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Beyond the Neoliberal Model
The Art of My Father, Diego Rivera
Time to Choose on Climate

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Cover: Monkey puzzle trees (*Araucaria araucana*), near the border of Argentina and Chile.
(Photo by Mariano Mantel.)

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

Photo by Jim Block.

CLAS Chair Harley Shaiken.

As President Obama stepped off Air Force One under a cloudy Havana sky in late March 2016, this first visit by a sitting U.S. President in nine decades clearly triggered hopes that a new direction in Cuba–U.S. relations might be possible. This issue's first article, "A Whole New Ballgame," examines the context of this opening, the roadblocks and possibilities lying ahead, and the implications for the rest of the Americas.

Latin America and the world faced the existential threat of climate change as 2015 drew to a close. Academy Award-winning director Charles Ferguson addresses the urgency of an effective response in his cinematically compelling and tightly argued new film "Time to Choose." The Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) scheduled an advance screening and conversation with the director between the appearance of Pope Francis's encyclical in June and the UN Conference in Paris in December. "The question," Ferguson emphasized, "is whether [action] is going to happen in time."

In our third article, Manuel Castells and Fernando Calderón take a highly original look at the "process of profound transformation" that Latin America has been going through in the new millennium in social, cultural, economic, and institutional terms. Against the backdrop of economic uncertainty and political instability in 2015, they point out that Latin America has superseded neoliberalism and is "in search of a new model yet to be discovered."

CLAS continues its collaboration with the Mexican Museum in San Francisco through a talk on "The Mexico of My Father Diego Rivera" by his daughter Guadalupe Rivera y Marín, who directs the Diego Rivera Foundation. In conversation with Andrew Kluger, president of the museum, Rivera y Marín discussed her father's times and legacy as an artist. Her wit, insight, and love for her father illuminated new dimensions of his art and the tumultuous historical context that shaped it.

Finally, we conclude this issue with a photograph of Parque Pumalín in the south of Chile. Doug Tompkins — an ecologist, philanthropist, and founder of the North Face and Esprit clothing companies — established this stunning nature reserve in 1991 and then greatly expanded it with his wife Kristine McDivitt Tompkins. We mourn his death and celebrate his signal contribution to the environment, not only for Chile, but for the planet. The Chilean government has announced that Pumalín will become a national park in March 2017.

— Harley Shaiken

CUBA

A Whole New Ballgame

By Valerie Wirtschafter with Julia Sweig

Photo from the U.S. Department of State.

Barack Obama and his family take in a baseball game in Havana with Raúl Castro in March 2016.

During the early 20th century, the hegemony of the United States on the island shaped diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba — one factor that drove Fidel Castro's revolutionary fervor and fueled the Cuban Revolution. During the Cold War, mutual hostility and distrust defined relations. Cuba served as one of the main theaters in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union waged many of their power struggles. But on December 17, 2014, something astonishing happened: the governments of the United States and Cuba decided to reshape this fraught history and chart a new course in diplomatic relations, one built on dialogue and compromise, as well as a shadow of mutual understanding.

In an obviously choreographed effort, at 12:01 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, both Raúl Castro and Barack Obama took the podium to announce a historic thaw in bilateral relations. In a vow to "cut loose the shackles of the past," President Obama announced a new approach to relations between the two countries, including a relaxation of restrictions on remittances to the island, increased travel and banking opportunities, and a restoration of diplomatic relations, among other changes. Raúl Castro, in turn, declared that the thaw would allow Cuba to embark "on the task of updating our economic model in order to build a prosperous and sustainable socialism." The Cuban government committed to increasing access to the Internet and released 53 political prisoners. As the crux of the deal, both agreed to a swap of the remaining three of the "Cuban Five," intelligence officers held in U.S. prisons since 1998, for a U.S. agent named Rolando Sarraff Trujillo and Alan Gross, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor.

Since then, the U.S. and Cuban governments have announced a dizzying array of changes to bilateral relations, ranging from the reestablishment of embassies to the removal of Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. In March 2016, the world saw a sitting U.S. president, Barack Obama, set foot on Cuban soil — an event that has only occurred once in history, when Calvin Coolidge visited the island in 1928. The sum total of these changes is enough to overwhelm and excite any student of Latin American history. However, the story of how we got to where we are today, as well as the circumstances that drove Raúl Castro and Barack Obama to the table for an unprecedented series of secret negotiations, is fundamental to understanding the new course set in motion in December 2014 and the future of U.S.–Cuban relations, more broadly.

When President Barack Obama assumed office in 2009, Latin America's turn to the left was already in full swing. From Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil to Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Latin America's "New Left" swept into power in the early 21st century with a populist message of greater economic, social, and political inclusion. The United States' outdated treatment of Cuba as a pariah served as a unifying symbol for many of these leaders and also offered a constant reminder of the historically imperial habits of the United States in Latin America throughout much of the 20th century. Calls for a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba were already resounding throughout much of the region, but the Obama administration was not yet ready — or perhaps not yet able — to heed these cries for change.

In 2009, the Cuban government arrested and jailed a USAID subcontractor named Alan Gross for "crimes against the Cuban state" after he attempted to bring satellite phones and computer equipment to Cuba's small

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Photo by Yamil Lage/AFP/Getty Images.

A young Cuban with an American flag below the motto of the Cuban Revolution, *Venceremos!* (We shall overcome!)

Jewish community. For the United States government at the time, his arrest became an impediment to the possibility of a bilateral opening between the two countries. As long as Gross was in prison, any potential for a thaw in relations appeared to be off the table entirely. The Cuban government also resisted any thaw as long as the Cuban Five remained in U.S. prisons. As a result, a political Frankenstein was born that seemed capable of thwarting any attempted negotiations.

Three years later in early 2012, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, the Cuba question soured the two-day affair and hindered productive dialogue among leaders in the region. The impasse was so severe that, in the words of the New York Times, the meeting "ended without a final statement of consensus … after the United States and some Latin American nations remained sharply divided over whether to continue excluding Cuba from such gatherings." Latin American nations had drawn a clear red line: either Cuba would be invited to the next Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015 or the Inter-American system — as defined by the longstanding but fading dominance of the U.S. at the Organization of American States — would, in effect, cease to function.

Notably, even the United States' most loyal allies in the region, including President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, were supportive of such a drastic ultimatum. Hillary Clinton, who in her capacity as Secretary of State had attended the summit in Cartagena with President Obama, also understood this reality. Before she left the State Department in 2013, she authorized the drafting of an exit memo laying out the absolute most the United States could do to overhaul its diplomatic approach to Cuba and, as a result, revive its foundering influence in the region.

While some of the plans in the memo have yet to come to pass, including a lifting of the embargo, much of what was envisioned has been announced over the past year. With his announcement on December 17, 2014, President Obama demonstrated to the Western Hemisphere nations that he was finally willing do what none of the 11 presidents before him had done: listen to the rationale of the United States' Latin American neighbors. Rather than continue in vain to try to change Cuba through covert operations and sanctions, he now understood that the best way to gain influence on the island was through open dialogue, a posture he had in any case first suggested during the

2007–2008 presidential campaign, which then-candidate Hillary Clinton adamantly opposed.

Though Latin American pressure played a significant role in getting President Obama and his team of advisors to the table, shifting politics in the United States around the Cuba issue also shaped the administration's willingness, and ability, to negotiate. As the direct impact of the Cuban Revolution gradually becomes a narrative of history books rather than a first-hand reality for more and more Cuban Americans, the intense outcry against engagement has also begun to subside. According to an Atlantic Council poll released in early 2014, Cuban Americans in Florida are now more in favor of engagement than isolation. In the Florida gubernatorial race that same year, they validated this polling data through votes at the ballot box. Although he ultimately lost the election, a Democrat won the support of the Cuban American population for the first time, arguably a vindication — or at least not a rejection — of his open support for ending the embargo. Undoubtedly, Obama, who had won a second term following the Cartagena Summit, saw the momentum shifting among the Cuban American population and seized it as an opportunity to shape his presidential legacy.

For Raúl Castro, the rationale behind engagement is also in some ways about legacy, but it is even more about Cuba's future — what the Communist Party now calls the "updating of the Cuban social and economic model." In 2018, he plans to step down from the presidency, and for the first time, someone outside the Castro family will drive Cuba's ever-evolving transformation. Moving forward, neither the personality of Cuba's leaders nor anti-imperial nationalism will be enough to sustain the island's revolutionary project. By engaging with the United States now, Castro hopes to leave behind some permanent sense of autonomy in foreign policy and to secure fiscal, monetary and investment policies that can sustain both growth and a modicum of social justice for future generations.

In Cuba, the definition of "revolution" is now amorphous: socialism has supplanted communism, and with it, José Martí has triumphed over Karl Marx. Propaganda billboards that all-too-familiarly dot Cuba's sparse highways now boast the slogan "Growth is Good." In a remarkable shift in rhetoric, Castro talks about equality of opportunity as the focus of the Revolution rather than egalitarianism. Slowly but surely, he is trying to fortify Cuba's economy by weaning the population off what one prominent Cuban official referred to as "the Daddy State."

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Jose Martí rides through Central Park in New York.

Photo by David Shankbone.

Photo by Christian Cordova.

A small businessman on the beach in Havana.

When Raúl Castro took over for his brother, Fidel, in 2006, he recognized the need for the revolutionary model to evolve if it were to survive through the next generation. In 2010, he bluntly stated, "We reform, or we sink." Through calculated reforms, Castro has worked to rewrite the social contract and strengthen Cuba's economy by opening up opportunities in the private sector. Since 2009, he has endeavored to cut the public-sector payroll by one million people — in a population of twelve million.

There are now approximately 200 activities for private business that can be licensed to the Cuban population. However, even with that limited number, the government has issued some 400,000 licenses for Cubans to run their own businesses. Raúl Castro and his ministers now talk of, at least as an aspiration, some 50 percent of Cuba's economy in private hands within the next five years. The state no longer controls — or desires to control — every aspect of economic life. Small businesses and employee-owned cooperatives are legal and beginning to flourish (or flounder) as private enterprises do around the world. Through a series of agricultural reforms, the government has privatized large plots of untilled, but fertile, land in an attempt to increase domestic production. A private residential real-estate market is also growing in Cuba. Instead of people in the street brokering properties on the black market, there are actual real-estate agencies on the island. Cuban nationals can now get a loan from the bank and buy property — a previously unfathomable reality — and small business loans (albeit very small) are slated to come on line soon.

With nearly unlimited remittances flowing to the island, anyone from the United States can fund these private sales and businesses. At present, U.S. citizens send an estimated $3.2 billion in remittances to Cuba annually, up from around $242 million in 1993. This amount will undoubtedly grow in the coming years. A commuter economy between Cuba and South Florida is rapidly taking hold: remittance dollars are financing small businesses on the island, which in turn are plowing money into the South Florida economy, which is exporting all manner of supplies, as well as capital, to the family business and cooperative economy. Commercial (rather than charter) flights and ferries are set to take off in 2016.

Raúl Castro implemented his economic reform package to revive Cuba's economy, which is hampered by lack of production and a dependency on an economically untenable Venezuela. Given the United States' proximity to the island, opening up relations creates a natural trading partner for Cuba as it seeks to diversify its economic activity. The most tangible reflection of this aspiration is the recent $1 billion renovation of the enormous, deep-water port at Mariel, with the support of Brazilian investment. The Mariel Port is designated a "special economic development zone," where incentives are used to encourage international companies to conduct business. By renovating the port, Cuba has set itself up in a post-embargo world as a major outpost for the United States in the Caribbean.

Castro has also been forced to deal with the politics of pent-up demand. Many Cubans, who are highly educated but lack opportunity, are pushing for the chance to put their superior education to work. Those who are unable to find what they need on the island are lured to the United States by the Cuban Adjustment Act, which gives any Cuban citizen who arrives on U.S. soil permanent residence after a 366-day period. They are also drawn to Spain because of what is known as the "grandchildren's law," which provides a Spanish passport to any Cuban citizen who can prove Spanish lineage. Or to Ecuador, which until recently had no visa requirement.

Young people who do stay in Cuba — and a notable cohort of those who are returning from Spain and the United States — are demanding a better life, a less onerous daily existence, and the opportunity to make a good living. A thaw in relations with the United States allows the Cuban government to foster a stable economic, diplomatic, and business partnership for future generations. In turn, this partnership will help feed into the geographic, demographic, and geopolitical needs of the country moving forward.

Though the preconditions that brought the U.S. and Cuban governments to the table were vital, the personalities involved on both sides mattered a great deal to making the December 2014 announcement a reality. From the Vatican and the Catholic Church in both the U.S. and Cuba to the U.S. Congress and the White House, the individuals who played a role in setting the stage for the two governments to broker a diplomatic thaw could not have been better suited for the task at hand. At points when the talks seemed like they might be going sour, what ultimately drove them forward were more human concerns than political ones: the wish of Adriana Pérez to become pregnant even though her husband, Gerardo Hernández, one of the Cuban Five, remained locked away in a U.S. jail and the influence of Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont to bring this wish to fruition, in an effort that the New York Times cheekily referred to as "sperm diplomacy"; a deep concern for Alan Gross's deteriorating physical and mental state as he sat for years in Cuban prison; and the shared moral language of the Catholic faith, shaped by Cardinal Jaime Ortega in Cuba, Cardinal Theodore Edgar McCarrick in Washington, D.C., Cardinal Seán Patrick O'Malley of Boston, and Pope Francis, the first head of the Catholic Church from Latin America, who had also accompanied Pope John Paul to the island in the 1990s and authored a book about his travels. In each of these instances, and others, the actors involved relied on personal interactions and human concerns to build a tenuous trust as the formal negotiation process continued in secret.

