women feared, could disappoint their mothers — they could kill or be killed as adolescents and young men. The Alto was still a dangerous place, and gangs, drugs, and the death squads were still in operation. But women in the state-run clinic spoke of having control over their reproductive lives in ways that I could not have imagined.

What was happening in Timbauba was part of a national trend in Brazil. Since the 1960s, birth rates and child death rates have plummeted. Over the past decade alone, Brazil's fertility rate has decreased from 2.36 to 1.9 children per family — a number that is below the replacement rate and lower than the United States.

Unlike in China or India, this revolution occurred without state coercion. It was a voluntary transition, long in the making. I recall writing a footnote in *Death Without Weeping* about the most common requests that people made — could I possibly help them obtain false teeth, a pair of eyeglasses, a better antibiotic for a sick child. But most often I was asked — begged — to help women of the Alto arrange a clandestine sterilization. In Northeast Brazil, sterilization was always preferable to oral contraceptives, IUDs, and condoms. Reproductive freedom meant having the children you wanted and

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

Brazilian fertility and child mortality rates (green) approach regional norms. (Source: World Bank.)

then "closing down the factory." "*A fábrica é fechada!*" A woman would boastfully explain, patting her abdomen. Until recently, this was the privilege of the upper-middle classes and the wealthy. Today, tubal ligations can be openly discussed and arranged, often when anticipating a birth by caesarian section.

Many factors came together to produce this reproductive transition. In Brazil, the reproductive revolution is linked to democracy and the coming into political power of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), aided by his formidable wife, the anthropologist and women's advocate, Ruth Cardoso. It was continued by Lula da Silva and, since 2011, by his successor, Dilma Rousseff. President Cardoso fortified the national health-care system with a program of local "health agents" — barefoot doctors who today visit at-risk households, identifying crises, diagnosing common symptoms, and intervening to rescue vulnerable infants and toddlers from premature death.

President Lula's Zero Hunger campaign, though much criticized in the popular media as a kind of political publicity stunt, in fact has supplied basic foodstuffs to the most vulnerable households. The policy of dispensing monthly stipends to poor and single mothers for keeping their children in school has turned elementary school pupils into valuable household "workers," and literacy has increased for both the children and their mothers, who often study at home alongside their children. Women's literacy is the best predictor of lowered birth rates and reduced infant mortality.

Another primary cause of the decline in infant mortality in the shantytowns of Northeast Brazil, however, was the result of a simple municipal public health program: the installation of water pipes reaching nearly all the homes with sufficient clean water. Water = life! It is amazing to observe how culture, beliefs, maternal sentiments, and infant- and child-care practices are transformed — even revolutionized — following basic changes in the material conditions, and therefore the possibilities, of everyday life.

What about the role of the Catholic Church? The anomaly is that, in a nation where the Catholic Church predominates in the public sphere and abortion is still illegal except in the case of rape or to save a mother's life, family size has dropped so sharply over the last two decades that the fertility rate graph resembles a playground slide. What is going on? For one, Brazilian Catholics are independent, much like U.S. Catholics, and they have been going their own way for many years when it comes to women's health and reproductive culture. Others have simply left the Church and joined evangelical churches, some of whom compete with the Catholic Church by announcing their openness to the reproductive rights of women and men. Today, only 60 percent of Brazilians identify as Roman Catholic.

And the Brazilian Catholic Church is itself deeply divided. In 2009, the Archbishop of Recife demanded the excommunication of the doctors and parents of a nine-year-old girl who had an abortion. She had been raped by her stepfather and was carrying twins. The girl's tiny stature and narrow hips put her life in jeopardy. After comparing the abortion to the Holocaust, Archbishop Cardoso Sobrinho told the media that the Vatican rejects believers who pick and choose their moral issues. The Vatican approved — and then revoked — the excommunication of the surgeons, but the damage was done. The result was an immediate decline in church attendance throughout the diocese.

On the other hand, the teachings of liberation theology, while condemned by the late Pope John Paul II, helped dislodge a baroque folk Catholicism that saw God

and the saints as "authorizing" and "blessing" the deaths of angel-babies. During one fieldtrip to Timbauba, I was asked by Padre Orlando — who refused to continue the quaint custom of blessing the bodies of dead infants as they were carried to the municipal graveyard — to give an orientation on family planning to poor women in the Church Hall. When I asked what form of contraception I could teach, the good priest replied, "I'm a celibate priest, how should I know? Teach it all, everything you know." When I reminded him that only the very unpredictable rhythm method was approved by the Vatican, he replied, "Just teach it all, everything you know, and then say, but the Pope only approves the not-so-safe rhythm method."

There is no doubt that when poor women began to think of themselves as capable of deciding how many pregnancies they would have, their sentiments about pregnancy, birth, and infant-tending were radically transformed. Hope and optimism replaced a sense of fate and resignation before God's will. With hope in their hearts, they can now depend on their infants to be few and healthy, and maternal attachment and affections can be released at birth rather than after a year or more of distance and apprehensive waiting.

There are still many problems faced by the people of the Alto do Cruzeiro. Drugs and gangs leave their ugly mark on the community alongside the old diseases that raise their heads from time to time: schistosomiasis, chagas, and even cholera. Death squads have grown and spread; by the first decade of 2000, the extermination groups and their hit men (and women) had become, for all practical purposes, the shadow government of the municipality — its legal, executive, and judicial branches

Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

A health agent makes the climb up the newly paved streets of the Alto do Cruzeiro.

combined. These new features of anti-social life take away some of the pleasure from the gains in infant and child health, as one sees adolescents and young men of the shantytowns, who survived that dangerous first year of life, cut down by bullets and knives at the age of 15 or 17 by local gangs, strongmen, *bandidos,* and local police in almost equal measure.

But the bottom line is that women on the Alto today do not lose their infants. Children go to school rather than to the cane fields, and social cooperatives have taken the place of shadow economies. When mothers are sick or pregnant or a child is ill, they can go to the well-appointed health clinic supported by both state and national funds. There is a safety net, and it is wide, deep, and strong.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes is Chancellor's Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley and the co-founder and director of Organs Watch. She spoke for CLAS on February 25, 2013.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU



Photo by Jeffrey M. Boan/Univision.

President Barack Obama with Univision's national anchors, Jorge Ramos and María Elena Salinas, during the 2012 campaign.

JOURNALISM

A New Vision for Univision

by Steve Fisher

While many sectors of the U.S. media are in limbo or dying, the Univision news division is expanding and developing at an extraordinary rate. In 2010, the company brought in Colombian entrepreneur and investigative journalist Isaac Lee to serve as president of news. Lee believes their decision signaled a change in the vision of the company. "No one hires me to keep things calm or for business as usual," he said at a recent event hosted by the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley. "They hired me because they needed a revolution."

Lee has a history of hard-hitting investigative reporting. By age 27, he was editor-in-chief of Revista Semana, one of Colombia's most respected magazines, where he helped break a story uncovering a government scandal that caused two top officials to resign. Lee then went on to create popular magazines and websites in both Colombia and Mexico, including the lifestyle magazine Soho, the business news magazine PODER, and the news site AnimalPolitico.com. Now at the helm of Univision News, Lee has begun expanding by building a new investigative journalism unit. In addition, he oversaw the network's first town hall meetings with U.S. presidential candidates during the heat of the campaign between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama.

At his presentation, Lee highlighted the growing voting power of Latinos in the U.S., noting that the recent presidential election was a particularly strong example. "No candidate will ever again think that he or she can ignore the Hispanic community," Lee said. "It shows you that we are

not the voiceless anymore, that we are not invisible."

Latino media is one of the fastest growing news sectors in the United States, and advertisers and politicians alike are striving to reach the demographic. Univision captures about 80 percent of the Spanish-language television market, and for more than 70 percent of its viewers, the network is their principal or only source of news. Earlier this year, the company made history when it took fourth place in the February Nielson ratings, edging out NBC. Now, Univision is expanding its focus from a primarily Spanish-speaking audience to second-generation Latinos through a deal with Disney and ABC News to create Fusion, an English-language news and lifestyle network scheduled to go on air in the fall.

According to Lee, no other major news outlet has succeeded in attracting this growing, English-speaking Latino demographic. Second- and third-generation Latinos "have a huge cultural connection to family, to their roots, to the food, and to the music," he said. "And we found there was a void there." With Fusion, Univision is no longer just about television. They plan to expand into interactive multimedia, data visualization, and, perhaps most importantly, mobile content. For many young Latinos, the digital screen is quickly becoming the first place they turn to for news. "We are not going to change a cultural trend," he said. "We are adapting the content to it."

Univision was founded by the Mexican TV conglomerate Televisa, but the two companies have since become more independent. During the recent Mexican elections, Televisa was scrutinized by international outlets for what was said to be favorable press towards now-president Enrique Peña Nieto. The Mexican news network currently owns a 24.9-percent share in Univision — the maximum a foreign company can invest in a U.S. media outlet. The two companies recently extended a deal to broadcast Televisa-produced *telenovelas* on Univision's channels. When asked if coverage of Mexican politics is affected by Televisa's stake in the company, Lee said it isn't. "I have never received a call from anyone from Televisa asking for anything," he said, adding that he never expects them to contact him regarding news content. The same goes for ABC News.

When asked how Univision balances serving the Latino community with remaining an objective news service, Lee said his company seeks the improvement of the Latino community, and they report news with an angle that serves their audience. For example, he said they reported the recent Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting just as any other network would, only they gave particular attention to Victoria Soto, a Latina teacher who died saving the lives of her 16 students. Similarly, with the shooting that nearly killed Congresswoman Gabby Giffords, they also focused heavily on her Latino aide who was shot dead at the scene. Lee said this approach is often construed as bias but countered that the company seeks to report news that is of interest to the Latino community.

Lee was also asked if Univision plans to expand beyond the Latino audience to other immigrant communities in the United States. While acknowledging that Univision's content may be of interest to others, he stressed that his team is focused on creating content for the population they know best: Latinos.

Isaac Lee is the president of news at Univision Communications Inc. He spoke for the Graduate School of Journalism on February 13, 2013.

Steve Fisher is a student at UC Berkeley's Graduate School of Journalism.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

Isaac Lee at Berkeley, February 2013.

Photo by Megan Kang.

Main Street, Shenandoah, Pennsylvania.
Photo by David Turnley.

FILM

A Melting Pot Boils Over

by Erica Hellerstein

Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, is a small town with a few defining details.

A lonely pastry shop stacked with empty trays. An iron-clawed bulldozer chipping away at an iconic old church. A misty pink sunrise huddled between the hills. A bustling Mexican restaurant, and a man in a T-shirt that says: "I'm American, so I speak English."

This is the economically depressed town that Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer David Turnley brings to life in his documentary, "Shenandoah." In many ways, Shenandoah feels like quintessential small-town America, with residents' fierce pride and enthusiasm for local happenings like the high-school football game and the Christmas parade, where Santa Claus parachutes in from a plane. Once a thriving coal-mining town built by Italian, Polish, and Irish immigrants, Shenandoah has been hit hard by the recession and industrial decline. Most recently, Mexican and Latino immigrants have begun settling there in search of farm and factory work.

But something has gone terribly wrong in Shenandoah. Turnley doesn't reveal this immediately, but he hints at it, with evocative sound bites, ominous music, and lingering pans of the town. Through bits and pieces, we eventually learn about a fatal attack in which four star high-school football players fell upon Luis Ramírez, a 25-year-old farmhand from Mexico.

One evening after a football game, the boys stumbled drunkenly into a neighborhood playground, where one

of them began talking to a girl. At some point, Ramírez came out and yelled something at the boys in Spanish. They responded with profanity and racial slurs and then rushed toward him, knocking him to the ground and dealing football-trained blows that would later result in Ramírez's death. After the last kick was pounded into Ramírez's head, the boys darted down the dark street and fled the scene. Later, they seemed to come out unscathed — both from harm and from conviction, as local police attempted to cover up the crime. Ramírez's death wasn't widely publicized, and town business proceeded as usual. That is, until Gladys Limón of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund became involved. The California-based civil-rights attorney read a brief summary of the incident online and decided she had to go to Pennsylvania. Limón was adamant that the case get a proper hearing. Her visit led to a media firestorm and discussion about immigration, recession, and racism in the hardscrabble town and beyond. And Turnley was there to document it all.

But the film is less about the tragedy and ensuing trial and much more about Shenandoah itself — and the forces within the town that gave rise to such a complex act of rage. There is something vaguely Shakespearian in the plot and its unsettling moral ambiguity. Nothing is black and white. The boys didn't crouch in a dark basement for weeks on end, plotting a devious hate crime. Somehow, it just happened. And the senselessness of it all is what's so difficult to grapple with: there's no conspiracy, no war, no gang-driven battle. It's not clear where their blind, white-hot fury came from, or what propelled them to kick Ramírez until his chest heaved and his breath came out in slow, painful rattles. And even more troubling is the overwhelming denial by so many town residents of what really happened — despite clear evidence linking the boys to Ramírez's death.

Brian Scully, one of the four boys, describes what he felt when he lunged at Ramírez: it was "emptiness. I didn't even care. I didn't even worry about him at that time." As the film progresses, Turnley documents the evolution of Scully's thoughts and feelings, from a frigid, impassive understanding of the events to an awareness of the lives he affected outside of his own. "I started to think about Luis as a person," Scully acknowledges later in the film. "He has a family; he has kids." Of all the football players, Scully is the only one intimately interviewed. And so, his perspective colors the film. It's through his eyes that we begin to see the enormity of his action register internally. He seems to tiptoe towards this comprehension in a particularly compelling scene. He's sitting in a chair in his room, squinting at his computer screen and reading the "comments" thread of an article about the trial. "How could this happen?" someone wrote. "Those kids are monsters," replied another. Scully slowly reads the excerpts aloud, deadpan, and vulnerable. Perhaps, for the first time, the wheels are turning.

Photo by David Turnley.

Luis Ramírez's fiancée, Crystal Dillman, with his photo after his death.

There are other, deeply moving moments in the film, such as the scene in which we see Ramírez's fiancée, Crystal, for the first time. She is gazing at a framed picture of herself and Ramírez. "Dada!" her son squeals as his chubby hand excitedly smacks the glass covering the photo. "Dada!" There are also acts of uncommon courage: one eyewitness to the beating — a retired Philadelphia policewoman — publicly calls it murder and faces ostracism from many in the town.

But there are less redemptive moments as well. There's the blind rage and xenophobia of some — but not all — of the town's residents. "He got what he deserved," and "USA!" chants an American flag-toting crowd at a protest about the trial. "I don't think he deserved to die," a woman announces into the microphone, "but Luis Ramírez would have been alive today if he stayed in his own country!"

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But more than anything, Turnley's intentioned shots tell the story of a tight-knit but decaying town — where craggy old men lean up against storefronts musing about the fate of a place that was "just like a little New York City in the 1950s" — and the racism that can fester below the surface and explode into violence during hard economic times.

Many of the same themes came up in a discussion with Turnley after the CLAS screening of the film. He shared the stage with Berkeley Law professor Maria Echaveste and Harley Shaiken, chair of the Center for Latin American Studies. They talked about Turnley's motivations for making the documentary, as well as their own takes on the events that took place in the film.

"In the family that I come from," Turnley explained, "when Dr. King was assassinated in 1968, my three brothers and sisters and I were in a movie theater, and my parents came and got us and took us home. And when we got home, my mother said 'We didn't come to get you tonight because we were worried about what might happen to you. We came to get you because we feel like someone in our own family was killed tonight.' And that's the kind of family that I came from."

Turnley's political sensibilities — coupled with a crushed dream of playing pro football — eventually led him to photography. "What I saw in photographs was finally what made sense to me. What is equal is human dignity," he said to a packed crowd. "That's something you can't buy and no one can take away from you."

Echaveste, too, shared her remarks. "As history has shown over and over again, fear and anxiety strike a chord too often in us that leads us to lash out at the stranger among us."

It was a comment that resonated with many in the audience.

David Turnley is the director of "Shenandoah." He, Maria Echaveste, a professor at the Berkeley Law School, and Harley Shaiken, the chair of the Center for Latin American Studies, spoke after the CLAS screening of the film on April 29, 2013.

Erica Hellerstein is a student in the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

Gladys Limón speaks at a press conference.

Photo by David Turnley

SHENANDOAH

photographs of the town and its people by

David Turnley


Yuengling



Photo from Getty Images.

The soy harvest in Correntina, Brazil.

CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA

Problems or Possibilities?

by Julie Klinger

When it comes to the evolving relationship between China and Latin America, speculation abounds. China is perceived as an alternative to U.S. hegemony in the region, a fierce economic competitor displacing Latin American industries, and a neo-imperial power whose industries are gobbling up Latin American commodities with little regard for environmental and labor protections. In fact, none of these statements are necessarily true. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the data tell a different story.

The importance of having good data was a common theme at the special panel discussion "China and Latin America: Perceptions, Problems, and Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. While the panelists affirmed that China's trade and investment in the region is driven by the Asian giant's hunger for primary commodities to fuel its booming economy, each offered a careful analysis of the common tropes surrounding China as the next global superpower.

Much has been made of the global shift in power precipitated by China's rise. Theories of an emergent multipolar world order, demonstrated by China's bilateral trade agreements with countries of the global south, have proliferated in recent years. But Carol Wise, an associate professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, has a different view. Based on her analysis of the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that China signed with Chile and Peru, respectively, Wise notes that

much more was expected than was delivered. The FTAs between China and Latin American countries *do* represent a shift in the general dynamics of global trade agreements since the 1990s, when most tended to be agreements between the global north and global south. In contrast, China's FTAs with Latin American countries are classified by the WTO as South–South agreements. Diplomatic discourses from both China and Latin America have emphasized this character of their cooperation.

But there's a twist. Although these FTAs are technically classified as South–South agreements, they follow the trade patterns of North–South agreements, with Latin America exporting primary commodities to China, and China exporting industrial goods to Latin America. This dynamic is not at all what Latin American countries were expecting when they entered into these agreements. Both Chile and Peru were hoping to diversify their exports and attract investment in non-mining sectors. According to Wise, even top Latin American negotiators were convinced that deepening trade relations with China would provide their countries with the opportunity to break free from the traditional comparative advantage relationships that have characterized their exports to North America and Europe. So, although the FTAs are only in their first decade, disappointment runs deep.

Wise suggested that China's incentive for entering into FTAs with Peru and Chile had very little to do with gaining access to those countries' markets — they are negligible, she said, relative to China's other export markets. Rather, China entered into these agreements for political and strategic reasons. Indeed, China accepted more than 150 export restrictions on certain products that are "sensitive" in the Chilean market, such as shoes, appliances, and agricultural commodities. Why China would agree to so many restrictions on a putative Free Trade Agreement can perhaps be explained by diplomatic strategy. China is looking to mitigate trade conflicts and offset anti-dumping complaints that have arisen in recent years with its Latin American counterparts and, of course, to cultivate a friendly environment for ongoing investment in the sizable mining sectors of Chile and Peru.

The FTAs also touch on another hot topic in China–Latin America relations: the question of trade. Barry Eichengreen, a professor of Economics and Political Science at UC Berkeley, presented findings on trade, foreign direct investment, and export competition between the two regions. While the popular discourse tends to sound the alarm over fierce competition from China, Eichengreen and colleagues found that the picture is much more nuanced: "Whether China's emergence is good or bad news for you depends on who you are and what you export." Unfortunately for Latin American industries, China's growing consumer population seems more interested in European cars and luxury brands than in Latin American goods.

While China's economic rise has had a negative impact on Latin American exports of consumer goods to other countries, it has had a positive impact on exports of capital goods, commodities, and energy. As far as economists are concerned, that is good news because it demonstrates a continued rise in China's outward investment, which means new opportunities, jobs, and economic growth for recipient countries. The caveats lie in how effectively Chinese firms adhere to local labor and environmental protection regulations.

Indeed, Chinese firms have come under fire for labor exploitation and environmental degradation in their overseas operations. Encouraging China to adopt international environmental and social safety standards has been a *cause celebre* for Western development organizations for nearly a decade. The concern — and the conventional wisdom — has been that, given China's dismal domestic environmental and labor safety record, Chinese firms could hardly be expected to employ better practices abroad. But according to Margaret Myer, director of the China and Latin America Program at The Inter-American Dialogue, even the most despised Chinese firms in Latin America abide by local labor and environmental regulations at least as often as their U.S. and Canadian counterparts.