The talks took place over a period of 18 months, mainly in Ottawa, Canada, and they culminated at the Vatican — a symbolic blessing by Pope Francis — without a single leak or break in protocol. Perhaps what is most stunning about the U.S.–Cuba rapprochement is that, in an age when the media operates around the clock and the

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Pope Francis waves to the crowd while visiting Havana in September 2015.

Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images.

Internet and social media are pervasive, these negotiations were kept secret. Some in the United States have criticized Obama for too many unilateral steps or giving away too much to superficially address human rights abuses. The Cuban gamble, however, may be even more consequential: by opening up to the United States, Raúl Castro is placing a high-stakes bet on how much control he is willing to give up to take the steps required to preserve the fundamentals of the Cuban Revolution.

When Raúl Castro hands over power in 2018, it is unclear — at this stage — how his chosen successor will keep this new consensus together. Raúl hopes that an infusion of investment on the island and a diversified trade and diplomatic portfolio, which has space for the United States but doesn't return the kind of hegemony that country once had, will create a more sustainable Cuba that is equal parts proud of its successes and open to new ideas and healthy debate. Obama's gamble is that direct dialogue and overt, but constructive, criticism will help Cuba transition toward a more open society.

The United States and Cuba will continue to convene bilateral meetings to build on existing diplomatic momentum. The biggest change to come is the congressional repeal of the embargo, which prohibits U.S. citizens from traveling to Cuba for tourism, for example. The White House is hoping that enhanced commercial activity, made possible by Obama's use of executive authority, will compel congressional action to repeal the embargo sooner rather than later. Though it is hard to predict which president's gamble will ultimately pay off, what is certain is that consolidating this new "normal" in bilateral relations hinges first and foremost upon economic engagement. Fostering stronger economic ties will be critical not only to repealing the embargo and driving bilateral relations forward, but also to ensuring that the gains made so far outlast the Obama administration, regardless of who wins the presidency in the United States in 2016.

Julia E. Sweig is Senior Research Fellow at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at UT Austin. Her talk "The United States and Cuba: Recent History and the Path Forward" on September 17, 2015, was co-sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies and the Institute of International Studies.

Valerie Wirtschafter is a consultant on U.S.–Cuba relations. She previously provided research support to Dr. Julia E. Sweig at the Council on Foreign Relations.

A man stands on his Old Havana balcony celebrating the restoration of diplomatic relations with the U.S.

Photo by Ramon Espinosa/Associated Press.

Photo by Stefan Cohen.

An emaciated polar bear hunts in the Arctic.

CLIMATE

A Time to Choose

By James Gerardo Lamb

Global climate change, its causes, consequences, and solutions, is the subject of a profoundly disturbing, yet deeply optimistic new film, "A Time to Choose." The race against time that the planet is facing — and the tremendous stakes involved — dramatically open the film. Set against stunningly beautiful natural panoramas filmed all over the world, the opening montage movingly illustrates just what is at risk if nothing is done to change the current trajectory. Noting the warming that has already taken place in the last several decades, the threat of further climate change causing a major rise in sea levels is the first sobering reality addressed in the picture. If this effect is not soon mitigated, the film warns, with the skylines of some of the world's largest and most important cities cascading in the background, major metropolises around the globe could be submerged within the lifetimes of many in the audience. New York City, London, Saint Petersburg, Mumbai, Singapore, Beijing, and more appear on screen with their respective population totals. The narrator, noted actor Oscar Isaac, informs the audience that up to 600 million people could be affected by this displacement.

Academy Award-winning documentary filmmaker Charles Ferguson sat down for a conversation with the audience following a special advance screening of the movie at UC Berkeley, hosted by the Center for Latin American Studies in September 2015. Ferguson explained to the audience that he had been approached by Thomas Dinwoodie, founder of SunPower Corporation and a leading voice on renewable energy technology and policy, to make a film highlighting both the dire climate situation, as well as pathways to its resolution that are more practicable than ever. It was this latter realization that particularly stuck with Ferguson, who directed, co-wrote, and co-produced the film. He admitted to having shared "the predominant view, which is that this

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is a very serious problem, but there's nothing we can do about it."

In that vein, the film devotes significant focus to the technology innovators, political and social leaders, and grassroots activists across five continents who are struggling to address the problem before it is too late. Along the way, Ferguson learned "how deep the connections were between the forces that are causing the climate problem and forces causing many other problems around the world of a much more immediate and direct kind, ranging from economic inequality to the destruction of nature to the incredible human toll associated with fossil-fuel extraction."

This stark seriousness informs the tone of the narrative, which is broken down into the major areas contributing to climate change. In each part, however, the forward-looking and solution-oriented perspective of the director lightens what might otherwise be a bleak and overwhelming subject. It is, as Ferguson said, "a film about the problem and how to solve it," its message delivered in a line of text following the opening sequence: "We can stop climate change."

The first major part of the film deals with perhaps the most widely known contributor to climate change: the extraction and burning of fossil fuels for energy. Fully two-thirds of global warming is caused by this type of energy production. At the front end, the extraction of these fossil fuels has tremendous human and environmental consequences, while the burning of these fuels releases carbon dioxide into the environment, warming the planet. In both regards, the burning of coal is the most critical issue globally, particularly because of reliance on this energy source in the populous and growing nations of India and China.

The film shows the catastrophic consequences to the natural environment of mountaintop coal removal in West Virginia, which has leached toxins into the local water and sickened many residents while scarring a vivid, gorgeous landscape. The audience also sees and hears from coal miners in China, an industry so dangerous and yet economically central that all filming had to be done secretly and at significant personal risk. "I knew that coal mining was not a nice industry, but I had no idea," Ferguson shared with the audience. "When I learned coal mining had killed a million people in China and perhaps two million worldwide in the last 30 years ... that definitely was a wake-up call." Scenes of the intense air pollution in Beijing and of an enormous coal ash heap in China complete this picture of the devastating consequences of burning coal.

However, the movie informs viewers that the development of renewable energy technologies has made them scalable and cost-competitive with new energy production of any type. The price of solar and wind has come tumbling downward in recent years, and a graphic indicates that solar and wind energy may be cheaper than any other source of energy within just a few years. Moreover, the film maps the rapid increase in installed capacity and in production of renewable energy technologies. From large players in the U.S. and Chinese solar energy industries to smaller-scale entrepreneurs trying to bring solar electricity to the household sector in Kenya (where the underserved population numbers 40 million), the audience sees a new industry with tremendous possible impact just beginning to reach that potential in the present. The innovations around "mobile solar" in Kenya — households can make payments on small solar electricity systems that are cheaper than traditional, but polluting, kerosene — begins to indicate the connection between clean energy and broader social justice issues.

The costs of oil are also poignantly highlighted. From environmental devastation and health consequences and economic marginalization of local populations in the Niger Delta, to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and even geopolitical conflicts and war centered on petroleum resources, "Time to Choose" makes clear the destruction wrought by this form of energy extraction and production. Of course, oil production is most closely tied into the transportation system, its derivatives still fueling the vast majority of transport worldwide. In this context, innovations in transportation and urban planning are discussed.

Most importantly with respect to transportation, the rise of electric vehicles is profiled. One important player in this area is California-based Tesla Motors, which designs and manufactures both electric cars and energy storage products. Electric vehicles that are cheaper to operate and can travel longer distances are being developed. Storage capacity is improving in quality and cost, thanks to new battery technologies and the economies of scale that come with increasing demand. With respect to urban planning, the issues of public transportation and walkable, mixed-use urban spaces and neighborhoods come to the fore. These issues are especially crucial since a massive urban build-out, primarily in the developing world, is forecast for the coming decades. As seen in some U.S. cities, and more recently with the growth of mega-cities in China, urban transportation systems designed around private automobile transportation are beset with traffic congestion, air pollution, and alienating city landscapes.

Conversely, some cities offer a more sustainable model of urban development. In Curitiba, Brazil, investment in public transportation — notably Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), which carries two million passengers per day — has significantly reduced air pollution and emission of climate-change gases. Key public services distributed

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The aftermath of mountaintop removal coal mining.

Photo by Dennis Dimick.

Photo by marlordo59

A variety of electric cars outside San Francisco's City Hall.

throughout the city in each district, neighborhoods that combine work, leisure, and residential functions, and attention to street life, pedestrian friendliness, and public spaces like parks round out the picture. These measures contribute to countering climate change as well as other social goals, such as development of peripheral areas and public safety.

The third major part of the film deals with "land and food," the agricultural and food production systems that contribute to one-third of climate change. In this area, two major interrelated concerns are highlighted. First, meat-heavy diets in the developed — and increasingly in the developing — worlds put strain on the agricultural system. The audience learns that producing meat for human consumption takes up ten times as much land as the equivalent nutrients drawn from plant-based foods. Feedstock for livestock husbandry also contributes to other pathologies in the agricultural system, like encouraging large-scale monocrop agriculture of a few specific commodity grains. This type of farming in turn necessitates the mass use of petroleum-based insecticides, with the ensuing health and environmental consequences. As an alternative, the film offers the example of a bio-diverse, organic polyculture farm that not only yields healthier produce, but actually helps capture carbon and renew — rather than deplete — the soil's nutrients.

With so much land devoted to raising animals for food, the pressure for deforestation to clear land has been greatly increased in places like Brazil. Another example of the problems in the food production system is the monoculture palm oil plantations in Indonesia, which have been driving deforestation of particularly crucial peat forest, one of the most important carbon sinks on the planet. In addition to destroying the habitat of endangered species, underwriting a highly exploitative and unequal economic sector, and contributing to the corruption of public institutions, this deforestation is also releasing large amounts of carbon dioxide. Here, the solutions are more difficult to envision in the immediate term, but the film touches on consumer awareness and choices as well as the valiant efforts — under incredibly difficult circumstances — of anti-corruption officials fighting illegal deforestation in the country.

Indeed, one of the messages Ferguson emphasized in his comments after the movie was that "personal choices do make a difference." From the type of car we drive — or more broadly, the type of transportation we use — to the mix and type of foods we consume to efforts to conserve energy use, a change in perception and action at the individual and local levels will be a key part of any climate change solution. Of course, policy is and will remain critical: from international treaties committing to greenhouse gas emissions reductions to building regulations, urban planning, and energy production and use rules. Still, when moderator Harley Shaiken asked the director how making this film had changed him, Ferguson's first answer was "various aspects of my personal conduct," a sentiment very much in line with the pro-active message of the film. This personal conduct extends beyond individual consumption choices and also involves becoming knowledgeable about the issue and involved in policy advocacy to pressure governments and businesses to take serious action on climate change. In this vein, the film ends with scenes from the September 14, 2014, People's Climate March in New York City, which drew perhaps half a million participants to coincide with a meeting of global leaders at the UN Climate Summit.

A final lasting impression of the film involves its timing and the historical moment in which it appears. As Shaiken noted, the screening occurred between Pope Francis's encyclical, "On Care for Our Common Home," which advocated "swift and unified global action" on climate change, and the December 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference. Even more broadly, the movie comes at a time that is seeing the convergence of a long-term crisis becoming acute just as many of the technological, policy, and social innovations needed to counter it are, for the first time, also becoming feasible at the scale needed. In the optimistic register of the film, Ferguson sees both a technological and a cultural revolution approaching rapidly. Regarding how people view the kinds of cars they drive and the way they eat, "There is going to be a major cultural transition ... a cultural sea change," Ferguson predicted. "The question," he added, "is whether it is going to happen in time." As Michael Brune, the President of the Sierra Club, says in the film, "The future has become the present." It is this combination of historically new factors that makes the "time" referenced in the title of the film so significant.

Charles Ferguson is an Oscar-winning documentary film-maker. He received the 2010 Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature for his film "Inside Job."

James Gerardo Lamb is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at UC Berkeley.

Director Charles Ferguson (center) with CLAS Chair Harley Shaiken (left) and Professor Dan Kammen before the Berkeley screening.



Photo by Andrea Flores Rosas.

LATIN AMERICA

Economic Faultlines

By Manuel Castells and Fernando Calderón

A New Latin America

Since the turn of the 21st century, Latin America has been in a process of profound transformation. Within this far-reaching regional shift, however, it is necessary to account for major internal differences in each country, both in terms of social structure, culture, and institutions, as well as in terms of the relationship to the global system.

With regard to economic growth, the region as a whole has modernized its productive structure, increased its competitiveness in the global economy, and changed its traditional patterns of dependency vis-à-vis the United States. Overall annual GDP growth was 4 percent in 2003–2008, which slid to 2.9 percent in 2009–2011 under the impact of the 2008 economic crisis in the U.S. and Europe, then continued at 2.8 percent in 2012–2013, and kept growing until 2014–15. Latin America withstood the effects of the 2008 financial crisis much better than the U.S. or Europe and, despite the region's deeper integration in the global economy, actually decoupled itself from the evolution of the developed world for the first time. In short, after 2001, Latin America experienced more than a decade of sustained economic growth and increased competitiveness, although a number of countries are experiencing economic traumas today.