For Myer, this demonstrates the growing professionalization of China's overseas firms. In contrast to previous years, they are investing significant sums in legal, public relations, and advertising firms to advise them on local markets and social conditions. This approach demonstrates a significant shift from the early days of China's "Going Out" strategy and, perhaps more importantly, challenges Western development organizations to rethink their priorities when it comes to mitigating the social and environmental costs of multinational extractive industries. Chinese firms can no longer be scapegoated, at least not in contexts where multiple international firms are engaged in mining activities, as in Peru.

Although the panelists focused on different aspects of China–Latin America relations, each uncovered problems with the conventional wisdom. Myer noted that Chinese firms are themselves advocating for greater transparency in their overseas dealings, suggesting that progress in this arena could potentially outpace Beijing's efforts at home. The relationship between China's domestic and

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international policies is both complex and consequential for Latin American countries. With China's growing domestic consumption, everyone wants a piece of the Chinese market. Wise advised prudence, predicting that China's growing domestic demand will not be for Peruvian or Chilean manufactured goods. In fact, while the FTAs have brought disappointing results for the Latin American side, trade has increased significantly between Peru and Chile over the same period, leading Wise to propose that the two countries worry less about trade with China and focus on their own bilateral relationship. Eichengreen concluded with a sobering reminder that China's economy will not grow at its recent pace forever, noting that "all fast-growing economies slow down eventually."

The greatest obstacle to smooth relations between China and Latin America lie in persistent mutual misunderstandings. Although university students on both sides of the Pacific are studying each other's languages, cultures, and economies, a generational lag in expertise continues to complicate political and economic relations. The costs, in the meantime, may include excessive risk-taking, missed opportunities, and oversimplification. In the face of improving research and growing empirical evidence, relying on the conventional wisdom is increasingly untenable. Indeed, this is true not just for China–Latin America relations, but also for the U.S. and Europe as they grapple with the 21st-century world order.

The panel "China and Latin America: Perceptions, Problems, and Opportunities" was held on February 12, 2013. Panelists included Carol Wise, associate professor of International Relations, University of Southern California; Barry Eichengreen, professor of Economics and Political Science at UC Berkeley; and Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America Program at The Inter-American Dialogue. The panel was moderated by Harley Shaiken, professor of Geography and Education and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley.

Julie Klinger is a Ph.D. candidate in Geography at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

The port of Santos, Brazil.

Photo courtesy of the Program for Accelerated Growth PAC.

Photo by Otávio Nogueira.

People like this elderly couple are the beneficiaries of some of Brazil's social programs.

SOCIAL POLICY

Weaving a Stronger Safety Net

by Wendy Hunter

Following the structural adjustment that Latin American economies underwent in the 1980s and 90s, social policies aimed at reducing poverty and enhancing equity assumed heightened importance. Economic recovery, technocratic initiatives, and the competitive dynamic of democracy itself led administrations from across the political spectrum to address longstanding social deficits. The policies adopted differ significantly from those of preceding periods. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and non-contributory pension programs are prominent among the social policy innovations that have helped to decrease poverty and increase equity in the past decade.

Motivated by the twin goals of poverty alleviation and human capital development, CCTs involve the direct transfer of money from the state to families (generally to mothers) conditional upon their children attending school regularly and receiving basic preventative health care. Often such programs also require that expectant mothers receive prenatal care and have trained attendants present at birth. Noncontributory pensions, on the other hand, are crucial for keeping people from falling into indigence in old age. Given the sizable number of Latin Americans who labor their entire lives in the informal sector, have not paid into a pension system, and cannot even prove the number of years they have worked, noncontributory pensions are an important new type of social protection. In many countries, they represent an especially important safety net for women, who often spend their working lives toiling as domestic servants, small-holding agriculturalists, or in other jobs located outside the formal economy.

Conditional cash transfers and noncontributory pensions differ in key ways from the standard policies of Latin American welfare states during the

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Image from Wikimedia Commons.

Propaganda featuring then-president Getúlio Vargas from Brazil's "Estado Novo" (New State) period, 1938-1945.

period of import-substitution industrialization and the subsequent era of economic stabilization and liberalization. The welfare states of the 1930s and 40s focused coverage almost exclusively on (mostly male) urban workers in the formal sectors of the economy. Later, in the aftermath of the debt crises of the 1980s and during the unfolding of market reforms in the 1990s, coverage was extended to the poor but only to the most vulnerable individuals within that segment, that is, those living in extreme poverty. Today, income transfers offer protection to a much broader segment of the population. Due to the persistence of high levels of informality in Latin American economies, both types of income subsidies offer an important safety net for sizeable numbers of poor people in the region.

The roll-out of conditional cash transfers and noncontributory pensions in the last two decades has been marked. Between 1989 and 2010, the governments of 17 Latin American countries introduced conditional income transfers. Most of them are means tested: eligibility rests on families offering proof of their low-income status. This is the case with the two best-known examples of CCTs in the region: Brazil's Bolsa Família and Mexico's Opportunidades. Bolivia's Bono Juancito Pinto is distinctive in being universal, although a large share of the population would pass a poverty means test if required to do so.

Brazil led the way in non-contributory pensions. In 1997, the country's democratic government established the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC) for destitute elders and the disabled. The program improved upon one begun under the preceding military regime. Over the next 10 years, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay adopted some form of a non-contributory pension scheme. As with CCT programs, most non-contributory pension systems are means tested. For example, Brazil's well-known BPC is available to only the poorest of the poor. Bolivia's Renta Dignidad is an exception: it entitles all elderly Bolivians to a minimum pension.

To date, economists and political scientists have investigated many of the more concrete outcomes associated with these programs. For example, in addition to analyzing how much CCTs contribute to diminishing poverty and income inequality, researchers have sought to determine the extent to which cash transfers lead to greater uptake of basic education and health services, less child labor, better child nutrition, and increased acquisition of birth certificates, which are required for every member of the family in the application process. Political scientists have also investigated the credit-claiming game that politicians have engaged in around CCTs and the political dividends that such programs have paid to presidential candidates and their parties at election time.

While these subjects are clearly important, there are a number of potential impacts of the new social assistance programs that have been investigated less thoroughly, if at all. Though more difficult to study and quantify, these are crucial

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People waiting to register for Brazil's Bolsa Familia program.

Photo by Mason Hiatt.

questions to pursue nonetheless. Scholars in disciplines that go beyond economics and political science have a key role to play in this regard. Anthropology and sociology are obvious disciplinary arenas for such work. The following are some of the issues that warrant further research.

Changing relations within the family: The infusion of new income into an income-deprived family can be expected to have some effect on family dynamics. An impact on family structure would be expected especially if a steady and consistent stream of funds were introduced and if the amount made up a large percentage of the family's overall income. In the case of CCTs, the mother of the family is generally the recipient of the program. In most countries, she receives the funds directly through a debit card in her name. It might, therefore, be anticipated that this would enhance her status and power in the family relative to the children's father and sometimes even to the children themselves, especially when they are adolescents. Few systematic studies have been carried out to ascertain whether this is indeed the case or the conditions under which it holds. Similarly, elders who receive non-contributory pensions are likely to become less dependent on their children. In some instances, they may even end up supporting their children and grandchildren. There are several potential consequences of this change in care relations in the home, which in turn impact who enters the labor market and under what conditions.

Social inclusion and political participation: One broad set of questions to be explored concerns whether and to what extent such programs lead to a heightened sense of social inclusion among beneficiaries. Given that many Latin American governments have historically paid negligible attention to the informal-sector poor, do recipients of the new income transfers — once among the most marginalized members of society — feel more included by contemporary democratic governments? Are they more likely to feel that these governments care about and respond to people like them? If so, what are the political implications? For example, does democracy gain legitimacy in the eyes of the poor? In countries where voting is not obligatory, are program beneficiaries more likely to be engaged in politics and vote with greater regularity, similar to how Social Security in the United States brings people, especially senior citizens, to the polls? Is a heightened inclination to vote associated with feelings of greater political efficacy? Questions concerning social inclusion and political participation represent a promising path to pursue in future research.

Social provisioning as a right: Present-day governments tend to cast the new social assistance schemes in the discourse of rights and entitlements rather than in the language of patronage and clientelism. The programs themselves tend to be run in a highly bureaucratic manner: for the most part, decision-making over who receives the funds takes into account objective rather than political criteria. Furthermore, in most cases, the way that funds are distributed minimizes the role of local political discretion and maximizes the possibility that the money will get to the recipients. This represents a significant change in a region where social provisioning to the destitute has occurred largely in the form of "hands-outs" by politicians who held patronage hostage to votes at election time. Yet, even if the design of social assistance programs has changed, do recipients understand these welfare state advances in terms of modern rights or traditional favors? Do recipients still think there is a "quid pro quo" expectation, that is, that they need to reward the incumbent at the polls or suffer recrimination? Or, have more rights-based norms and conceptions of social programs as entitlements begun to take hold? If Latin Americans begin to think of social programs as rights rather than as favors, the relevance of the current social assistance programs may extend to more bottom-up demand making from key societal actors down the road.

Leaving debt behind: Ethnographic accounts suggest that income subsidies have helped poor people, especially those in remote rural areas, come out from under the personal debts they have traditionally held with local store owners and suppliers of crucial inputs. As the literature in anthropology and political science has amply demonstrated, debt is a source of tremendous vulnerability for individuals and families alike and is often handed down from one generation to the next. Paying off one's debts and remaining free from future debt — especially if it is held with local elites who have a virtual monopoly over goods and services — would seem to be a significant step forward in the life chances of people who reside in isolated interior regions of the country. Stated more positively, having newfound consumption power would seem to elevate the social standing of poor people in such settings, with untold positive multiplier effects stemming from that fact alone. Exploring the consequences of new state sources of income against the history of debt peonage to local providers could be the basis of another research agenda.

Interaction with state services: The conditions stipulated by CCTs — that recipient families make sure their children attend school on a regular basis and receive basic health care — may encourage Latin Americans to interact with the state and utilize a greater range of

services than they would otherwise. Notwithstanding the arguments against conditionality, which revolve around giving state agents too much power and paternalistic authority over program recipients, there are positive consequences that may potentially result from the interactions that these conditions induce. Social workers as well as education and health providers connected with CCTs have observed that when recipients step into schools and clinics — even if those first steps are induced by the requirements of the CCT program — their confidence grows along with their awareness of the range of other services available.

Coming out of isolation and having more contact with supportive service providers seems to encourage some people to take advantage of further opportunities to enhance their life chances. For example, the fact that a mother takes her children to the health clinic may well make her more likely to pursue basic medical care for herself, something that impoverished women often don't do for a variety of reasons. While anecdotal evidence suggests that this dynamic is sometimes at work, more systematic studies are needed to trace recipients' steps and see whether those who were previously reluctant to utilize available services come to do so as a result of income support. Ideally, state authorities would respond to such increased demand with efforts to improve the quantity, as well as the quality, of social services.

Conditional cash transfers and noncontributory pensions represent an important pillar in the new paradigm of social protection in Latin America. No doubt their impact goes well beyond the immediate poverty relief they provide. Conceivably, their long-term consequences may include putting program recipients into a stronger position within the family, the political sphere, and society. The state's discourse around such programs, and the details of program design, most likely influence the full impact they end up having. In any event, future research across various disciplines is necessary to shed light on the wider impacts of the new social assistance programs. There is much room and reason to go forth with such studies.

Wendy Hunter is a professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. She spoke for CLAS on April 16, 2013.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff announces an expansion of Brazil's social safety net in Irecê, Bahia, 2011.

Photo courtesy of Secom Bahia.

Photo courtesy of Paul Wise.

A tough environment for raising healthy children in the highlands of Guatemala.

HEALTHCARE

Health and Justice in High-Conflict Areas

Dr. Paul Wise opened his CLAS talk by admitting that the story he was about to tell is not new. On the screen in front of him, two photos were juxtaposed: one of a child looking very ill and one of her home, a decrepit shack that does nothing to protect her from the inclemency of the weather. Perhaps even more serious than the physical instability of the child's home is its political precariousness, situated as it is in one of the world's most unstable regions. This situation — "the juxtaposition of multiple serious clinical problems and a setting of profound material deprivation" as Wise described it — exemplifies the challenges that still face those seeking to improve global child health.

Historical Context

For decades now, the developed world has been looking for ways to help developing countries. International aid has traditionally focused on women and children, who generally are regarded as vulnerable and innocent victims of poverty, violence, and war. In his talk, Wise described the various approaches to maternal and child health that the international community has adopted over the years. In the 1960s and 70s, child and maternal health was viewed as dependent on economic development; and as a result, international aid took the form of economic assistance and, on occasion, humanitarian relief for natural disasters. Some critics, however, deemed these kinds of interventions incomplete and called for more health-related, technical interventions.

In this context, the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) launched the Campaign for Child Survival based on the GOBI strategy (Growth monitoring, Oral rehydration therapy, Breastfeeding, and Immunization). The GOBI strategy was a focused, technical intervention

designed to produce quick and significant improvements in child health. Despite the initiative's success, there was a pushback in the 1990s from child advocates who regarded this approach as too narrow and unable to deal with issues that require fundamental social change, such as child labor or child soldiers. The United Nations again led the way, adopting the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. Since then, the convention has been ratified by 192 countries — with the notable exception of the United States. Even though the convention has been regarded as a major step toward the wellbeing of children everywhere, deep concern remained that a focus on social reform tended to diminish technical efforts that respond directly to the fact that 70 percent of all child deaths are preventable. This tension in global child health — between social interventions and technical interventions, between social science and medicine, between lawyers and doctors — has persisted throughout the years. Paul Wise tries to overcome these tensions and marry the two in a new, integrated approach.

The Framework

Dr. Wise proposes a simple framework: any disparity in health outcomes can be explained either by differential underlying risk status or by differential access to effective interventions. At the center of these two concepts is the efficacy of the intervention. The more effective the intervention, the more important equitable access to that intervention is in determining a population's health status. The framework's very simplicity is controversial. Wise noted that it does not include words like "social determinants," "prevention," or "primary care." For him, as long as the intervention is effective, it should be provided equitably to all those in need. Period.

Wise's experience working in tumultuous settings has informed his framework. Those in regions at war, or recovering from war, not only have increased mortality due to direct effects like violence, but also due to indirect effects such as precarious living conditions and crumbling healthcare infrastructure. As the efficacy of medical interventions grows, so too grows the moral burden on our global community to provide those interventions — especially when they will save children's lives. In this manner, efficacy and justice are inextricably linked since, as Wise says, the "non-provision of a highly efficacious intervention is unjust." Based on this framework, Wise has devoted his life to developing an approach that will improve child health in areas of unstable governance through integrated political and technical strategies.

Implementing the Framework in Guatemala

Wise has been working in the highland area of Guatemala since the early 1970s, a region devastated by a 46-year civil war that claimed more than 200,000 lives and left 10 times that number disabled. The indirect effects of the civil war are estimated to be even larger. This is particularly true in the indigenous highlands, where recovery has been slow, and infant mortality rates are still high.

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Child mortality in high-conflict regions has persistently been higher than expected.



Chart courtesy of Paul Wise.

Photo courtesy of Paul Wise.

A local community health promoter working in Guatemala.

As part of Stanford University's Children in Crisis initiative, Wise has spent many years working with local people and Stanford students in San Lucas Tolimán, an area surrounded by volcanoes in the middle of "coffee-country." The goal of the program is to link "lifesaving child health interventions with the essential political requirements for providing them in the real world." In Guatemala, this goal has been translated into a program that trains local volunteers to be *promotores* (health promoters) and schedules regular visits from Wise and Stanford students to support much-needed healthcare services for the local population. The promotores not only provide basic care and health education, they also frequently become community organizers.

The integration of health-service provision and community organization helped support an effort to engage the community, the Catholic Church, and the government to build new houses and get local people titles to the homes. These efforts resulted in the new owners investing in infrastructure such as latrines and roofing. Wise highlighted these results to show how social and health interventions can go hand in hand.

The assertion that health and social interventions are mutually reinforcing can sometimes be met with resistance: some argue that medical interventions are just a band-aid that can't heal the wounds of social exclusion and oppression, while those in the health sector focus on technical interventions that can prevent or treat clinical diseases. The former argue that what really needs to be addressed are the "upstream" determinants of health, such as education, discrimination, and social class. The latter maintain that while these concerns warrant attention, there is great potential to improve health through the provision of highly effective technical interventions, such as immunizations and antibiotics. Wise argues that these positions must give way to an integrated strategy that recognizes that both fundamental determinants and life-saving technical capacity are tied to social justice and improved outcomes. "The death of any child is always a tragedy," he said, "but the death of any child from preventable causes is always unjust."

Although these perspectives have been validated by years of research, Wise makes a compelling argument that an integrated approach emphasizes the need to develop strategies that can improve maternal and child health in areas long plagued by inadequate or unstable governance. For this reason, Wise advocates for intense cross-disciplinary interaction between health experts, political scientists, and local community development workers in collective efforts to improve health services in areas of

political unrest. "The majority of young child deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are occurring in places where most NGOs won't go," he said.

While groups such as Doctors Without Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provide critical health services in conflict areas, there may be a paucity of services once the active fighting is over. In contrast, Children in Crisis is not only concerned with health services in war zones but also in service provision in the years after the conflict is over, when poor governance and political instability may still persist. In addition, humanitarian organizations such as MSF often remain politically neutral in order to gain access to high-conflict areas, while the initiatives of concern to the Children in Crisis project focus explicitly on developing political strategies that permit essential health interventions.

The Future

The Children in Crisis program has been concerned with multiple geographic regions — from Zimbabwe to Eastern Congo, from the West Bank and Gaza to the *favelas* of Brazil. One of the main objectives of the program is to extend its reach to all children trapped in conflict areas and to help identify the political and health strategies that will prevent whatever modern medicine can prevent. Dr. Wise hopes that his program can be expanded to every place where there is political unrest.

It would be extremely interesting to see the Children in Crisis project advance the development of a research agenda that evaluates any programmatic successes that have occurred in areas of civil unrest and unstable governance. Since the pot of money to be distributed is limited — foreign aid represents less than 1 percent of the federal budget in the United States — and so many women and children continue to die from preventable causes in areas of political instability, there must be a serious reevaluation of the way health aid is distributed throughout the world.

Paul Wise is the Richard E. Behrman Professor of Child Health and Society and a professor of Pediatrics at Stanford University's School of Medicine. He is also a senior fellow at the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He spoke for CLAS on March 11, 2013.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

This young girl benefitted from the efforts of the Children in Crisis program.

Photos courtesy of Paul Wise.

Photo by Andre Deak.

Piqueteros burn tires during a 2001 protest in Buenos Aires.

DEMOCRACY

Economic Roots for Unstable Regimes

by Belén Fernández Milmanda

Latin America's young democracies present an interesting puzzle: while their party systems display high levels of instability, their political regimes have proven to be much more stable than expected. Unlike in the past, social unrest has not led to military intervention. Despite the meltdown of their representative institutions, Latin American societies have dealt with their crises within the limits of democracy. In other words, the crisis of the party system has not translated into a crisis of the democratic regimes.

This puzzle can be illustrated with survey data from Latinobarómetro. In 2011, while 58 per-cent of Latin American citizens thought that democracies were preferable to dictatorships, only 22 percent of them trusted political parties. When asked about their partisan identity, only 44 percent of respondents felt attached to a specific party. Unsurprisingly, electoral volatility is very high in Latin America and has been increasing in recent years. Electoral volatility measures the difference in votes that parties gain in different elections. In other words, it evaluates the ability of political parties to retain social support over time. According to 2010 data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, average electoral volatility in Latin America was 26.8 percent. However, this high overall score conceals important differences between countries. In fact, while some countries such as Honduras and Chile presented volatility indexes lower than 10 percent, other countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru showed scores above 40 percent. Although the general picture in Latin America is one of partisan de-alignment and low institutionalization, two very different stories can be told depending on which countries we look at. One group — Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela — has seen its party systems collapse, with the popular

vote switching massively to new outsider figures, while other countries (like Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) have experienced party system consolidation. Looking at these cases raises the question: How can we explain this variation in the trajectories of Latin American democracies?