We contend that the containment of the effects of the global financial crisis and steady economic growth in the 2003–2013 period were due to two major factors. First, the regulatory role of the state was stronger than in the U.S. and Europe, particularly in financial markets after the crises of the 1990s throughout the region, the crisis of the *real* in Brazil in 1999, and the collapse of Argentina's banking system in 2001 (it appears that the Cardoso administration and the Kirchner administration took more effective financial regulatory measures than either the U.S. or Europe, adapting more efficiently to the systemic volatility of global financial markets). Second, there was a transformation of world trade patterns, with South–South trade (both with Asia and within Latin America) becoming increasingly more significant than dependency on the United States or the European Union.

Photo by Emilio Kiffer.

An abandoned railcar symbolizes the failure of Argentina's rail privatization under neoliberal policies in the 1980s.

At the same time, democracy — the key problem in the history of Latin America — stabilized throughout the continent. In 1976, there were only three democracies in the region; now democracy is pervasive, despite 16 occasions on which presidents either resigned or were removed from office, including two coups that were rapidly reversed. According to Latinobarómetro, the index of satisfaction with democracy as a form of government peaked in 2010 and continues at a very high level by international standards, despite widespread disaffection with political parties and most politicians. Indeed, although democracy as institutional form has been legitimized, the traditional weakness of the political system still characterizes most of Latin America (with the exceptions of Uruguay and Costa Rica). In recent years, the main mechanism to stabilize the state, in spite of institutional flaws, has been the rise of charismatic leaders in a number of countries (Chávez, Lula, Kirchner, Morales, Correa). This phenomenon is, in fact, a short-term solution to an endemic problem.

Poverty, the other traditional ill of Latin America, has been reduced from 48% of the population for the entire region in 1990 to 44% in 2002 and to 28% in 2014. Extreme poverty has dwindled from 19.4% in 2002 to

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12% in 2014. Adding the dramatic improvement in main health indicators and near-universal enrollment at the primary education level (despite the poor quality of the school system in many cases), we observe a Latin America that is quite different from the traditional image. We propose that this scenario is largely due to a renewed presence of the state as a central actor in the development process, with strategic guidance and public spending in infrastructure, education, and health, as well as redistributive policies such as the Bolsa Familia in Brazil. Indeed, the neoliberal model of unfettered market-led insertion in globalization collapsed around the turn of the century in most countries, both economically and socially (with the strict economic measures of the *corralito* in Argentina in 2001 being the most symbolic expression of this collapse). And a new model emerged: a model self-declared as *neodesarrollista* (neodevelopmentalist), which was centered in the state, but aimed at global market competition, quite similar to the East Asian development model in the 1960s–1980s period of the Asian takeoff.

A Bolsa Familia identification card.
(Photo from the Senado Federal do Brasil.)

On the other hand, the criminal economy has become a fundamental sector of the broader economy, a destabilizing force in society, and a disabling factor for the governments of some countries, particularly in Mexico, Central America (with the major exception of Costa Rica), the Caribbean, and Peru. Fortunately, Bolivia seems to have reversed the influence of narcotraffic.

This transformation of the development model from neoliberalism to *neodesarrollismo* (neodevelopmentalism) was largely due to the resistance of large segments of the population to the exclusionary policies of forced incorporation into the global economy for the benefit of elites, old and new. In a number of countries, another fundamental factor conducive to a new polity was the asserted expression of oppressed cultural identities, particularly in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, but equally present in Chile, Mexico, and Colombia under different ethnic identities. A combination of social movements against exclusion and identity movements against institutionalized racism gave birth to a new constellation of political actors, including the Bolivarian regimes (Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua), nationalist *indigenista* regimes (such as Bolivia and neo-Peronism/*kirchnerismo* in Argentina), and political left-wing governments, like the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil and Frente Amplio in Uruguay. The broad process of social change underlying these political transformations included the affirmation of human rights, the rise of women's consciousness and the improvement of their condition, as well as the recognition of multiculturalism in society and politics. Furthermore, the ascendance of new political actors traditionally opposed to the United States' control of the region led to a new geopolitical insertion of Latin America in the world — particularly in Mexico, Central America, and Colombia — diversifying the economic and political links that now include China, Japan, Southern Africa, and to a lesser extent, Russia, together with a greater role of European Union countries, alongside the still-significant presence of the United States.

However, the new hegemony of the state was based on weak political institutions, particularly the political parties that became rapidly vulnerable to widespread corruption and patrimonialism in a context of democratic freedom in which civil society could mobilize and the media and social networks could denounce. The result has been the emergence of new networked social movements (Castells, 2015) — particularly in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Central America, as well as the civil resistance that led to the ousting of the corrupt president in Guatemala — that challenge statism and try to imagine new forms of democracy and new models of development based on sustainability and dignity. All these trends, in their contradictory realities, are what we call the New Latin America. We will now focus on critical components of this new historical landscape.

The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism

After the lost decade of the 1980s, the 1990s saw an accelerated insertion of Latin America into the global economy, liberalization of markets, privatization of public companies and natural resources, strategic alliances of companies and states with multinationals (particularly in banking, communications, and technology), decreased dependence on the United States, and technological modernization, particularly the use of communication technologies and the

expansion of digital media. Yet widespread corruption, submission to the multinationals' interests, lack of an informational model of development that could make the economies truly competitive in the global Information Age, massive rise of poverty and inequality, and vulnerability to financial crises (the Tequila Crisis of 1995, the Brazilian Crisis of 1999, and particularly, the collapse that led to Argentina's 2001 corralito) signaled the limits of neoliberal integration in the global economy. It was clear that the Fajnzylber strategy of productive transformation with equity was the only approach that could make Latin America a modernized region competitive in its own right (Fajnzylber, 1993). But the political conditions for such a strategy were not present in any country in the last years of the 20th century.

Social protests and political challenges to neoliberal globalization forced an opening of the political systems in most countries (Calderon/UNDP, 2014), starting with the Zapatistas in 1994, who explicitly opposed Nafta in defense of the Mexican Revolution and Indian identity. In Venezuela, the democratic take-over of institutions began with the Bolivarian Revolution after the 1998 election and was supported later by a series of re-elections of Chávez and the Chavistas. Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia elected governments that challenged the Washington Consensus and engaged in a nationalist-leftist strategy of autonomous development. Costa Rica continued with its social-democratic policy of pacifism, modernization, and a tropical welfare state. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay clearly positioned themselves against global financial capitalism, while engaging in global competition. In Colombia, on the other hand, the civil war and Uribe's paramilitary state blocked political change for some time, although such transformation did take place at the municipal level, particularly in Medellín and Bogotá. And in Mexico, the narco-state created a specific context of civil war — within and between the cartels and the state apparatuses, with a death toll of 100,000 — that still dominates the dramatic situation of one of Latin America's most important countries.

There was, however, one case of the neoliberal model's partial survival — Chile — with one fundamental observation: there were actually two models of Chilean development, and the democratic model was neoliberal in the economy, but not in the state.

Indigenous Zapatista women in Mexico. >>

Photo by Antonio Nava.



Photo from the Gobierno de Chile.

Chile's five post-restoration presidents (from left): Ricardo Lagos, Michelle Bachelet, Sebastian Piñera, Patricio Aylwin, and Eduardo Frei.

The Chilean Exception: Neoliberalism with a Human Face

In his 2005 book, Castells empirically differentiated two models of development in Chile: the liberal exclusionary authoritarian model under the Pinochet dictatorship (1974–1989) and the liberal inclusionary democratic model that started in 1990 under the governments of the Concertación and bloomed in the Lagos administration of 2000–2006. The data and analysis presented in this book demonstrated that the democratic model was much more efficient in terms of economic growth, when comparing the two periods' control of inflation, human development indicators, macro-economic stability, productivity, and international competitiveness. At the same time, human and political rights were asserted, democracy was restored (albeit with some limitations inherited from the dictatorship), and poverty and extreme poverty were significantly reduced. On the other hand, free-market policies, both domestically and internationally, were at the center of the development strategy, and extensive liberalization was maintained, with an all-out export-oriented strategy. Yet, the copper mines — "the salary of Chile" nationalized by Allende — remained in the public sector for the simple reason that Pinochet did not reverse the nationalization in order to have direct control of the main wealth of Chile and to use this control for his predatory accumulation of a personal fortune.

It has been clearly proved that the strictly neoliberal model ended in Chile in 1990, but some of its economic features continued to characterize the country's successful development. New industrial relations, democratic control of the state, and a legitimate government have smoothed the social resistance that led to the political challenge to the hegemonic neoliberal model in other countries. As a result, Chile has been able to maintain steady economic growth and to increase productivity and competitiveness over the years. However, as soon as the inefficiency and corruption of parties in the Concertación opened the way for the election of conservative Piñera, a highly legitimate and mobilized student movement took to the streets and ultimately contributed to the (re)election of president Michele Bachelet, a progressive Socialist, in 2014.

Social Resistance and Political Change as the Source of Neodesarrollismo

The revolts against social exclusion and the affirmation of multiculturalism and dignity were at the roots of the political processes that took place in Venezuela with Hugo Chávez, in Ecuador with Rafael Correa, and in Bolivia with Evo Morales. Furthermore, the election — for four consecutive terms — of the left-wing PT in Brazil, under the charismatic leadership of Lula, altered the balance of power in the region. Building on the policies of macroeconomic stability and modernization of Fernando Henrique Cardoso — despite the deep differences between Lula and Cardoso — the PT moved toward a new developmental state at the forefront of the process.

It was the Brazilian emphasis on investment in productive infrastructure, together with increases in social spending and redistributive policies that gave birth to neodesarrollismo in Latin America. Argentina experienced a similar process under Kirchnerism, combining socio-political mobilization from the Peronist movement with a dominant role of the state that took on the multinationals and loosened the grip of financial markets on Argentina's economy. Uruguay joined the effort under the leadership of President Mujica. A former member of the Tupamaros guerrilla group, Mujica fully embraced democracy and asserted dignity and welfarism, becoming one of the most respected political figures on the international scene.

Thus, Latin America created the political foundations for a state-led development strategy based on the creation of a productive infrastructure to provide the resources for social spending that could improve the living conditions of the population. Statism, productivism, and welfarism expanded in a process of synergistic interaction, supported politically by neopopulist movements and left-wing parties in a 21st-century version of the political left. The success of the strategy, however, was largely predicated on favorable new conditions of the world economy.

The Neodesarrollista Model and the New Globalization

The rise of China to a preeminent position in the new global economy provided a huge market for the exports that still characterized most of the region: agricultural products, raw material commodities, and energy. The more China imported and invested in Latin America and the rest of the Southern Hemisphere, the more it induced economic growth in the global south, which became an expanding market in itself.

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Bolivia's reliance on lithium extracted from the Uyuni Salt Flats makes the country vulnerable to commodity price shifts.

Photo by DimitriyB.

Latin America took advantage of the bonanza in the price of commodities linked to the surge of demand in China, India, and other large markets to modernize its primary sector, using new technologies (in information and agricultural genetics), new knowledge, and new commercial strategies.

A new model was born: what we call "informational extractivism." While informationalism did not transform the entire productive system, it did transform the production of soy, meat products, energy and gas, and rare metals (e.g., lithium in Bolivia), increasing quality and productivity in a virtuous circle of economic growth. However, the success of neodesarrollismo was predicated on two premises, which would soon reveal their fragility: that global demand for commodities would continue to rise and their prices remain high; and that the state, basing its legitimacy on redistributive policies, could remain unchallenged by an increasingly informed, active society, with a growing, assertive middle class.

The Crisis of Neodesarrollismo

The inability of almost every country to engage in a full-fledged informational transformation of economy and society at large — for instance, in research, higher education, and innovation policies (Castells and Himanen, eds. 2014) — left the pattern of economic growth almost entirely dependent on the exports of the extractive sector. As soon as China's growth slowed and commodity prices fell, Latin American economies revealed their vulnerability to the fluctuations of the global economy. Even the most diversified economy, Brazil, did not have enough knowledge-based capacity to shift its export mix to higher value-added goods and services. While Latin America had learned to manage financial volatility to some extent, it could not do the same with trade volatility.

As a result, Argentina's economy shrank by 2 percent in 2014, as did the Brazilian economy in 2015, while the rate of growth was sharply curtailed throughout the region. 2015 is projected to be the first year of the 21st century in which the Latin American economy will not grow. While a high level of public spending (essential for social stability) continued for some time, the renewed threat of inflation — as spending outpaced economic growth — forced some governments to impose austerity policies in 2014, particularly the Rousseff administration in Brazil. Such actions undermined the popularity of governments in Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina, and although the neopopulists kept winning elections, it was with increasingly narrow margins. These narrow margins became significant reversals in the 2015 elections in Argentina and Venezuela.

Furthermore, neodesarrollismo's model of development was based on economic growth and redistribution at all costs, focusing on the development of productive forces and the improvement of the population's material conditions, particularly among the poorest members of society. This model of productivism neglected the attendant environmental and social costs. Giant metropolitan areas became the inhospitable habitat for much of society, with rates of urbanization surpassing three-fourths of the population in most countries. Housing conditions, transportation, urban amenities, pollution, and environmental livability all deteriorated rapidly. While traditional measures of human development (health, education, income) improved, a model of "inhuman development" negatively affected the quality of life for the population at large. The criminal economy, wild violence, pervasive delinquency, and the terror of gangs became the most significant problems of everyday life in virtually every country. The media nurtured this panic, showcasing the atrocious threats to ordinary citizens' daily lives. Corruption of the police contributed to a shared sense of vulnerability.

At the same time, the consolidation of statist regimes, controlled by one powerful party, evolved towards a patrimonial state, in which access to public companies became a source of funding, influence, and power for the neopopulist movements and induced widespread corruption in political systems. The tradition of transparency in Chilean democratic politics was challenged, with both conservative politicians and Concertación politicians being included in the networks of corruption, which even implicated the family of President Bachelet, a moral personality above all suspicion.

Moreover, the extensive powers of the state in almost every country were enforced with repressive strategies from the political police (sometimes with the assistance of foreign advisors), transforming into a bureaucratic presence that permeated the entire society. The new generations of youth — who had grown up in democracy and were educated, informed, and able to express themselves through the Internet — resented this overwhelming presence of the state. They opposed what they perceived as a threat to their freedom.

The criticism of inhuman development, the denunciation of political and state corruption, and the deterioration of living conditions under the impact of economic stagnation and austerity policies came together to trigger social movements, particularly in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These movements directly challenged the political regimes and their policies, focusing on the demand for alternative forms of political representation. Originally, these movements were spontaneous and driven by a younger population with projects for a better society, as seen in Brazil in 2013. However, they soon were joined by the mobilization of a middle class concerned about the loss of their privileges, as in Venezuela or in Brazil in 2015. Societies fractured, and the legitimacy of neodesarrollismo and its agency — statism — gradually faded away.

Latin America entered a period of economic uncertainty and political instability in 2015, as the new social structure formed during the growth period of the 2000s no longer corresponded with the political agents that had come to power through their struggle against neoliberalism. In a process of conflicts and contradictions over the last two decades, Latin America has superseded both neoliberalism and neodesarrollismo and is currently in search of a new model yet to be discovered in the practice and consciousness of its people.

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Castells and Calderón spoke for CLAS on September 24, 2015, and wrote this article for the Berkeley Review in October 2015.

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Protest in Brazil, March 2016.

Photo by Leonardo Veras.

BRAZIL

Tottering Toward the Brink

By Elizabeth McKenna

There's a longstanding joke about the year 2015 in Brazil. Customarily, if a national holiday falls on a Tuesday, Brazilians will "enforcar" Monday. The word *enforcar* literally translates as "to hang" or "to strangle," but figuratively, it means to treat any day between a weekend and a holiday as a day off. In 2016, September 7 – Brazil's Independence Day – falls on a Wednesday. Thanks to the logic of *enforcamento*, some students, workers, and bosses will happily justify skipping out on two days of work or more.

It was in this context that a street vendor told me: "We heard that we would host the World Cup in 2014. Then they announced that Rio won the 2016 Olympic bid. So naturally everyone thought, 'Great! We'll just enforcar all of 2015!'" He laughed.

In many ways, the year 2015 in Brazil reflected something of a suspended state of affairs. Deepening political and economic crises beset the country. Its brief status as a star emerging economy with a soaring 6 percent GDP growth rate came to an end in 2010. Inflation and unemployment were on the rise, and the *real* lost 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar between 2013 and 2015. Dilma Rousseff's approval rating sank to the lowest for any sitting president since the polling institutes first started keeping track, falling below even that of Fernando Collor de Mello, who was impeached in 1992. Considered side-by-side, three covers that The Economist published in 2009, 2013, and 2016 speak to Brazil's recent volatility.

Brazil's 7–1 loss to Germany in the World Cup semifinals was only the beginning of a series of defeats. Soon after the commodity boom with China went bust, the country's largest political parties, private construction companies, and most recently, private banks were exposed for orchestrating the biggest publicly known

Rio de Janeiro's Cristo Redentor statue outlined against swirling clouds.

Photo by Geraint Rowland.

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Changing perceptions of Brazil.

corruption and cover-up scandal in Brazil's history: Operação Lava Jato (Operation Carwash). Pundits have been quick to declare the collapse of Brazil's second so-called economic miracle.

The Specter of Corruption

In November 2015, a much-publicized poll indicated that for the first time in history, corruption ranked as Brazilians' foremost concern:

What is the biggest problem facing Brazil today?

ISSUE	% OF RESPONDENTS
Corruption	36%
Health	16%
Unemployment	10%
Education	8%
Violence	8%
The Economy	5%
Other	17%

(Datafolha poll (Nov. 2015): N = 3,541 ME ± 2%.)

Less than a year ago, similar polls reported that the number of Brazilians who identified corruption as the biggest problem never surpassed single digits. Two questions follow: 1) Has the country become more corrupt than in years and decades past? 2) What is meant by the term "corruption," a construction that is now as banal as the catchall phrase "the economy"?

In the following three sections, I offer three ways to contextualize these questions in light of Brazil's current and deteriorating political conjuncture.

Bringing History Back In

Many of the discussions surrounding Brazil's latest corruption scandal have lost their historical moorings. A large body of scholarship has documented corruption as an endemic feature of Brazil's political and cultural life, dating back to Portuguese colonial rule, passing through the country's brutal and protracted history of slavery, and continuing into the post-democratization period of "neoliberal reform[s] combined with a level of corruption unprecedented even for Brazil," as Peter Evans wrote in "Embedded Autonomy" (1995). The more recent political history of the country – more than 13 years of Worker's Party (PT) rule – amounts to what sociologist Ruy Braga calls "a (weak) reformist project led by a union bureaucracy in a time of global financial hegemony" (2015). Yet the structural underpinnings of the most recent crises are lost in the inchoate outrage against "corruption" in Brazil. We must ask: What are the material conditions that give rise to scandals like Operação Lava Jato?

Brazil has long been one of most unequal countries in the world. Setting aside wealth, which many stratification scholars argue is the most accurate way to measure intergenerational status transmission, the richest 10 percent of Brazilians receive 42 percent of the country's income, while the bottom 40 percent receive only 13.3 percent (IBGE, 2013).

Political scientist Marta Arretche told El País that Brazil's dubious distinction on inequality indexes meant that relatively "cheap policy concessions such as Bolsa Familía and increases in the value of the minimum wage" had a disproportionately large impact on overall inequality measures. Brazil's much-heralded gains were

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GDP Growth and National Strike Count, 1983-2013



Labor unrest grows with declines in Brazil's GDP growth.
GDP data: World Bank (2015); Strike data: SAG-DIEESE's Strike Monitoring System, UNICAMP (2012).

modest but effective at securing what Braga, drawing on Gramsci, says can only be described as the passive consent of the masses. A blunt yet telling comparison of the relationship between Brazil's GDP growth between 1983–2013 and the number of worker's strikes over that same period reflects this trend (see figure above).

The Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE) has not yet released data on the number of strikes in 2014 and 2015, but the inverse relationship between economic growth and unrest is expected to continue. Brazil's GDP fell 1.7 percentage points in the third quarter of 2015 — the worst performance in 20 years — and analysts are forecasting an additional 3 percent plus contraction in 2016. Meanwhile, estimates of strike counts in 2014 numbered more than 400 in only a four-month period, suggesting a return to the levels of the mid-1990s.

Sporadic street mobilizations on both the left and right in 2013–2015 indicate that some segments of the population have begun to gain an awareness of their own historical agency. This awareness is viewed as a positive development after the quiescent 2000s, a period that sociologist Luiz Werneck described as a "great, depoliticized Sahara of civic life" (2011). At the same time, a number of *militantes* (activists) with ties to longstanding social movements responded with incredulity to phrases like "the giant has awoken," the catchphrase used to describe the 1.4 million protestors who took to the street in June 2013. Many of the protestors belonged to middle socioeconomic strata: they were largely urban, well educated, and earned on average more than twice the minimum wage. The profile of the 2015 and 2016 impeachment protesters was even wealthier and more homogenous.

"The giant may have just woken up, but the periphery never slept," one activist told me. Another leader of the Homeless Worker's Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto, MTST) put it this way:

> Brazil has a long history of peasants, workers, and marginalized classes engaging in struggle. [The] Brazilian people who are most exploited have always resisted, but always within the context of a very strong state. The Brazilian state is perhaps one of the strongest and most consistent in post-colonial history; it has been able to administer class conflict very efficiently.

Both of these interview respondents speak to the historical and class nature of the current political crisis, a dimension that has been disguised generally behind the banal language of corruption, and in particular, by "lulopetismo," a neologism that combines the former, larger-than-life President Lula da Silva and his party, made up of Worker's Party loyalists, *petistas* (Peschanski, 2015).

Corruption by Any Other Name

Operação Lava Jato revolves around a money–politics connection that extends into the highest reaches of government and into the wealthiest enclaves of the private sector. Members of the country's largest political parties, construction companies, and private banks are under investigation for perpetrating the largest graft scandal revealed in the country's history.

Much of the public outrage appears to be highly selective. To take just one example that Juliana Barbassa discusses in her new book, "Dancing with the Devil in the City of God" (2015), there have been 8,466 extrajudicial killings by police officers in the urban periphery of Rio de Janeiro in the past decade alone. Nearly 80 percent of the victims were black (Amnesty, 2015). As Céli Regina Jardim Pinto, a scholar of the history of corruption in Brazil, has observed, "pointing a finger at those who are guilty does not absolve society of responsibility." She further explains:

> Identifying the corrupt, judging them as corrupt, making them return illicitly obtained resources, and condemning them to prison are necessary acts and must be justly carried out. But, at the same time, we must recognize that [these steps] are incapable of reducing 'residual' corruption, [evident in] … a population that has little compunction about judging acts of corruption large and small but which itself does not feel obligated to follow laws, even the simplest of traffic laws.

Ironically, the person perhaps most aware of this double standard — epitomized by the Brazilian idiom *dois pesos, duas medidas* (two weights, two measures) — is federal judge Sérgio Moro, whom some consider a hero for spearheading the recent indictments. "It is not Operação Lava Jato that will solve the problem of corruption in this country … for that to happen, we need to improve our institutions, and I do not see that happening at all," he told the national public news agency Agência Brasil.

Three Options for the Future

Brazil's unrest is not the result of a sudden epiphany about the inegalitarian nature of its institutions, nor

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Starting as a money-laundering investigation, Operação Lava Jato grew to threaten the Rousseff government.

Photo from Polícia Federal do Paraná/Agência Brasil Fotografias.)

Photo by Rodrigo Soldon.

Brazil's natural beauty: a sailboat in front of Pão de Açúcar.

a heretofore unknown revelation about the ways in which kickbacks fuel what Barbassa called the country's "construction industrial complex." Most observers instead point to the economic crises and a political climate of uncertainty, what sociologist João Alexandre Peschanski called *desnorteamento político* (political disorientation). The familiar rules of the game — those that govern how legislation passes, how contracts are awarded, how stadiums are built, how politicians are elected — have disintegrated.

It is impossible to know what the long-term fallout of the current crises will be. However, there are at least three hypothetical paths forward. The first and much more difficult option might entail what some scholars call "political articulation," which refers to a coordinated "politicization" of divisions to suture together once-atomized groups. In some ways, Rousseff's impeachment proceedings have done just that: galvanizing right-wing sectors around neoconservative politicians like Jair Bolsonaro, who is leading in the polls for the 2018 elections among voters in the highest income stratum. At the same time, although Brazil's left is notoriously fragmented, umbrella movements like the Movimento Povo Sem Medo and the Frente Brasil Popular have united in their opposition to the impeachment, to austerity policy, and to the rollback of hard-won social rights.

The political articulation approach is to be contrasted with the anti-party, anti-political, and "national unity" sentiment that characterized some of the massive, digitally enabled, middle-class protests of recent years. According to Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tuğal's recent book on the subject, successful political articulation manifests as "a constant call and response between [political] parties and would-be constituents." This dynamic is impossible in the absence of class-conscious associations, movements, and parties that are internally organized enough to contest political power. In this organized scenario, "equality of voice" — progressive or reactionary — stands a chance to "balance inequality of resources," as Sidney Verba famously described the defining feature of a functioning representative democracy.

The second option is to approach this interregnum in the same way that the street vendor joked about Brazilians treating the time between the World Cup and the Olympics. The country will ride out this cyclical economic downturn, there will be a nominal transition of power within the existing state machinery, and the conditions that permit widespread corruption and structural inequality will remain intact. Lest we forget, in the 15 years after Collor de Mello's impeachment on corruption charges, he was twice elected — and still serves — in the senate that is now tasked with weighing Rousseff's impeachment. In short, as the Brazilian saying goes, *tudo acaba em pizza* (it all ends up in pizza), which is to say that after all of the tumult, everything returns to the status quo. This scenario seems increasingly likely if the PMDB — the second-in-command political party that Brazilians describe as *fisiologista* (opportunist) — takes power after Rousseff is impeached.

A third, perhaps most probable, option is a mix of political articulation and political amnesia. New parties and movements will emerge, as they have, but they may turn on transactional electoral calculus rather than strategies that strengthen the power of their constituents vis-à-vis the state. So long as the battle only plays out in the legal arena or in congressional floor fights in Brasília, the conditions that give rise to corruption in all its sordid forms will continue unperturbed.

In her new book, "Dancing with the Devil in the City of God: Rio de Janeiro on the Brink" (Simon and Schuster, 2015), journalist Juliana Barbassa examines a city in crisis as Rio prepares to host the 2016 Olympics. Her talk on November 9, 2015, was co-sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies and the Institute of International Studies.

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Impeached for corruption as Brazil's first post-coup president, Fernando Collor de Mello has twice been reelected to the Brazilian senate.

Photo from the Senado Federal do Brasil.

Photo by Esteban Ignacio Paredes Drake.

CHILE

Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, Concepción, Chile, August 2015.