Kenneth Roberts, a professor of Government at Cornell University, argues that the answer lies in Latin America's period of market reforms. While all countries in Latin America adopted significant market reforms in the 1980s and 90s, the impact of those reforms on the political system varied greatly across countries. Inspired by the work of political scientists David and Ruth Collier and their conception of critical junctures, Roberts maintains that the process of market reforms was both an economic and a political watershed in the region. The way in which this shift from a state-led to a market-led development model was implemented had long-term consequences for the region's political systems. These consequences can be seen in: (a) the relative stability of the political system after the implementation of market reforms; (b) how political opposition to market liberalization was expressed; and (c) the nature of the shift to the left that followed the implementation of market reforms. The key factors shaping these different political outcomes were: (a) the partisan identities of those in charge of implementing market reforms; and (b) the existence of a leftist opposition to reform. In other words, the extent to which a country's party system was aligned around the process of market liberalization explains the different paths that Latin American political systems took. The contrasting trajectories of Argentina and Brazil illustrate this argument well.

In Argentina, the party conducting the shift to market-led development — the Peronists, a labor-based party — had historically supported a strong state. Its conversion to neoliberalism had a de-aligning effect on Argentina's political system. The Peronist Party took over the right of the ideological space, marginalizing existing conservative parties. On the other side of the cleavage, Argentina's left had long been weak, and as a result, opposition to market reforms could not be channeled through partisan entities, at least during the period in which the reforms were being implemented. When the consequences of neoliberalism on the Argentine economy and labor market became evident, the political opposition to them was headed by the *piqueteros*, a very disruptive movement of the unemployed. Social mobilization against neoliberal adjustment increased hand-in-hand with economic hardships and ultimately led, in 2001 to the meltdown of the entire party system. Once again, it was a transformation within the Peronist party that put an end to the political crisis, inaugurating Argentina's left turn. Responding to the social backlash against neoliberalism, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner's

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Perceptions of the government's economic role and responsibilities in Latin America and the United States.



(Data from AmericasBarometer 2008.)

governments adopted a series of heterodox economic polices leaning toward a state-led development model.

In Brazil, market reforms were implemented by a center-right alliance, led by the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) and contested electorally by the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party, PT). Therefore, in contrast to Argentina, opposition to market reforms had a partisan expression. Campaigning against neoliberalism, the PT's leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former union leader, tried to channel social discontent with market reforms in his first four bids for the presidency. His win in 2002 began Brazil's move to the left, which was less radical than that of Argentina. Although Lula adopted a more redistributive social policy than his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso, he continued with Cardoso's orthodox macro-economic policy.

In sum, the political effects of neoliberalism varied widely in Latin America depending on the political orientation of the government implementing the market reforms. Roberts identifies two main patterns. On the one hand, "bait-and-switch" reforms adopted by populist or leftist leaders created a legacy of electoral volatility that led to the demise of historic conservative parties and the outflanking of traditional populist parties by more radical outsiders. In the long run, the shift to the left in these countries was more radical, characterized by a dramatic turn towards a state-led economy. In contrast, market reforms that were adopted by conservative leaders and opposed by a major leftist rival led to stable patterns of electoral competition and reinforced existing party systems. In these countries, the left turn was milder, with leftist governments sticking to economic orthodoxy.

Roberts' analysis invites us to evaluate the long-term effects of market reforms beyond the economic realm. The way in which the shift to a market economy was implemented was not only important for its effect on the economic development and social structure of Latin American countries but also for its impact on the political systems of these young democracies. Fifteen years after their implementation, market reforms still shape political life in Latin America.

Kenneth Roberts is a professor of Government at Cornell University. He spoke for CLAS on February 28, 2013.

Belén Fernández Milmanda is a graduate fellow of CONICET Argentina and a research assistant at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

A woman carries a fake pig at a protest against neoliberal economic policy.

Photo by Vicnaba.

Photo by Martin Iglesias.

A woman holds a sign saying "'This' is democracy?" during a protest in Argentina.

DEMOCRACY

Building a Better Citizen

by Oscar Oszlak (with Ingrid Baumann)

The study of democratization in Latin America has undergone several phases. Originally, scholars tried to explain what variables trigger the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Then, as democracy was re-established in most countries of the region, the consolidation of these regimes became the focus of analysis, especially the circumstances that could produce a return to authoritarianism. This new interest led to a focus on the quality of the established democracies, and several adjectives began to be added to the term "democracy" to qualify its distinctive nature. "Delegative," "restrictive," "exclusionary," "limited," and "low intensity," are just a few descriptors among dozens of terms. Even though all types meet the accepted standards of democracy in procedural terms, they are far from being full-fledged democracies.

In any case, most of the research has examined the quality of democracy from the point of view of the regime, observing the rules of the game and the management styles imposed by the government. Very few studies have been concerned with the quality of democracy from the perspective of the citizens, looking at their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior with regard to the political framework in which they live. From this angle, the question becomes: How democratic are the citizens? Or even better: Can a democracy exist if citizens are not entirely democratic?

In this article, I reflect upon these questions, drawing from the preliminary results of an ongoing research project dealing with the quality of democracy in Argentina. Guillermo O´Donnell has characterized the Argentine regime as "delegative," meaning that, once elected, presidents feel that they are entitled to govern as they see fit. He also characterized Argentina as a country with "brown areas," namely territorially based systems of domination

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

Acceptance of non-democratic responses to crises is falling in Argentina. (Data courtesy of Oscar Oszlak.)

barely reached by state law. My study reveals that, just as a country may have "brown areas" where democracy is weak, citizens may also exhibit quite different profiles in terms of adherence to democracy.

Between 2003 and 2009, the national government of Argentina launched the so-called Programa de Auditoría Ciudadana (Citizens Audit Program), known as PAC. As part of the program, citizens of 47 municipalities were surveyed to learn about their expectations, values, beliefs, and opinions regarding the quality of democratic practices in their neighborhood. Focus groups were also organized to obtain a similar diagnosis.

As director of a consulting team, I carried out an evaluation of PAC at the request of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the funding agency. In the course of this evaluation, I noticed that the results of the 47 surveys differed strongly in terms of the quality of democratic practices. After obtaining the surveys and focus group records, I started a separate research project aimed at analyzing the variation among citizens' perceptions about the quality of democratic practices, including commitment to democratic values, extent of citizen participation, treatment received by citizens from public officials, and degree of accountability of public officials. The data was classified on the basis of socioeconomic level, degree of education, and type of occupation of the citizens.

The 47 surveys were integrated into a single database of about 18,000 individual questionnaires containing more than 104 questions each. Large, medium, and small municipalities governed by Peronist, Radical/Socialist, and local (grassroots) political parties were included, involving a total population of over 10 million inhabitants, one-fourth of the entire population of Argentina. All geographical regions were present in the aggregate database, and the distribution of the municipalities in terms of size and incumbent political parties was quite representative of the country as a whole.

Among other goals, our project aimed to determine the ways and the extent to which citizens' perceptions of the quality of democratic practices are affected by their personal traits, the prevailing economic situation, the existing system of political domination, the size of the municipality, the culture of civic participation, or other particular local conditions.

To evaluate the possible association between the socioeconomic situation and the indicators of democratic culture, we distributed the 47 surveys according to the year in which the data was gathered. In 2004, when the first surveys were conducted, the country was still emerging from its deepest economic crisis, whereas in the following years, the situation had improved noticeably. We hypothesized that the satisfaction with democracy would increase with the improvement in the economy. In 2004, just above half of the total surveyed population (58.9 percent) considered democracy to be preferable to any other form of government, 17.9 percent believed that, under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be preferable, and 23.2 percent were indifferent. Five years later, when the effects of the crisis had receded, the first group comprised 70.7 percent of the total; the second, 19.1 percent; and the third, only 10.2 percent.

Answers to other questions also supported our hypothesis. In 2004, when surveys asked citizens whether democracy can function without a legislature or political parties, 32.8 percent of the citizens said yes. But three years later, the percentage had dropped to 27.2 percent (no legislature) and 30.3 percent (no parties), while in 2009, the corresponding figures were just 14.4 percent and 26.5 percent. Citizens were also asked whether the president may adopt extraordinary measures in the case of a socioeconomic crisis, including: 1) exerting violence against certain social groups; 2) controlling the media; or 3) violating the law. In 2004, 42.5, 47.2, and 40.3 percent of those surveyed favored these possibilities. In 2006, the respective percentages decreased to 37.9 percent, 32.6 percent, and 28.1 percent; and in 2009, figures further dropped to 23.8 percent, 21.7 percent, and 18.7 percent. Even though the procedure of randomly comparing surveys taken at different times is not entirely valid in statistical terms, the data does suggest that the hypothesis was correct: satisfaction with democracy increases with improvements in the economy.

Contrasting results among cases led us to classify the 47 municipalities surveyed in terms of size (small, medium,

Photo by Juan Mabromata/AFP/Getty Images.

Pamphlets cover the street during a protest outside the Argentine capitol building.

large) and incumbent political party at the time of the survey. The respondents were classified in terms of their socioeconomic level, occupation, and degree of education. The resulting distribution was quite representative of the Argentine population at large (12.4 percent upper class, 26.5 percent middle class, 41.8 percent lower class, and 19.3 percent marginal class). Citizens were asked about whether they preferred to live in a democracy. The majority, 63.2 percent, preferred democracy to any other form of government. But 17.3 percent indicated that under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be preferable to a democratic one, while 19.5 percent showed no preference between democratic and non-democratic government. These results were consistent with the question about citizens' satisfaction with democracy as a form of government: while 47.2 percent were very satisfied, a high proportion (40.2 percent) was not very satisfied, and 12.7 percent were not satisfied at all.

When we examined these results in terms of the socioeconomic level and the degree of education of the respondents, we discovered that the higher the socioeconomic and education levels of the respondent, the higher the preference for democracy. We found that the preference for democracy was inversely proportional to socioeconomic level: municipalities with low percentages of the population at a low socioeconomic level exhibited a higher preference for democracy.