Reflecting on the Revolutionary Left

By Marian Schlotterbeck

Four years ago, in October 2011, I was sitting on a park bench in the southern Chilean town of Tomé, enjoying the warm spring day and talking to retired textile worker Juan Reyes. I had met Reyes in the context of my dissertation research on the rise of Chile's revolutionary left, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR). Over the past months, Reyes had arranged and often accompanied me on interviews with former members of the MIR and its student and labor fronts.

Reflecting on this process of remembering, Juan Reyes said softly, "All this time, no one ever asked about the people, what happened in their lives, and how they felt about it … the Unidad Popular, the dictatorship, the Concertación … *se tapó* — it was all covered up." He paused before adding that even as former *miristas*, "we never talked about it either, about how we were, and what had happened in our lives." The silencing of Chile's recent history, particularly about what came before the 1973 military coup, was so complete that Reyes initially had been surprised that I had wanted to know about the MIR. When the iconic Bellavista-Tomé textile mill closed in 1997, he was the oldest employee — a distinction that earned him a handful of local history interviews. No one had ever asked about his politics.

I was interested in his politics because I wanted to know *why* everyday people decided to join Chile's revolutionary left. A question we could ask more generally about radical politics: Why does someone wake up and decide to be a revolutionary? These kinds of questions move us towards the realm of subjectivity to consider historical actors and their motivations, hopes, and values. These matters are entirely separate from the viability of a particular political project. Instead, they move us closer to understanding what gave a revolutionary project meaning, then and now.

Oral history happens in the context of the present. Memories of the Unidad Popular years (1970–1973, when Chile had a democratically elected socialist president) were filtered — just as Juan Reyes suggested — through the subsequent experiences of 17 years of military dictatorship with intense repression, exile for some, and broad disenchantment with the unrealized promises of a democratic transition.

But 2011 turned out to be a watershed year for Chileans to rethink their radical past. In the largest social movement since the dictatorship, students occupied the streets and their schools en masse. Like the nearly simultaneous Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements, the "Chilean Winter" struck a deep chord of discontent over growing social inequality. What started as protests over education in Chile quickly moved on to question the dictatorship's market-driven neoliberal policies and, by extension, the legitimacy of a political system that still maintained them 20 years after General Pinochet had left office.

Born after the democratic transition in 1990, this so-called "generation without fear" has returned, not just to the streets, but also to politics in new ways. Much has been written about the creative repertoire of student demonstrations that captivated the nation — like the 1,800-hour continuous run around La Moneda (Chile's presidential palace) or the massive kiss-a-thon. One element that caught many by surprise, including on the left, was the reappearance of the red and black flags of the MIR at student marches. Why had this iconography of revolution resurfaced after so many years and to what ends?

As historians, we often shy away from making explicit connections between past and present. A number of structural parallels exist, however, between the 1960s and our contemporary world. The student protests in Chile are responding to Cold War legacies of political violence and neoliberal economic restructuring. As heightened levels of inequality reached a breaking point with the 2008 financial crisis, the second decade of the 21st century resembles a more extreme version of the 1960s. Starting in 2010, we saw a series of movements in different parts of the world — from the *indignados* in Spain to Occupy Wall Street in the United States to the Chilean student movement — that not only questioned, but rejected the neoliberal economic model that once seemed hegemonic.

I want to consider this question of past and present working in two directions. First of all, I want to ask: How does the past continue to act on the present? As Chilean youth today engage in reimagining political practice, what historical memories do they mobilize?

And, in turn, how does the present-day resurgence of social movements change the kinds of narratives we can tell about the past?

If we consider the Cold War in Latin America, the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 marked a kind of crescendo to the opening of radical options across Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1973 military coup that overthrew his government and brought Augusto Pinochet to power marked a turning point in the consolidation of right-wing violence throughout the region. The chain of military dictatorships across South America spelled defeat for an array of leftist political groups, some of which explicitly validated armed struggle as a legitimate means of carrying out a revolution.

Like many other radical political movements, from the Sandinistas to the Black Panthers, the MIR has been alternately demonized, victimized, and romanticized. After the coup on September 11, 1973, the military junta targeted the MIR as an internal enemy of the state, and miristas disproportionately numbered among Chile's disappeared (more than 400 in the first two years of the dictatorship). During the dictatorship, the MIR functioned as a scapegoat for the specter of Marxist subversion that justified ongoing political and social repression.

For decades, the stigma surrounding the MIR effectively curtailed any serious investigation into its formative years. Following the 1990 democratic transition, victimhood became the most accepted narrative. As Chilean social historian Mario Garcés has argued, the MIR remains "a group about whom it is better to speak of as victims — of their own idealism or of state terrorism — rather than as political subjects who proposed a radical transformation of Chilean society." It should hardly be surprising then that no one had bothered or dared to ask Juan Reyes about his politics — the stigma of association with leftist politics had real consequences for decades.

With the return of social movements to the national political scene, 2011 has been called the "awakening of Chilean society." It was also an awakening of historical memory. For the first time in many years, it appeared that all those sacrifices in the past might have been for something. Amid intense debates about Chile's future, many individuals who had been silenced by fear, like

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Image from archivochile.com.

The front page of the clandestine MIR newspaper, August 1975.

Juan Reyes, openly acknowledged their past activism. For Reyes and his *compañeros* from the textile factory, watching the student protests — and sometimes even accompanying their grandchildren to marches in Concepción — gave a sense of urgency to this task.

But this process of remembering was not always easy, not only because — as Juan Reyes had suggested — their experiences during the Unidad Popular had been repressed for so long, but also because many miristas faced what cultural critic John Beverley has described as the "paradigm of disillusionment" — a refusal among 1960s activists to find anything positive in an experience that ended so badly. Lest it seem like 2011 suddenly made it fashionable for everyone to have been a revolutionary in the 1960s, I want to underscore that most of the grassroots activists I interviewed had not been prominent public figures. They were not accustomed to telling their story; they didn't have neatly packaged narratives of heroic deeds. Rather, it was the sense of possibility and hope in the present that generated an opening for previously unelaborated memories. More than one interviewee (around 60 in total) remarked at sensing a flood of speaking more freely than anticipated, of unburdening. Their memories contained multiple timeframes and conflicting emotions of sadness, anger, and hope. To tell their stories and to listen to others was to confront defeat and the consequences of loss. But it was also an opportunity to find one's ideals again and to remember how it felt to be an agent of change. As one interviewee put it: "People in the MIR gave me the possibility of hope, but it is a hope that I myself build."

A number of instructive parallels exist between this oral history of activism in 1960s and the student protests in 2011. Too often, endless debates about ideology and strategy forestall an understanding of the impact that these movements for radical change have on participants. Under the auspices of the admittedly grandiose rhetoric of utopias in the 1960s were many smaller transformations of daily life and people's sense of self. For example, Juan Reyes explained that "people changed" during the Unidad Popular years: "They were no longer content to be little people because they wanted to be more than that. Someone had opened their eyes, and now they could open [the eyes of] others." Subjective experiences of empowerment and equality remain the Chilean left's enduring legacy — one that has been overshadowed in the defeat of its major utopian projects.

Young Chileans' perception of the reality that confronts them today has parallels to the 1960s — in the distance they feel from the state and their suspicion of traditional political parties. In the 1960s, the MIR posed a challenge to the political system by demanding its expansion to include "the urban and rural poor." These demands for a more fully participatory and inclusive political system were suppressed, but not resolved, by the military dictatorship. That unresolved contradictions have become visible again should not surprise us. Until new institutions are created that can allow for actual social representation, democracy in Chile (and elsewhere) will always be incomplete, lacking legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens.

In Chile's case, the 2011 student movement revealed a crisis of legitimacy for the political system, inherited from dictatorship and still governed by the 1980 Constitution. If anything, this crisis has only deepened at a time when politicians across the political spectrum faced mounting scandals over corruption. Today, the discussions in Chile about an Asamblea Constituyente and new constitution reflect the process of social transformation that students set in motion in 2011. Democratization in Chile — and much of the world — remains a pending task and the experiences of 1960s activism offer lessons for how this task might proceed.

Above all, Juan Reyes' story underscores the real success of the MIR's grassroots organizing and its capacity to be an ally in diverse social struggles. In a short period of time — from 1965 to 1973 — the MIR and its many young activists succeeded in promoting a vision that society could be radically transformed through people's participation. The historical contribution of the MIR was the recognition that change comes from society, not solely from the state. In this sense, long-term changes cannot always be measured by immediate political victories, but rather in the capacity for long-term social transformation.

Understanding this history enables us to comprehend the present-day challenges that students and other activists face as they seek to envision a new social contract for Chile. In their efforts to redefine political practice, it will be important to move beyond the limitations of past political forms and to realize that change happens not just through the state and formal politics, but also from an organized citizenry. In this sense, the usable past of the MIR is its grassroots empowerment, rather than its vanguard politics.

Marian Schlotterbeck is an assistant professor of history at UC Davis. She spoke for CLAS as part of the Bay Area Latin America Forum on October 27, 2015.

Students ran for 1,800 hours straight around La Moneda, Chile's presidential palace, to protest poor education in 2011.

Photo by Nicolás Binder.

Photo from Google Art Project/Wikimedia Commons.

Diego Rivera with his daughter Guadalupe, circa 1927.

ART

The Mexico of My Father

By Yngrid Fuentes

Beyond the power of his imagery, painting style, and influence in Mexican art, to talk about Diego Rivera is to talk about Mexico, according to Guadalupe Rivera y Marín, daughter of the famous Mexican painter.

During her talk, "The Mexico of My Father Diego Rivera," organized by the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley and San Francisco's Mexican Museum, Rivera y Marín discussed her father's legacy and evolution as a muralist, in conversation with Andrew Kluger, president of the Mexican Museum.

Rivera's paintings and murals played a critical role in shaping contemporary Mexican culture and forming the attitudes of Mexicans themselves towards their history, from the pre-Columbian indigenous past through the turmoil of the Mexican Revolution and its fulfillment during the Lázaro Cárdenas years in the 1930s. Rivera's outsized life was intertwined with iconic artists of the 20th century, from Pablo Picasso and Amedeo Modigliani in Europe during the early years of that century to contemporary muralists like David Alfaro Siqueiros and José Clemente Orozco in Mexico from the 1920s onwards. And Rivera's art and passion linked him to defining people of his era around the world, from Detroit industrialist Edsel Ford to Leon Trotsky, the exiled Russian revolutionary.

"If there was someone who understood and loved Mexico, that was my father," said Rivera y Marín.

But it wasn't until the age of 35 that Diego Rivera truly discovered his country. After studying art for eight years in Europe, he only knew his hometown of Guanajuato, in central Mexico, and Mexico City.

"He came back [to Mexico] in 1921. He was invited to collaborate with the artistic revolution that the Secretary of Education, José Vasconcelos, planned to start," said Rivera y Marín.

The artistic revolution sparked by Vasconcelos intended to define a new Mexican culture that would give meaning to the lives and extreme sacrifices of a fractured people after the Revolution. In a country where illiteracy hovered at 90 percent in the aftermath of a devastating conflict, one vital tool was the promotion of mural painting through a government-funded program. Ordinary people, from peasants to factory workers, would be moved, inspired, educated, and amused with powerful art on public walls. Muralists like Siqueiros and Orozco were also part of this program.

A year after his return to Mexico, Diego Rivera developed his first mural in the Antiguo Colegio de San Ildefonso, at the request of Vasconcelos. In the mural called "La Creación," Rivera portrayed several well-known contemporary women artists from Mexico. One of the women who posed nude for Rivera was Guadalupe Marín. She ended up marrying him and, years later, becoming Rivera y Marín's mother.

"After [she had posed nude], my grandfather traveled from Guadalajara to Mexico to ask my father to marry my mother. That was my origin, but I only found out after many years," said Rivera y Marín with humor.

Unfortunately, "La Creación" did not meet Vasconcelos's standards. He considered it "too European," because it did not reflect Mexico's turbulent, traumatic reality. So Vasconcelos bought train tickets for the artist and his new wife, Guadalupe, to travel across Mexico. The experience would help Rivera to better understand the country, its people, and their revolution and to translate that new perception into art. Rivera's long, meandering trip through Mexico provided the passion and the subjects for his murals. His art gained meaning, relevance, and power, and his artistic genius forged the style we associate with Rivera today.

From the lives of working-class people to images of indigenous Mexicans, farmers, politicians, and depictions of power struggles, Diego Rivera's work became an account of Mexico's reality.

In front of more than 300 attendees, Rivera y Marín explained how her father's murals reflected Mexican culture, such as the traditional festivities of the Día de los Muertos or the floating parties on the Xochimilco.

As an artist with strong political convictions — he viewed himself as a Marxist and, at times, a Communist — many of Diego Rivera's murals addressed social themes, like the struggle for land. Yet his art also reflected a human universality that transcended his ideology.

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Diego Rivera, "La Creación" (1922), Antiguo Colegio de San Ildefonso.

Photo by Evgeny Zhivago. © 2016 Banco de México Diego Rivera & Frida Kahlo Museums Trust. Av. 5 de Mayo No. 2, Col. Centro, Del. Cuauhtémoc 06059, Mexico City.

Rivera y Marín said that many of her father's beliefs converged in the murals he made at the chapel of the Universidad Autónoma Chapingo.

"According to art critics, this was Diego Rivera's masterpiece. To the left, there is the land and the unfortunate living conditions of farmers, and to the right, the way the land was distributed," said Rivera y Marín.

The murals inside the chapel also featured Rivera's wife, Guadalupe, and their daughter as a cherub.