Among many other questions, the surveys asked whether democracy helps to improve the quality of life. Only 28.2 percent of the people were quite convinced of this; 34.0 percent were fairly convinced, 29.0 percent were less confident, and 7.9 percent were not convinced. People were also divided in their opinions regarding the contribution of educational institutions to democracy. Just 18.4 percent believed that they contributed very much; 35.3 percent, some; 37.9 percent, very little; and 8.4 percent, nothing. When the analysis was disaggregated by the socioeconomic level and education of the respondents, the results were consistently similar: lower and marginal income groups held more negative opinions of educational institutions, as we expected.

We also designed an index of the quality of democratic practices after selecting a bundle of variables and running

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Photo by Gustavo Facci.

An Argentine woman looks for her name on the voting rolls.

the database to obtain a ranking. Citizens living in the two largest municipalities governed by the Peronist Party were lowest in the rankings, while those living in large cities governed by either the Radical or the Socialist Parties fell in the upper 50 percent of all cases. In turn, no medium or small municipalities governed by the Radical Party appeared within the worst quartile of the ranking. And in the case of neighborhood parties, the quality of democratic practices improved in smaller municipalities. Hence, the quality of democratic practices seemed to be inversely correlated with populist (i.e., Peronist) governments, whereas citizens living in small municipalities governed by neighborhood parties appeared to uphold democracy more than their fellow citizens living in larger localities and governed by any of the national parties.

The level of civic participation was also explored as a factor contributing to the quality of democracy. We found that most respondents welcomed the participation of their fellow citizens in public affairs, but only 3 percent were active participants in community groups of some sort. Half of these were church goers, followed by members of school boards. A negligible number were affiliated with political parties. Asked about their reasons for not participating in public affairs, respondents were either unable or unwilling to act in this capacity. Free riding was the prevailing attitude.

Up to this point, we had concluded that, according to the variables originally selected by the PAC, not all citizens appeared to be equally democratic. The economic cycle provided a partial explanation for this result. The size of the municipality and the governing party offered additional clues. The socioeconomic and educational levels of the population added another critical dimension to explain differences among citizens, while the culture of participation seemed to have a lower impact on democratic quality than other factors.

However, an in-depth analysis of the focus group meetings showed a recurrent grievance: the problem of social inequality, insistently introduced by the poorer participants in all focus groups. This issue had not even been considered in any of the survey questions. In order to explore it further, we organized field visits to take a closer look at the local scene. Nine municipalities were selected after cross-tabulating size (small, medium, and large) and incumbent political party (Peronist, Radical/Socialist, or Provincial/Neighborhood Parties). We obtained a

representative sample in regional terms, as well as in terms of the main economic activities. We also made sure that socioeconomic and educational levels, preference for democracy, interest in finding collective solutions to local problems, and other relevant variables were consistent with the universe of 47 cases.

The differences among the cases were quite remarkable. We found that social inequality had a very different importance according to the patterns of local political domination, economic structures, and size of the respective municipality. We also discovered that the belief that citizens' rights are not fully respected is directly proportional to the socioeconomic level of the population: the higher the percentage of the population of low socioeconomic status, the larger the percentage of people who believe that their rights are not respected.

Interest in creating associations to seek solutions to community problems was found to be directly proportional to the socioeconomic level of the population: the higher the percentage of the population with a low socioeconomic level, the larger the percentage of citizens showing great interest in associating with others. In turn, interest in creating associations to seek solutions to community problems was directly proportional to the respondents' belief that their rights were not respected. This particular finding was highly relevant, given the fact that the aggregate figures for the entire database showed very low levels of effective citizen participation, despite explicit recognition of its importance. Low-income and marginal groups seem to be more prone to getting actively involved in collective action, even though their participation takes place mainly through less institutionalized forms of organization.

Our project is still active, and we expect to publish a book that will offer a full report of the research process, findings, and conclusions about the reasons that seem to explain why some citizens are more democratic than others. The subject is important and should receive more attention from scholars interested in the quality of democratic practice. Democracy is not simply an institutional, procedural issue. Its quality also depends upon the culture, values, and behavior of its counterpart, the citizens.

Oscar Oszlak is a professor at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, the Universidad Nacional de San Martín, and the Universidad de San Andrés. He spoke for CLAS on January 31, 2013.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

Graffiti emphasizes the importance of voting for democracy.

Photo by Caitlin Margaret Kelly.

Photo by Ben Garland.

Contaminated water pours from a pipe in Nicaragua.

WATER

Clean, Reliable, and/or Affordable

by Asavari Devadiga

The "Water War" that broke out in Cochabamba, Bolivia, after the privatization of water services is probably the best-known controversy surrounding water service contracts, but it is certainly not the only one. That conflict was an outgrowth of two strands of reform that gained currency across the developing world during the 1990s: decentralization and institutional insulation from politics. Alison Post, an assistant professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley presented the findings of a study on the rationale behind these reforms and their outcomes that she conducted with Veronica Herrera, an assistant professor at the University of Connecticut.

Historical Context

From the post-World-War-II era through the 1990s, national bureaucracies managed urban water and sanitation systems in most developing countries. This centralized model resulted in impressive gains by the 1960s, even though communities outside the central network had to rely on informal providers. However, three main problems with the centralized model emerged in the 1970s and 80s. First, the focus remained on building new infrastructure rather than maintaining what had already been built. Poor maintenance undermined the functioning of the infrastructure and caused people to become frustrated with the poor level of service. Second, since it was politically difficult for utilities to raise rates to reflect inflation, there was an increasing reliance on tax revenue to provide funds for water and sanitation services. Using tax revenue to fund these services had two negative impacts. It forced utility managers to compete with other national priorities for funding, and

it created a geographically regressive system, where people in poor rural areas and on the marginal urban fringe supported centralized water and sanitation services with their tax money but did not receive any of those services themselves. Lastly, with the emergence of the Latin American debt crisis, national governments could no longer dedicate sufficient general fund monies to national water and sanitation providers, especially given the increasing pace of urbanization.

Urban Service Delivery in Selected Latin American Countries

Country	Water		Sewerage	
Year	1960	1990	1960	1990
Chile	74%	100%	60%	100%
Colombia	79%	87%	61%	84%
Mexico	68%	94%	70%	85%
Peru	47%	68%	30%	76%

Source: Gilbert, Alan, *The Latin American City*, Nottingham, UK: Russell Press, 1998.

Post presented this confluence of factors as an example of what the scholars Pablo Spiller and William Savedoff describe as "low-level equilibrium." In this situation, low prices lead to poor service quality, limited service expansion, operational inefficiency, and corruption. Consumers receiving these poor services have a low willingness to pay due to low trust of providers. Once entrenched, this vicious cycle becomes difficult to break. Post noted that in pre-privatization Argentina, for example, in some provinces as few as 50 percent of those with a water connection were registered as consumers, and among registered customers, only 30 percent actually paid their bill. The limited revenue collected was used primarily for personnel, with very little remaining to invest in physical infrastructure.

Decentralization and Insulation as Solutions

In the 1990s, two reform proposals were put forth to solve these problems: decentralization and insulation. The supporters of decentralization argued that water and sanitation services should be provided at the subnational level. Their rationale was that users would be able to participate more in decisions made locally and would thereby become more aware of resource constraints. This awareness would in turn make them more willing to pay the higher rates needed to cover the utility's costs. A combination of domestic and international incentives led to widespread adoption of decentralization. Approximately 34 countries implemented it worldwide, and all but three countries in Latin America have decentralized systems today, although central governments tend to retain some financial and regulatory roles.

The goal of the second reform, insulation, was to protect service providers from political influences, which were blamed for patronage hiring and the politicization of water rates. A spectrum of strategies were suggested to accomplish this goal, including transferring water and sanitation provision to a special purpose department within a municipal or state government; creating a special purpose government agency with its own budget; corporatizing the provider by creating a publicly owned entity operating under private sector law; and outsourcing or privatizing service provision.

The last category itself spans a wide spectrum of options. Private sector provision of services can be managed through short-term contracts with less insulation or via long-term concession contracts with more insulation. Divesture, where the private provider actually owns the infrastructure, is the most extreme form of privatization and was considered to be the most insulated from political influence.

While corporatization has been initiated in at least 21 countries, and roughly 5 percent of the world population in 61 countries gets their water from the private sector, the impacts of these policies are unclear due to poor documentation and the lack of publicly available data.

Impacts of Reform

According to Post, the outcomes of these two reforms vary substantially, and there is no consensus about their impacts in the literature. She also pointed out that the rationales behind the two reforms, which were often implemented simultaneously, are in tension, and they may in fact serve to undermine one another. Decentralization was supposed to bring service closer to the people so that they could pressure utilities for better service, while insulation was designed to insulate providers from political pressure.

What she and Herrera found in Latin America was that the reforms have not performed as expected. Formal mechanisms set up to allow customers to provide feedback to decentralized providers have not been well used. Rather, consumers have taken to the streets or resorted to backroom pressures to influence

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service providers. The fact that utilities now have local headquarters has also given protestors an easy-to-reach target. Technical problems with decentralization have also arisen due to difficulties coordinating between different tiers of government and the lack of economies of scale. In addition, smaller-scale systems have made it more difficult to subsidize the rates of poor consumers. These failures of decentralization have contributed to the failure of insulation as well: politicians facing street protests still pressure service providers to keep rates below the cost-recovery level. And, despite reformers' good intentions, patronage appointments continue to be common.

When asked during the question-and-answer session whether the reforms had lowered the number of unregistered customers, Post referred again to the Argentine example. While privatization was eventually reversed in most communities, during the 10- to 15-year window when private companies provided services, they had strong incentives to update the records, and they employed methods such as aerial surveys to make sure all their customers were on the books. She also noted that one study found that Argentine child mortality rates declined more rapidly where systems had been privatized.

In sum, the conflicting rationales behind the 1990s-era reforms have led to mixed results. Despite efforts to insulate utilities from political pressure, elected officials still intervene in utility management. Likewise, efforts to increase customers' willingness to pay for needed infrastructure upgrades through decentralization have foundered due to public unrest and local protests. Meanwhile, the key to disrupting Latin America's pernicious low-level equilibrium remains elusive.

Alison Post is an assistant professor in the Charles & Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley. She spoke for CLAS on March 18, 2013.