Over time, Rivera y Marín's achievements and involvement in Mexican politics would go far beyond her early appearance floating through the sky in a mural. She became a lawyer, worked as a lawmaker, and represented Mexico at the United Nations. She was also named the Diego Rivera Foundation's Chair and Director.

Rivera y Marín admitted that her father's radicalism and sympathy towards Marxism became a burden during her childhood.

"My father was widely discussed and not quite appreciated in Mexico. During his first years, when he returned from Europe, he was a member of the Communist Party," said Rivera y Marín. " And as you all know, Communists around the world are like enemies of the world."

"This was hard for me when I was a child, because people saw me as the daughter of a Communist. Now, my father is the most prominent figure in Mexican art and is seen as an example of a respected and admired Mexican around the world."

Evidence of Rivera's considerable impact outside Mexico can be found in the murals he painted in the United States in the 1930s. The Detroit Industry murals fill 27 panels in the Garden Court of the Detroit Institute of Art, and the San Francisco Art Institute is home to a mural called "The Making of a Fresco Showing the Building of a City," which Rivera painted at the request of architect and interior designer Timothy Pflueger.

"That time was very important for my father. It was a period when Frida traveled with him, and they were both guests of San Francisco," said Rivera y Marín.

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Gatefold (right): Diego Rivera, "Tierra Fecundada (Fertile Land)" (1927), Chapel of the Universidad Autónoma Chapingo.
Gatefold (overleaf): Diego Rivera, "Pan American Unity" (1940), City College of San Francisco.

(Chapingo photo by Jorge Ibarra. Pan American Unity photo courtesy of City College of San Francisco. Both images © 2016 Banco de México Diego Rivera & Frida Kahlo Museums Trust. Av. 5 de Mayo No. 2, Col. Centro, Del. Cuauhtémoc 06059, Mexico City.)

Diego Rivera, "The Making of a Fresco Showing the Building of a City" (1931), San Francisco Art Institute.

Photo by Doug Oster. © 2016 Banco de México Diego Rivera & Frida Kahlo Museums Trust. Av. 5 de Mayo No. 2, Col. Centro, Del. Cuauhtémoc 06059, Mexico City.

Photo by Peter Stackpole/Life/Getty Images.

Diego Rivera sketching for "Pan American Unity."

One of Diego Rivera's most controversial works was "Man at the Crossroads," which he did during his time in the United States at the Rockefeller Center shortly after completing the Detroit Industry murals. The fresco generated increasingly heated criticism by its patrons as a portrait of Vladimir Lenin among other noted revolutionaries began to appear. After Rivera refused to remove the image from the mural and replace it with a more "suitable" iconic American figure, John D. Rockefeller had the mural destroyed.

"That was a great emotional shock for my father. It depressed him," Rivera y Marín recalled. The mural's destruction threw Rivera into a deep depression, which also led him to one of the most unproductive stages of his career.

It wasn't until 1940 that he was resurgent as an artist: once again at the invitation of Timothy Pflueger, Diego Rivera came to San Francisco to work under the sponsorship of the architect.

The "Pan American Unity" mural features a synthesis of art, religion, politics, and technology of the Americas. Rivera painted it as part of the Golden Gate International Exposition on Treasure Island.

"My father found the way in which the United States and Mexico belong to America, and that there is a reason to fight for America, the continent," Rivera y Marín said. "It was a reconciliation of my father with the United States." She then reflected "the mural should be in [the new home of the Mexican Museum] that is going to be built, as a tribute to the friendship that we now have between the United States and Mexico."

Powerful Friendships

During his lifetime, Diego Rivera surrounded himself with the most renowned artists and activists.

In Europe, for example, he befriended many leading artists of the day, including Pablo Picasso. Around that time, the Mexican painter also experimented with diverse art techniques. He even tried his hand at Cubism.

"The Cubism created by Picasso was a dark Cubism, without political meaning, and what did Diego Rivera do? He used Cubism to confirm his political ideologies," said Rivera y Marín to explain "Paisaje Zapatista (Zapatista Landscape)," one of Diego Rivera's incursions into Cubism.

"In 1915, he was already convinced that Zapata was a national hero and was sure of the success of the Revolution,

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Diego Rivera, "Zapatista Landscape (The Guerrilla)" (1915), Museo Nacional del Arte, Mexico.

Photo by the Hermanos Mayo

Diego Rivera with Lazaro Cárdenas (left) following Frida Kahlo's hearse, 1954.

so this painting was done in tribute to Zapata. It has bright Mexican colors. Picasso was very upset and stopped being my father's friend. He also asked him to leave the Cubist group because he had broken the Cubist tradition."

Rivera y Marín also reflected on her father's relationships with public figures like Nelson Rockefeller, Leon Trotsky, and several Mexican presidents.

Leon Trotsky, the Russian revolutionary leader who was hounded across Europe by Stalin, was given refuge in Mexico by Lázaro Cárdenas. Rivera had intervened on Trotsky's behalf with the Mexican president. The Russian exile initially stayed at Diego Rivera's house and became a close friend of both the painter and his wife, Frida, Rivera y Marín said.

"Trotsky and Diego's relationship had some highs and lows. Why? Because Trotsky fell in love with Frida, and Frida fell in love with Trotsky," said Rivera y Marín.

"When my father found out, he terminated the friendship. It was tough, because when Trotsky moved to another house ... he was killed."

Kluger's conversation with Rivera y Marín concluded with a discussion on the state of contemporary art. According to her, art in Mexico has fallen short of meaning and political impact, qualities that infused art during her father's time.

"Nowadays, contemporary art lacks political meaning," she said.

"In the last years, mural painting is rarely done. It has decayed, unfortunately, and now, we see this art that I no longer understand."

Guadelupe Rivera y Marín's presence and her comments seemed to resonate deeply with the audience. One listener observed that she felt as if she had just walked with Diego Rivera through the art and politics of the first half of the 20th century.

Guadalupe Rivera y Marín, Ph.D., is the daughter of Diego Rivera. She is a lawyer, former legislator, ambassador to the United Nations, and Diego Rivera Foundation Director. She spoke at an event co-sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies and the Mexican Museum.

Yngrid Fuentes is a student in the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley, where she works as a reporter for UC-affiliated online news sites.

Guadalupe Rivera y Marín at Berkeley, November 2015.
(Photo by Jim Block.)

POLITICS

How Clientelism Actually Works

By Carlos Schmidt Padilla

In many parts of the developing world, political leaders provide goods and services to secure votes from their constituents. The conventional and theoretical logic of such clientelistic exchanges vary in scope and reach, often — but not exclusively — mediated and coordinated by on-the-ground brokers with extensive networks in their communities. In some settings, politicians or their brokers target the electorate at large, while in other cases these exchanges target particular voting groups, such as swing or absentee voters.

By engaging in a quid pro quo with voters, politicians or their brokers seek to secure electoral victory by persuading and mobilizing voters in their favor. However, it is unclear whether targeting the at-large electorate or specific swing groups is more feasible, and which strategy — if any — maximizes the politicians' chances of electoral victory. Since brokers often mediate the exchanges, politicians may have little idea about what happens when voters are courted. For example, are brokers motivating swing voters or reinforcing existing ties with loyalists? Despite the best efforts by social scientists to document this phenomenon, with and without brokers, there are conflicting views on how clientelism is carried out across the globe and particularly in developing countries.

Examining three countries with widespread clientelistic exchanges between the electorate and their politicians — Venezuela, India, and Argentina — Thad Dunning, the Robson Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, discussed the puzzle of distributive politics at the Center for Latin American Studies. His presentation focused on the logic of mobilization and persuasion in clientelism: how these exchanges are focused to reach different electoral constituencies.

Dunning identified four types of citizens from the perspectives of both the politicians and the brokers: potential voters, certain voters, loyalists, and swing voters. The first two types describe whether a voter is likely to show up to the polling booth or not, while the latter two categories characterize the voters' political leanings. The four categories interact dynamically. Voters can either be potential or certain and either loyalist or swing. Conventional theories on clientelism tell us that politicians and brokers will target potential/loyal voters to mobilize them and certain/swing voters to persuade them. For Dunning, however, this view fails to convey how distribution actually occurs through these practices. More importantly, in the cases where brokers act as the middlemen between politicians and their constituencies, conventional theories do not fully account for brokers' agency in the exchanges.

In Venezuela, for example, Dunning describes how Chávez and his supporters used a spending redistribution program, Misiones, to target voters when faced with a competitive reelection campaign in 2004. *Chavistas* built a database, Maisanta, with information on whether individuals had voted in the past and if they were considered loyalist or not. Conventional clientelism theories would hypothesize that Chávez and his followers would have targeted individuals who had voted previously and were potential swing voters (certain/swing) and individuals who had not voted in the past and were loyalists (potential/loyal) to maximize Chávez's reelection prospects. However, Dunning found that certain/loyalist voters overwhelmingly received the funds from the Misiones spending program. Instead of targeting indecisive voters, Chavez's on-the-ground operators opted to reinforce existing ties with loyalists who had given them support in the past. For the most part, chavistas opted out of gaining a foothold in new constituencies. Their patronage strategy largely reinforced existing ties with potential/loyal voters. Although this seems limiting in trying to gain votes, the chavistas' strategy worked: they gained control of the National Assembly and re-exerted their control on the Presidency. In an effort to unravel this contradiction on conventional expectations of clientelism, Dunning studied these practices in two additional settings.

Through a survey questionnaire in India, Dunning explored how voters reacted to clientelistic offers. Randomizing partisan and caste ties between survey respondents and hypothetical candidates for village council president, Dunning asked different groups of voters who they expected to give them some type of good or generate some sort of policy in exchange for their vote. When voters and politicians were co-partisans, Dunning found that the former were slightly more likely to expect a quid pro quo. Not only do more targeted goods go to partisan voters, but there is also a greater demand from partisans for benefits in return for their continued support.

Photo by Germán Canseco/Procesofoto.

People waiting for handouts from the Peña Nieto campaign during the 2012 election in San Luis Potosí, Mexico.

Dunning further tested his argument by surveying brokers in Argentina. Building a network of politicians and brokers across various provinces in Argentina, Dunning randomly sampled the broker population and conducted extensive surveys with them on how they mobilized voters. This strategy allowed him to generate a relatively representative sample of the broker population in Argentina. Presenting a hypothetical situation in which politicians gave them authority over how to allocate spending programs in order to secure votes, Dunning asked the brokers whether they would target loyalists or swing voters during the campaign. Once more, against conventional theories and expectations of clientelism, Dunning found that an overwhelming majority of brokers (more than 65 percent) would target loyalist over swing voters. Since politicians expect brokers to secure votes — and the former cannot fully distinguish between loyalist and swing voters — Dunning argued that brokers opt for the most secure venue in courting voters.

From his three empirical exercises, Dunning concluded that clientelism operates in situations with varying degrees of information among politicians, brokers, and voters. Targeting certain/loyalist voters might be a good strategy — against conventional expectations — because not only are those type of voters more likely to show up on the date of the elections, they are more likely to make brokers look as if they are actually doing their job. For Dunning, understanding information asymmetries and agency are crucial in unraveling the machine behind targeted distribution schemes.

Thad Dunning is the Robson Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, and directs the Center on the Politics of Development. He spoke for CLAS as part of the Bay Area Latin America Forum on October 21, 2015.

Carlos Schmidt Padilla is a graduate student in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

Image from Wikimedia Commons.

An 1872 map of Cuba shows the stark delineation of east and west.

CUBA

Ever the Twain Shall Meet

By Rebecca Bodenheimer

Derived from the late-19th-century writings of Cuban national poet José Martí during the struggle for independence from Spain, the notion of *Cubanidad* — "Cubanness" or the essence of Cuban identity — has always imagined a unified, hybrid nation where nationality trumps all other axes of identification. This projection of national unity became even more crucial following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ushered in the socialist regime, as the island has faced an ongoing political threat to its sovereignty by the United States for the last half century. However, despite the revolutionary government's unifying rhetoric celebrating the population's dedication to socialist ideals of egalitarianism and cooperation, expressions of regionalism are pervasive, and many Cubans cling tightly to their regional identities. Not only is there fierce loyalty to one's province of birth, but often explicit antagonism toward people from other provinces, particularly between *habaneros* (people from Havana) and *orientales* (people from the eastern provinces). These regionalist antagonisms are often entangled with notions of race. This article examines various manifestations of contemporary regionalism in Cuba and the ways that race is mapped onto different regions and cities on the island, a racialization and regionalization of Cuban society that challenges the nationalist notion of a unified Cubanidad.

Regionalism in Cuba

Far from constituting a novel social dynamic on the island, regionalism has a long history in Cuba, dating back to the early colonial period and the Spanish settlement of the island. Due to its proximity to the island of Hispaniola (the site of Columbus's first landing in the Americas), Oriente (eastern Cuba) was settled first. Santiago de Cuba, the island's second-largest city, was founded in 1515 and became the first capital of the colony. By the mid-16th century, Spanish colonizers had moved west, and Havana had grown in significance; in 1607, colonial authorities moved the capital to the western city. From that point on, western Cuba became the focus of the colonial government and its commerce, and Oriente was neglected and marginalized. Regionalist hostilities flourished due to the very distinct social and economic conditions of eastern and western Cuba under Spanish colonialism.

In the mid-19th century, while central and western Cuba were enjoying the economic boom produced by high levels of slave-driven sugar production, eastern Cuba was suffering from an economic downturn, partially due to harsh taxation by the colonial government. This explains why Oriente was the site of the first rebellion in 1868 that began the 30-year struggle for independence from Spain. Oriente's tradition of rebellion did not, of course, end with the wars of independence. The Cuban Revolution officially began on July 26, 1953, with a failed attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago by a group of rebels led by Fidel Castro, a native of another major eastern city, Holguín. After being released from jail in 1955 and spending a year in exile gathering forces for another invasion in Mexico, Castro landed in the southeastern province of Granma in late 1956. From that point on, guerrilla activity against dictator Fulgencio Batista's forces was based in the Sierra Maestra range in the eastern provinces of Santiago and Granma. Thus, like the struggle for independence from Spain, the Cuban Revolution historically has been linked to Oriente, evidenced by the fact that Santiago is known as "la cuna de la Revolución" (the cradle of the Revolution).

While regionalism has a long history in Cuba, contemporary antagonisms are quite pervasive on the island, especially in Havana between natives of the capital and orientales. Baseball is perhaps the most visible arena for regionalist antagonism, and the fierce and longstanding rivalry between the teams of Havana and Santiago is often played out on the national stage. Since the "Special Period" — the decade of extreme economic crisis precipitated by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 — the level of hostility has grown, primarily due to the marked increase in migration to Havana by Cubans from *el campo* (the countryside). Like the natives of many capitals throughout the world, habaneros consider every locale outside the capital to be "el campo," even large cities like Santiago and Camagüey.

Orientales face particular hostility in Havana, as evidenced by the term that habaneros often use to refer to them — *palestinos* (Palestinians) — drawing a parallel

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Fidel Castro seen playing for his favorite team, Oriente, against a team from the west's Pinar del Rio in 1964.



Photo from Associated Press.

between the political conflict in Palestine/Israel and the antagonism between orientales and habaneros in the Cuban capital. This term not only reveals the longstanding unequal power dynamics between Havana and Oriente, but also contains racialized overtones. In fact, even the seemingly neutral term "oriental" often functions as a euphemism for rural and/or poor blackness and even general backwardness.

Considering the fact that Israelis occupy significant portions of Palestinian land, the use of the term "palestino" to refer to orientales is curious because the latter are characterized by habaneros not as the occupied (the situation of actual Palestinians), but as the occupiers of Havana. Nonetheless, the use of the term seems to be related partly to the perception that eastern Cuban migrants are like refugees from a foreign country who have no real homeland, which is sometimes the way that exiled Palestinians are depicted.

In the eyes of many habaneros, orientales have colonized large sections of their city, packing themselves and their numerous relatives into crumbling colonial apartment buildings and contributing to the deterioration of the capital's once-great architectural accomplishments. Habaneros also tend to paint orientales as the main culprits responsible for petty theft and hustling-oriented crime that targets tourists. Many habaneros assume orientales have sinister intentions in migrating to Havana, whether to try to make a living *jineteando* (hustling tourists, which can involve a large variety of activities, including the exchange of sex for material goods or money) or to engage in the illicit buying and selling of goods on the black market.

Another principal source of tension is the police force composition: the state recruits many officers from the eastern provinces. Given that the police function as the main agents constricting Cubans' freedom of movement, orientales represent by proxy the repressive state forces that Havana residents collide with on a daily basis. Policing technologies take on a variety of forms in contemporary Havana, the most common being the random detention of citizens on the street to ask for identification, particularly if they are black Cubans walking with (white) foreigners. Furthermore, habaneros engaged in black-market activities — from non-licensed taxi driving to the illicit buying and selling of goods — often rail against the "palestino" cops for curtailing their economic ventures and enforcing the heavy-handed policies outlawing non-licensed, individual private enterprise.

Ironically, while a significant proportion of the police force is from Oriente, orientales are the most heavily criminalized and policed population in Havana. When the police randomly detain a Cuban on the street, one of the first things they check is the citizen's place of residence. If a Havana-based residence is not listed on the *carnet* (identification card), the citizen is questioned about the purpose of their stay in the capital, the result of a 1997 law that restricts migration to the capital and requires that Cubans from other provinces get authorization from the local police to be in Havana. While it has been possible in the past for Havana residents to add non-Havana residents to the registry of occupants in a given domicile, thereby providing the latter with legal residency in the capital, the state authorities have been curbing these permits since the late 1990s due to overpopulation within Havana generally. Owing to stereotypes of orientales as petty criminals and hustlers and the already-large proportion of them in the capital, they are less likely to be given authorization to stay in Havana, and many do, in fact, remain "illegally."

I have witnessed firsthand this "regional profiling" when orientales are stopped by the police. Not only does the officer radio in to the precinct to check if the detained citizen has a criminal record, but even if that person has no prior convictions, they automatically may be brought in to the precinct in a police car and subjected to a long wait while the authorities conduct a more in-depth investigation. At the very least, people who are detained are held at the precinct for several hours and sometimes released after midnight. If they have prior convictions or *advertencias* (warnings) on their record, they are sometimes deported back to their province of origin and prohibited from coming back to Havana for a certain period of time. While it is disconcerting to recognize that the criminalization of orientales in Havana is often perpetrated by their regional compatriots, it is also important to note that the police officers recruited from Oriente and other provinces often have very few occupational options and, in the end, are constrained to carry out orders issued to them from above. In sum, orientales function as scapegoats for a whole range of social problems in contemporary Havana: housing shortages, the crumbling infrastructure, police repression, black market activities, petty crime, hustling, and prostitution.

Intersections of Race and Place

As mentioned above in relation to the term "palestinos," different cities and regions in Cuba are often associated with particular racial attributes. I refer to these notions as "racialized discourses of place," by which I mean the ways that regions and locales are linked with specific racial and cultural attributes. The common assertion that Oriente is the "blackest" region of the island

Photo by Bernd Schwabe/Wikimedia Commons.

A stereoscopic image of sugar plantations in Cuba, circa 1900.

exemplifies this phenomenon. Camagüey and Pinar del Río, on the other hand, are commonly racialized as white, with the former viewed by many Cubans as the most racist region in the country. Known as "la cuna de la cultura afrocubana" (the cradle of Afro-Cuban culture), the city and province of Matanzas is also associated with blackness, albeit a very different sort of blackness than the one attributed to Oriente. Finally, Havana, as the capital and geographical signifier of Cubanidad and national identity, is often represented as the center of racial and cultural hybridity, more open to foreign influence, and less "pure" in cultural terms.

Nonetheless, these racialized discourses of place do not necessarily reflect racial demographics. For example, in regards to Oriente's racialization as black, this discourse of blackness functions as a signifier for backwardness and criminality, and it simultaneously acts to "whiten" western Cuba and signal its civility and modernity. To give another example, singling out Camagüey as the whitest and most racist place in the country allows people to disavow racism in other places, like Havana or Santiago. In addition, these notions do not correspond with racial demographics, as the province is home to one of the largest populations of (black) Haitian and West Indian descent on the island. Regarding Oriente, one of the primary reasons for revisiting its racialization as black is the fact that Holguín and Las Tunas (two of Oriente's five provinces) historically have been home to large white populations. Furthermore, during the colonial era the percentage of African-born people on the island was concentrated in the west: in 1774 almost 70 percent, in 1817 about 75 percent, and in 1899 more than 90 percent. These demographics are linked to the location of the largest sugar plantations and concentrations of slaves in western-central Cuba. At the height of the sugar boom, in 1862, both slaves and whites were overwhelmingly concentrated in the west, which created a more polarized racial climate there, but also a whiter population overall. The notion that Oriente is the "blackest" region likely stems from the demographics of the southeastern part of the region. The provinces of Santiago and Guantánamo historically have been the most nonwhite areas of the island, partly due to various waves of Antillean immigration, primarily from Haiti and Jamaica; the first major wave was propelled by the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s, and the second occurred in the early 20th century in response to the need for cheap laborers to work on sugar plantations in Oriente and Camagüey.

The discursive association of Oriente with blackness continued throughout the 20th century. In 1932, the

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Cuban Communist Party proposed the creation of an independent black state within Cuba, to be made up of the municipalities in Oriente that constituted the *faja negra* or "black belt," where more than 50 percent of the population was of African descent; most of these locales were in the Santiago province. Cuban scholars now consider this proposal to have been a misguided attempt to promote racial equality that was influenced by binary racial thinking from the United States. Moreover, only 22 percent of African-descended people on the island — including blacks and *mulatos* (those with some percentage of African ancestry) — lived in the "black belt" during this period. The proportion of nonwhites to whites was certainly higher in Oriente than in other regions in the first half of the 20th century, yet because of the overall concentration of the population in western Cuba, less than one-fourth of blacks and mulatos on the island actually lived in this province. The 1953 census showed a continuation of the demographic trends of the first half of the 20th century: whites were heavily represented in the western and central provinces and less so in eastern Cuba, but Oriente had a much higher incidence of mixed-race inhabitants. The census counts conducted after the Revolution have tended to omit information on race, which correlates with the official policy of silence on issues of racial inequality, as the regime argued that the socialist distribution of wealth had supposedly eradicated racism.

More recent national censuses were conducted in 2002 and 2012. Many researchers consider the results to be flawed, in that the figures in both seem to continue the trend of official statistical "whitening." The population in 2012 was reported as approximately 64 percent white, 27 percent *mestizo* (mixed race), and 9 percent black, figures not very different from those of the 1981 census (66 percent white, 22 percent mestizo, and 12 percent black). They seem especially dubious when taking into account the racial composition of the large majority of Cuban émigrés (white) during that period; in other words, Cuba should be a demographically blacker nation now. Interestingly, in the 2012 census the government recorded racial demographics not only of each province, but of each municipality: Villa Clara and Sancti Spíritus (in central Cuba) and Holguín (in Oriente) had the highest proportions of whites, all more than 80 percent. Santiago and Guantánamo continued to have the lowest percentages, both around 25 percent, and Guantánamo, Santiago, and Granma (all in Oriente) had the highest incidences of mulatos (all more than 54 percent). However, the city of Havana had the highest incidence of black Cubans, 15.2 percent, followed by Santiago with 14.2 percent. This means that the capital city is now the location with the highest percentage of blacks, which is quite ironic, given the tendency of habaneros to stereotype all orientales as black.

As noted above, Matanzas is also associated with blackness, largely through the notion that it is the "cradle of Afro-Cuban culture," and because of the province's strong links to plantation slavery. I do not view the racialized discourses attached to Oriente and Matanzas as contradictory or mutually exclusive, but instead find that each place is associated with a very particular type of blackness: Matanzas with cultural blackness and Oriente with social blackness. I believe that orientales are subjected to a process of "social blackening," in which racial blackness is projected onto all eastern Cubans regardless of their race, with blackness standing in for poverty, underdevelopment, and/or criminality.

Patricia Hill Collins theorizes about social blackness, asserting that people are racialized in terms of their position in the social hierarchy in ways that do not necessarily relate to skin color. For example, undocumented Latino immigrants are socially blackened, while middle- and upper-class African Americans are considered to be "honorary whites." I find this conceptualization of social blackness to be very productive for examining the discourse of race that adheres to Oriente. Orientales tend to be lumped together in the minds of western Cubans as poor, black, and uneducated, despite large populations of whites in Holguín and Las Tunas. However, many eastern Cubans whom I interviewed push against this social blackening and posit their overwhelming hybridity, both racially and culturally. Perhaps this is their way of inserting themselves into the hegemonic formation of Cubanidad that privileges *mestizaje*, being of mixed-race. On the other hand, if, as Hill Collins suggests, the racial category "black" stands in for a position of powerlessness — which I believe it does — then perhaps orientales are also fighting for a more privileged place in the hierarchy of social and economic relations on the island.

Returning to a comparison of the tropes of blackness used to discuss Matanzas and Oriente, the former is constructed as the site of the most authentic and well-preserved African-derived traditions, which is a positive discourse that alludes primarily to the past and historical phenomena. On the other hand, the racialized perceptions of Oriente are negative, in that easterners are often thought to represent a criminal, even foreign blackness. The "foreign" element is exemplified on one hand by the long history of Haitian migration to Oriente and the ways that Afro-Haitian culture is still widely viewed as outside the limits of Cuban identity. However, a connotation of foreignness is also constructed through the use of terms such as "palestino" to refer to orientales in Havana, which suggests that eastern Cubans are not really Cuban. In addition, this notion of foreign blackness is tied to contemporary social problems (as opposed to Cuba's slave past), exemplified in the idea that the "illegal" migration of orientales upsets the stability of the capital and creates residential overcrowding. Thus, the discursive blackness that adheres to eastern Cuba is not "good" or celebratory like the one attached to Matanzas, which invokes images of purity vis-à-vis African-derived culture. Unlike the social blackness projected onto orientales, this is a benign form of blackness that neither provokes social tensions among Cubans from different provinces nor threatens the hegemony of the nationalist hybridity discourse that consigns racial difference to the colonial past.

Photo by Petr Dosek.

An "oriental" girl in Santiago de Cuba.

Conclusion

The revolutionary government has always projected a picture of absolute national unity to the world, which is symbolized by a prominent billboard one encounters when driving from the Havana airport toward the city center that asserts, "Welcome to Havana, capital of *all* Cubans!" However, the expressions of regionalist sentiment that I have detailed in this article betray the cracks in the wall of Cuban national unity and socialist egalitarianism and illuminate how regional provenance is an influential axis of identity formation that can foster divisiveness. As evidenced by the discussion of the hostility towards orientales in Havana, the state's own policies that restrict and criminalize internal migration belie this unifying rhetoric. Moreover, the ways that race is mapped onto particular locales in Cuba — particularly Oriente's association with blackness — reflect longstanding inequalities between eastern and western Cuba. Examining these regional inequalities, as well as the intersections of race and place, provides a more critical view of contemporary social realities in Cuba.