Asavari Devadiga is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of City and Regional Planning at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

A city worker delivers a weekly water ration in a low-income Mexico City neighborhood.

Photo by Eduardo Verdugo/Associated Press.

Photo courtesy of blueEnergy.

Outhouses draining untreated waste into waterways, Bluefields, Nicaragua.

WATER

Powering Rural Development

by Jess Joan Goddard

Bluefields is the capital of the poorest department in the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere: Nicaragua. Located on the country's Caribbean coast, Bluefields is both geographically remote and economically marginalized. A lack of roads limits entry to those traveling by air or by sea, and residents lack access to many basic services. As a child, Mathias Craig, the executive director and co-founder of blueEnergy, accompanied his mother, an expert linguist, on research trips to the region's indigenous communities. Dedicated to helping improve the poverty-induced conditions he experienced there, Craig kept returning to the same question: "How do you put together a suite of solutions that can help change lives?" blueEnergy is the solution he came up with while still a graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The nonprofit's mission — "to work for a more equitable, sustainable world"— reflects both Craig's early preoccupation with social justice and the organization's ambitious approach to development.

For Craig and blueEnergy, the last 10 years have been marked by a deepening engagement with Bluefields. The organization focuses on holistic community development and the provision of basic services like energy and water. Thus far, they have provided services to 10,000 people in more than 18 communities. According to Craig, blueEnergy is "defining a different development path, and defining it with [Bluefields]."

Introducing the nonprofit's renewable energy program, Craig reminded the audience that "it's easy to take for granted the role that energy plays in our lives." Plotting annual

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per capita electricity consumption against the Human Development Index, a United Nations proxy for human well-being, reveals a non-linear trend. Referencing the graph, Craig noted: "When you go from no energy to a little bit of energy, the quality of life can increase dramatically." blueEnergy uses locally manufactured wind and solar power technologies to provide this little bit of energy to isolated communities and institutions, working collaboratively with them to provide technical training that ensures the success of their new technologies. One important application is providing electricity for the refrigeration of medicines, an essential improvement for a community like Monkey Point that is a four- to six-hour motorboat ride away from the nearest hospital. Before blueEnergy installed solar panels at the local medical center, staff were limited in their ability to save patients from preventable diseases because they were unable to store medicine properly.

In recent years, blueEnergy's awareness of community needs led to the development of a water and sanitation program. Worldwide, waterborne illness is the second leading cause of death for children under five. Craig is committed to improving the entire spectrum of water consumption in Bluefields. blueEnergy seeks to create access to clean water by drilling wells, providing biosand filters, constructing latrines, and teaching safe sanitation practices. These innovations are accompanied by community involvement, training, and education. Craig stressed the importance of using technologies that have worked elsewhere in the world. blueEnergy works with preexisting manufacturers to adapt proven technologies to meet the specific needs of Bluefields residents. This collaboration allows for strong partnerships and a higher probability of success when introducing new technologies.

For Craig, the individual projects of energy provision, water services, and latrine building together lead to a unified perspective on development: "If you zoom out and look at the bigger picture, a lot of the opportunities around economic development in an area require an intersection of multiple sectors." blueEnergy sees the nexus of water and energy as crucial to securing the well-being of marginalized communities. Using solar-powered water pumps in conjunction with biosand filters, blueEnergy has worked on integrated systems with farming cooperatives and agroforestry centers.

In designing unified energy–water systems that enhance communities' capacity to manage their health

Installing a solar panel in Rocky Point, Nicaragua, May 2012.

Photo courtesy of blueEnergy.

and food security, blueEnergy has developed a fourfold approach to holistic community development. First, Craig reiterated the organization's commitment to community engagement. blueEnergy is not just a technology provider, he said. Rather, the organization encourages communities to play a critical role in the acquisition of basic services. Second, blueEnergy partners with local educational institutions to provide complementary technical training. Setting the foundation for local empowerment through education and capacity building has proven essential to technology adoption and best practices in the region. Third, the organization values its services and products in ways that allow for community buy-in without prohibiting access. Recipients are required to make a financial contribution, participate in a day of training, and/or provide a day of labor so that they feel a sense of ownership of the services and technologies. Finally, blueEnergy is working as a partner to Bluefields to develop a long-term view for development in the region.

Photo courtesy of blueEnergy.

A young girl watches a water filtration unit in action.

blueEnergy's Global Leadership Program is another facet of the organization's long-term plan. The goal is to train the leaders of tomorrow by providing international students with field experience in the developing world. Volunteers take part in technical training and community development initiatives in Nicaragua. blueEnergy aims to educate students through hands-on fieldwork and to encourage them to carry forth a commitment to "a more equitable, sustainable world."

Mathias Craig and blueEnergy are working to synthesize a unified solution to the provision of basic needs with a holistic community approach. Adapting existing knowledge and technologies to address specific local needs is a hopeful model for development in poor, marginal regions in Bluefields and around the world.

Mathias Craig is the executive director and co-founder of blueEnergy. He spoke for CLAS on April 29, 2013.

Jess Joan Goddard is a MS/Ph.D. student in the Energy & Resources Group at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

Photo by John Erickson.

Utility workers repair a water main damaged by the installation of a storm sewer.

WATER

Flow, Interrupted

by John Erickson

Imagine waking up at 1:00 every morning to fill barrels in your backyard with water, since water only comes to your tap in the middle of the night. While much easier than hauling water from a well, this isn't exactly what most people think of when they hear that a city has a piped water supply with a tap in every house. However, this situation is common in many cities in low- and middle-income countries.

With support from the Tinker Foundation, I spent last summer in Managua, where some houses have rooftop tanks that fill up automatically when the water comes on, but most households have barrels, buckets, and cement tubs called *pilas* to store water until it comes on again.

Water supply becomes intermittent when utilities can't keep the pipes full and pressurized continuously. This situation normally results from a combination of problems that develop over time.

Consider a hypothetical (but typical) informal residential settlement built at the edge of a city, next to an existing neighborhood. In the beginning, new residents haul water from neighbors who have existing connections to the drinking water system. Later, they uncover the drinking water mains and install their own pipes to bring water directly to taps in their yards.

Since the settlement was unplanned and unsanctioned, the water utility is not prepared for the new demands on the system. The pipes and wells that were designed to supply existing neighborhoods are now insufficient.

In the morning, when everyone wakes up and turns on the water, pressure drops and the pipes begin to empty.

Only the houses in the low areas have water, and the houses in the high areas — whether they are in the new settlement or the old neighborhood — are left dry. The houses in the high parts only get water at night, when everyone else turns off their taps.

To make matters worse, the informal pipe system built by the residents of the new settlement has a lot of leaks, so, even at night, much water is lost. Power failures, which stop the water utilities' pumps and wells for hours at a time, are also common.

Soon, with increasing demand for water in the new settlement and high rates of leakage, some houses are barely getting any water at all, even in the middle of the night. To ensure that everyone has at least some water, the water utility divides the area into sectors, with each sector receiving water at a certain time, or on certain days, as controlled by valves operated by the utility. For those settlements at the highest elevation, water only comes in by tanker truck.

The scenario described above is highly simplified and just one example of how intermittent water supply can develop. In practice, urban drinking water systems are continuously evolving. Growth, planned or unplanned, puts new stress on the system's capacity, and the water utility does what it can to respond.

Often, water service is already intermittent when new settlements are built. New, informal settlements are not added onto a well-planned water distribution system but rather onto a patched-together system that evolved as earlier settlements became established neighborhoods.

Aside from inconveniencing users and causing headaches for the water utility, intermittent supply can affect water quality and lead to further deterioration of pipe infrastructure. When the water is off and there is no pressure in drinking water pipes, contaminants in groundwater surrounding the pipes can seep in through leaks. The risk of contamination increases if drinking water pipes have lots of leaks or if they are installed alongside leaky sewer pipes or drainage canals.

Water can also be contaminated during household storage, which is made necessary by intermittent supply. Drinking water stored in a bucket can be contaminated by something as simple as a child's hand reaching in to dip out water with a cup.

Drinking water utilities in Latin America normally chlorinate water, both to kill microbes that may be in the source water and to leave a residual concentration of chlorine that is intended to kill microbes that could re-contaminate the water during distribution. Nevertheless, chlorination practices are often not 100-percent consistent, and residual chlorine is not always strong enough to handle contaminants that seep into the distribution system.

Intermittent operation of drinking water systems causes pressure variations and frequently results in a mix of air and water being present in the pipes. According to a 2011 article in Water 21 by Bambous Charalambous, intermittent supply results in more pipe breaks and more leaks. If this theory is correct, pipes develop more leaks once a water supply becomes intermittent, making it even harder to maintain a continuous supply in the future.

Clearly, there are many advantages to maintaining a continuous supply of drinking water. However, many water utilities facing unplanned urban growth in cities with limited resources have been unable to avoid intermittent supply.

Once a water system is operating intermittently, returning it to

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In Managua, power outages and surges often cause utility water wells to shut down temporarily.

Photo by John Erickson.

continuous supply can be difficult and costly. Despite its many disadvantages, intermittent supply is one way to reduce leakage from the distribution system in the short term. When only a portion of the system is pressurized at any given time, only a portion of the system is leaking. Even if enough water is available to pump into an intermittent system to make it continuous, rates of water loss will likely soar if nothing is done to first reduce leakage.

More research is needed to better understand how intermittent supply affects water quality, water consumption, leakage, water pressure conditions, and infrastructure integrity. This improved understanding would help governments and water utilities decide how big a priority continuous water supply should be. A better understanding of the specific effects of intermittent water supply could also help water utilities reduce or mitigate its negative consequences. It might also be helpful for formulating strategies to avoid intermittent supply in the first place.

With the support of a grant from the Tinker Foundation, I spent last summer in Managua, Nicaragua, observing workers from ENACAL, the country's national water and sewer utility. I rode around with the workers who open and close valves, monitor wells, repair pipes, look for leaks, measure water pressure, and monitor water quality. I also got the chance to talk to utility managers about how operations decisions are made and how my research could be useful to them.

Based on what I learned last summer in Managua, I formulated a research plan to monitor water quality and pressure in an intermittent system. The results of this research, which will be carried out in Panama, another Latin American country affected by intermittent supply, will hopefully help water utilities to better manage intermittent supply and understand its effects.

John Erickson is a Ph.D. student in Civil and Environmental Engineering at UC Berkeley. He received a Tinker Summer Research Grant in 2012.

A water utility employee collects a sample from a customer's tap to be tested for contamination.

Photo by John Erickson.

Photo by Wang Chun Lyg/Associated Press.

Wheel loaders transport rare earths at the Port of Lianyungang, China.

RESEARCH

Tilling the Rare Earths

by Julie Klinger

China's new government leadership appears likely to continue enforcing production and export controls on the country's rare earth industry. Currently the producer of 95 percent of the world's rare earth elements (REEs), China has been under fire since 2009 to lift its export quotas on these strategic elements essential to the manufacture of everything from iPhones to missiles. Since China restricted exports in 2009, prices for some elements have increased as much as 80-fold.

The WTO ruled twice in China's favor against charges brought by the U.S., Japan, and the EU that China's quotas unfairly disadvantaged foreign businesses. China claims that it simply cannot keep up with global demand without exhausting its own resources at a high environmental cost. China's actions are permitted under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which allows WTO member countries to enact trade restrictions in order to conserve exhaustible natural resources, so long as they are imposed equally on foreign and domestic firms.

This is exactly what Beijing has taken pains to do. Citing environmental and safety concerns, China's central government has undertaken a three-pronged approach: reducing production quotas to levels that ensure long-term sustainability; closing down illegal mines; and forcing privately held companies to merge into larger, state-owned enterprises. These actions are calculated to facilitate greater oversight of China's domestic mining industry in hopes of curbing environmental damage as well as removing

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China from the unenviable position of having the most mining-related deaths in the world. While this move hurts certain businesses and raises prices, it addresses some of the leading causes of China's social unrest.

The effects of this strategy have been acutely felt by renewable energy, consumer electronic, and defense industries worldwide. The high prices have also opened up new horizons of mining possibilities, such as the northern Brazilian Amazon, where reserves have been known about for decades but were, until recently, considered too remote and too ecologically sensitive to extract. Not anymore: Brazil's Rousseff administration recently declared the goal of making the country self-sufficient in REEs — and eventually controlling a third of the global supply.

While a greater supply would bring welcome price relief to industries around the world, it comes at a cost. Brazil's REEs — like China's — are located in ecologically sensitive regions, some of which are populated by indigenous peoples. As China takes steps to reign in environmental degradation and mining fatalities in this strategic sector, it displaces the problem elsewhere, to places willing to look the other way while new mining concessions flout national labor and environmental protection laws.

But within this problem lies tremendous potential for international collaboration around sustainable REE production, which should include expanding specialized recycling facilities to recapture these important elements. The greatest untapped reserve may not lie beneath the forests and deserts of the world but instead in our mine tailings and electronic waste. REEs have long been a waste product in iron, silver, and phosphate mines. Before prices went through the roof, it wasn't economically feasible to filter through mine tailings for these precious resources. The game has changed.

Expanding recycling facilities and filtering for REEs in existing mine tailings will reduce the demand for China's REEs and help bring prices down. If we can afford to buy these elements from the Mongolian steppe and the high Amazon, surely we can afford to invest in advanced recycling facilities a little closer to home.

Julie Klinger is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley and a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow. She studies the global rare earth industry, focusing on China and Brazil and the relations between the two.

Rare earths on display in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Museum, Hohhot, China.



Photo by Julie Klinger.

Photo by Peg Skorpinski.

Isabel Allende signs copies of her new book at UC Berkeley.

LITERATURE

Maya's Notebook

by James Lamb

Perhaps the most powerful moments of best-selling author Isabel Allende's recent public appearance at UC Berkeley centered on her own family's experiences with drug addiction and tragedy. She shared with the audience the pain caused by the addiction and recent death of her husband's son, Harley, just "four weeks ago," the second child in the family to be lost to drug dependency. "My family is grieving right now… it has touched us in terrible ways," the author explained. These personal experiences deeply inspired her most recent novel, *Maya's Notebook*. Referencing this tragedy she said, "All the experience of Maya is what Harley lived."

Allende's revelations came in the context of an event marking the release of *Maya's Notebook* in English that took the form of a public conversation with UC Berkeley Professor Beatriz Manz. In the course of the conversation, Allende, who has been called "the world's most widely read Spanish-language author" and who once taught creative writing at UC Berkeley, reflected upon many aspects of her creative process, from how she gets to know the geographic areas she writes about to her relationship with the literary and artistic genre known as magical realism.

Maya's Notebook tells the story of a Chilean-American teenager raised by her grandparents in Berkeley, California, whose promising path as a good student and athlete is traumatically re-directed by the death of her grandfather and her grandmother's subsequent depression. In the wake of this blow, Maya begins a descent into drug use, delinquency, and crime that leads her to a school for troubled teens in Oregon and ultimately to the streets of Las Vegas, where she ends up homeless, addicted, and fighting for her life. Maya finds herself running away from her past as well as from hardened criminals, the police, and the FBI. In a climactic moment when Maya is near death on a restroom floor, the voice of her deceased grandfather gives her the motivation

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Photo by Megan Kang.

Isabel Allende's latest novel *Maya's Notebook*.

to keep living. Eventually, Maya is rescued by her grandmother who sends her first to rehab and then to the remote island of Chiloé, off the southern coast of Chile. It is a place that is the complete opposite of Las Vegas in terms of modern stimulation, entertainment, and lifestyle, according to Allende.

The two principal locations in which the novel takes place, Berkeley and Chiloé, were the subject of an early question from Professor Manz, who inquired about the inspiration for using these places and the method of knowing them as an author. Allende recounted her many trips to Chiloé and the personal relationships she cultivated with residents of the island during nights spent listening to the stories and myths of the archipelago while drinking tea around a traditional wood-burning stove. She also took a special research trip with a skillful guide who helped her get to know the culture more deeply. Similarly, although she knew Berkeley as a long-time San Francisco Bay Area resident, she told the audience that she spent time "hanging out" in the park across from Berkeley High School, a popular social gathering spot for local youth and a key setting in the novel. It is through spending time in a place and hearing the everyday stories and gossip of its residents that a person can really begin to know a community, Allende suggested.

Asked by Professor Manz what made this novel different from her other works, Allende emphasized both the immediacy of her emotional bond with the characters as well as the story's contemporary, rather than historical, setting. Maya "made me suffer as no other of my characters" according to the author, who acknowledged that there is much of herself in Maya's grandmother and would-be savior. Another important factor is that the book is set in the current decade, written in 2010 when Allende's own teenage granddaughters were a constant presence in her life. Their struggles with contemporary youth culture are likewise represented in Maya's character. This focus is a notable departure for an author whose works have often featured historical themes. Indeed, Allende joked that the three years that have elapsed since the book was released in Spanish made it a "historical novel."

The writer also shared some of her thoughts on magical realism, an artistic genre of Latin American origin with which Allende has frequently been associated. She embraced the term and its relationship to the novel. "Magic realism is everything that we cannot explain, or buy, or control… it is accepting all that we don't know," and it is also a "great literary device," said Allende. In *Maya's Notebook*, this element is most strongly present in the mythologies of the island of Chiloé. There, few would claim to believe in traditional magical stories and superstitions, yet they seem to have a deep influence on the island's people nonetheless. Reflecting on how beliefs of other cultures are often dismissed as superstitious, Allende emphasized that she is open to the reality and importance of "dreams and prophetic visions," adding "there are no boundaries between the other world and this world."

A later question from the audience referred to these dreams and prophetic visions with reference to Allende's writing and creative process. Allende related that as she works, she is "quiet, silent, alone for long periods of time, like a monk" and that in this context, she hears the voices of her characters. She said that she often dreams of babies during her writing process, a pattern of imagery that she has learned reflects the journey of writing the stories themselves. For Allende, magical realism is simply listening deeply, whether to nature or to her characters' voices or to her own unconscious as it might appear in dreams. This manner of listening and thinking is, for her, opposed to a world that is "rational and that we can control."

Allende also addressed questions about how complex contemporary social issues around race, ethnicity, and gender have influenced her life and work as well as her characters.

Asked about Maya's ethnic self-conception and Berkeley's complicated multicultural environment, Allende described the varied ethnic tapestry of Maya's world. She noted that Maya's grandmother is a Chilean immigrant who falls in love with an African-American man, that Maya's father is a Chilean pilot and her mother a Danish woman, that Maya looks Scandinavian but has a Chilean mentality strongly influenced by her grandmother, and finally, that Maya ends up among the indigenous people of Chiloé. Allende emphasized that the novel is multicultural with "all kinds of interracial stories in the book."

Reflecting on an audience member's question regarding how she deals with machismo as a Chilean woman, Allende ruminated upon changes over the course of her life. As "a feminist before the word was invented," Allende said that there have been many important changes since her realization as a five-year-old child that her mother was fundamentally oppressed, "a victim… of the males in the family of the society." While she has seen improvements for women, she also noted how much more needs to be done in terms of gender equality, particularly with regard to violence against women, and in this regard, she noted that she has set up a foundation for the empowerment of women and girls. Allende also expressed her belief that her granddaughters have much better opportunities than she did and that there has been more progress for women authors in the U.S. literary world than in Latin America.

Responding to a question about the legacy she would like to leave behind, Allende initially argued that this consideration is a male preoccupation. "I think legacy is," she then added, "the contribution to the collective culture, to the collective unconscious, to our collective dreams. We all contribute somehow, and that is the legacy we have. The rest is just vanity."

Finally, the event closed with a moving video made by students in Chiloé thanking the author for the touching representation of their home conveyed in the novel.

Isabel Allende is an international best-selling author and a winner of Chile's National Literature Prize. Beatriz Manz is a professor in the Departments of Geography and Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley. They spoke for CLAS on April 25, 2013.

James Gerardo Lamb is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at UC Berkeley.

VIDEO AVAILABLE AT CLAS.BERKELEY.EDU

A house on Chiloé.

Photo by Carlos Cerulla.

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The ruins of a Catholic Church in Canudos, Brazil, that was submerged by the Cocorobó Dam in the 1960s.
Today, the ruins only appear during severe droughts.
(Photo by Sebastião Edson Macedo, Tinker Grant recipient 2012.)

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