Rebecca Bodenheimer is an ethnomusicologist who received her Ph.D. from UC Berkeley in 2010 and has conducted fieldwork in Cuba for more than a decade. She spoke for CLAS as part of the Bay Area Latin America Forum on October 20, 2015. Portions of this article are excerpted from her book, "Geographies of Cubanidad: Place, Race, and Musical Performance in Contemporary Cuba" (University Press of Mississippi, 2015).

Photos from Wikimedia Commons.

Lucky Luciano, Pablo Escobar, and Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán.

MEXICO

The Geopolitics of Organized Crime

By Helke Enkerlin-Madero

With a presence in 55 countries, the Sinaloa cartel is among Mexico's largest corporations. The cartel's leader, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, appeared on the Forbes list of the world's most powerful people from 2009 to 2013 and likewise has made the publication's billionaire list, ranking number 701 in 2009. El Chapo has captured the imagination of the media and is admired by many in his home state of Sinaloa as an entrepreneur and self-made man. His business of drug trafficking has also unleashed a storm of criminal violence and terror throughout Mexico.

Like most Mexicans, Sergio Aguayo was surprised by the upsurge of criminal violence in the country during the last 10 years. This maelstrom led him to focus his research on the root causes of violence in Mexico. During a Fall 2015 talk hosted by the Center for Latin American Studies, the academic and human rights activist anchored his analysis in geopolitics and criminal history. Aguayo argues that to understand the roots of organized crime and the ensuing violence, a comprehensive regional approach is essential.

His narrative rests on two central elements. First is the dynamic of the Caribbean basin. During the past century, this region has been the site of a circular flow of people, ideas, drugs, weapons, and money that ignores borders and has created the conditions for criminal violence. Like any other business, organized crime is driven by a profit motive. The second element of Aguayo's narrative focuses on the three key actors who understood the business of organized crime particularly well and drove its evolution in the region: Lucky Luciano, Pablo Escobar, and Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán.

The Cuba Connection

Lucky Luciano, an Italian-American mobster operating in New York, is considered the father of organized crime. He transformed the Mafia by establishing a corporate structure, and in 1946, he convened a meeting in Havana that Aguayo considers the symbolic moment when organized crime in Latin America and the United States became part of a single history. During this Havana Conference, attendees defined the logistics of narcotics smuggling in the Caribbean, establishing organized crime as an international venture at the same time.

In the 1970s, new U.S. legislation cracked down on organized crime, precipitating a shift in the center of power. Colombia's access to the Caribbean routes, coupled with the boom of cocaine consumption in the United States, made this South American country the natural successor. This transition marked the rise of Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín cartel. His organization was responsible for the vast majority of cocaine entering the United States, and at the height of its power, the Medellín cartel controlled a network spanning 12 countries. Escobar became the stuff of legend, the wealthiest criminal of all time with a personal worth of more than $3 billion.

Escobar's execution in 1993 and the success of Colombian and U.S. law enforcement in fragmenting the cartels led to the decline of Colombian influence in the increasingly international business of organized crime. For Aguayo, the installation of a Cold-War-era radar system repurposed to blanket the entire Caribbean undermined the Colombian cartels and played a crucial role in who would succeed them.

Making the List

With the Caribbean basin sealed to air traffic, Mexico became the only alternative route to the U.S. market. In 1997, most of the cocaine entering the United States came through the Caribbean; by 2009, 90 percent of it came over land via Central America and Mexico. Criminal violence followed the drug trade, with homicide rates rising in Mexico as they declined in Colombia.

Mexico's role as the new logistical center of the drug trade also brought about the rise of the final character in Aguayo's cast. He considers Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán to be the synthesizer of the legacies of Lucky Luciano and Pablo Escobar. Guzmán has proven to be a shrewd businessman. He has been at the head of the Sinaloa cartel for 35 years and maintained his business in the face of increasing countermeasures through ingenious strategies like his famous border tunnels.

Not only has Guzmán's business prospered, opinion polls that Aguayo has conducted in Sinaloa also show the amazing strength of the cartel's social bases. El Chapo has become an icon admired by Sinaloans, immortalized in popular music and in paraphernalia that highlight his ranking on the Forbes Billionaires List. Guzmán's escape in July 2015 from a maximum-security prison in Mexico — the second time he achieved this feat — solidified his status.

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The motorcycle in the tunnel through which Guzmán escaped Mexico's highest security prison.

Photo by Eduardo Verdugo/Associated Press.

The effects of his January 2016 recapture are still uncertain. The Mexican government has been mocked, rather than praised, for showcasing the feat as a triumph, and it has done nothing to improve public perception of Peña Nieto's presidency. Guzmán, on the other hand, remains a source of fascination, although the rather farcical details of his capture have perhaps tarnished his mythical outlaw image. The effect of his capture on the drug trade — which should be the central concern — has gone largely unreported.

Where to Next?

Mexico will not be the epicenter of the drug trade and its related violence forever. Just as cartel operations switched from Colombia to Mexico because of transportation issues — or a multinational moves to a different country to lower production costs — the business of drug trafficking could shift again. Mexican drug trafficking organizations face ever-increasing pushback from the government, which increases their operating costs. It is this sustained strategy, rather than the capture of visible capos like Guzmán, that will eventually lead to their weakening. Aguayo's eyes are set on Cuba as the potential new center of organized crime. The island is increasingly open, geographically close to the drug trade's most important market, and already part of the history of organized crime in the region.

Aguayo stressed that the same comprehensive regional approach necessary for understanding the dynamic of organized crime in Latin America is, likewise, the source of its solution. For drug trafficking organizations, there are no borders. If governments want to be successful in their fight against them, they must share this perspective, applying holistic policies. However, Aguayo considers it politically impossible for governments to come to an agreement regarding a truly joint approach to organized crime, at least for the foreseeable future.

He proposes that scholars should also follow the path of Lucky Luciano, Pablo Escobar, and El Chapo Guzmán and forget about borders. Criminal violence must be analyzed in an integrated and interdisciplinary way; it is essential to produce the tools for society to defend itself. Academia in the region has the challenge of generating the knowledge to confront the threat of organized crime.

Sergio Aguayo is a professor at the Center for International Studies at El Colegio de México. He spoke for CLAS on November 12, 2015.

Helke Enkerlin-Madero is a graduate student in the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley.

The heirs of gangster Meyer Lansky are suing for compensation for Havana's Riviera Hotel, shown in 1973.

Photo from Wikimedia Commons.

A woman silhouetted in the window of a darkened office building. (Photo by Andrés Cediel.)

MIGRATION

Alone in the Night

By Levi Bridges

Imagine that you have punched in to work at your night job as a janitor in a nondescript building, long after the other employees have gone home, when your supervisor begins flirting with you. What starts as something seemingly innocent — a few compliments about your appearance — quickly gets physical. Several nights later, your supervisor steals up behind you and grabs your shoulders. You scream, and then remember that there is no one in the building who can hear you.

Many female workers — particularly undocumented immigrants from Latin America — are raped by their employers or supervisors. Women employed in the janitorial industry, who often work alone at night, are especially vulnerable to sexual assault.

A new documentary, "Rape on the Night Shift," aims to shed light on this devastating reality. The film premiered on the PBS program "Frontline" in 2015, the result of an investigative reporting collaboration between Univision, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR), and the Investigative Reporting Program (IRP) at UC Berkeley. The reporters who led the project found that female janitors are particularly vulnerable because they often work alone. The film cites the Department of Justice, which reports that more than 17,000 incidents of sexual violence occur on the job in the United States each year.

One victim, María Bojorquez, recounts in an opening scene how her boss harassed her. "I always had to check in with my supervisor," Bojorquez recalls. "At first, he tried to gain my trust. He started with flattery. And then he would pretend to be reaching for something but would brush against my breasts or sometimes just grab them."

Bojorquez breaks down in tears as she shares her story. She explains that her boss intimidated her to keep silent. "I told him that I was going to complain, and he would say, 'They won't believe you,'" Bojorquez recounts on camera.

The reporters who tackled this unsettling story began the project three years ago while working on "Rape in the Fields," a documentary about sexual abuse suffered by immigrant farmworkers. Prior to this film, little reporting existed on the subject of sexual violence in the workplace. Rape victims are understandably reluctant to speak publicly: they may fear revictimization or other repercussions, especially if they are undocumented workers. The reporters spent nearly a year identifying potential sources willing to go on camera in an investigation that took them from the sweltering agricultural towns of California's Central Valley to

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isolated egg-processing plants on the frigid plains of Iowa. What they found was a pattern of systematic abuse of female agricultural workers across the United States.

Workers in the agricultural and janitorial industries are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault because many of them come from outside the United States, particularly Latin America, and are undocumented. Immigration status is often an additional risk factor for abuse. Among the undocumented community, incidents of wage theft — when bosses refuse to pay workers and threaten to call immigration officials if they complain — are commonplace. Employers and supervisors may also use similar threats to coerce workers to remain silent after they have endured sexual violence.

"I don't speak English. I don't have work papers. So I have to put up with this," says one farmworker who appeared in "Rape in the Fields."

"And if you don't give in, you don't have a job the next season," another worker in the documentary adds.

One of the most significant challenges faced by the reporters who produced "Rape in the Fields" was quantifying the extent of the problem in the agricultural industry. In their research, they discovered a UC Santa Cruz study that found that nearly 40 percent of 150 California female farmworkers had experienced sexual harassment and rape. Another study conducted by a nonprofit in Iowa produced a similar result. The reporters also combed through all of the civil sexual harassment lawsuits filed by the federal government against agricultural businesses and found that none had resulted in criminal prosecutions. The problem had become endemic to the industry.

As often happens during long-term reporting, the journalists uncovered a new potential story to explore before they had even finished their first project. While interviewing a source in San Francisco for the first film, they received a tip about a janitor who had been raped while cleaning the city's ferry building. The detail stuck in the mind of Lowell Bergman, the Reva and David Logan Distinguished Chair in Investigative Journalism at UC Berkeley's Graduate School of Journalism, who helped produce both documentaries.

Part of what inspired Bergman and the other journalists to make a second film was that janitorial workplaces often seem just as isolated as the rural communities where agricultural laborers toil. Although janitors employed in major U.S. cities arguably have greater access to legal services than farmworkers after their supervisors abuse them, the process of speaking out can be just as intimidating. The connections between the ways sexual assault can happen in both urban and rural areas served as the inspiration for the new film.

"The pressure in these types of industries is to keep prices lower and goods moving, not to take care of the workers," Bergman told an audience during a recent screening of "Rape on the Night Shift" on the UC Berkeley campus organized by the Center for Latin American Studies.

In the opening scenes of the film, Bergman tells the story of ABM Industries, one of the largest janitorial companies in the United States. The team of journalists who led the investigation found that over the past two decades, 40 sexual harassment lawsuits had been filed against ABM, a company that contracts with the Pentagon. The film tells of a former ABM supervisor named José Vasquez, a registered sex offender who raped an employee during her night shift.

Although the team of filmmakers succeeded in getting one of Vasquez's victims, Erika Morales, to go on the record before a camera, they failed to capture Vasquez telling his side of the story, despite a surprise visit to his house. "I'm going to call the police right now," Vasquez says in the film as he walks away from the camera and disappears into his home.

Andrés Cediel, a documentary producer for the Investigative Reporting Program (IRP) and lecturer at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism who helped produce both films, said the encounter with Vasquez was a disappointment.

"During the filming of 'Rape in the Fields,' we succeeded in getting some of the men who abused the women to speak on camera," Cediel said. "It was disappointing that we couldn't do that in this film, because it's a cathartic experience for the audience to have the perpetrator confronted."

Although the filmmakers were not able get a supervisor accused of sexual violence to talk in this film, they did achieve something that they were unable to do during the "Rape in the Fields" production: they confronted a company whose employees suffered abuse.

In the new film, Bergman interviews Bill Stejskal, Senior Vice President of Human Resources for a janitorial company called SMS based in Nashville, Tennessee. After Stejskal asserts on camera that the company does a thorough investigation "every time" they receive a complaint of sexual harassment, Bergman reveals to Stejskal that SMS received 31 complaints made against supervisors over a three-year period and that many were never given a follow-up investigation. Stejskal responds that he was not aware the company had so many

Photo by Andrés Cediel.

Immigrant women are often reluctant to report harassment by cleaning company supervisors.

complaints and suggests that the investigations may have been misplaced, but Bergman doesn't let the issue drop.

"So there may have been an investigation, but there's no record of it," Bergman suggests.

"That's correct," Stejskal replies.

In an otherwise bleak story, the film describes several instances in which workers successfully sued their employers for damages. A class-action lawsuit filed against ABM by female workers who were assaulted on the job resulted in the company agreeing to pay their former employees $5.8 million. But this was only one success story in a chain of painful narratives that often go untold. Cediel said that during the research for both of the films, the immigration status of many women turned out to be only part of the reason why they chose to remain silent.

"Many women don't know their legal rights in the United States, or they come from countries where officials are corrupt and people don't go to them for help," Cediel told the crowd who attended a film screening at UC Berkeley. "On top of that, many of the women who we spoke with came from abusive relationships back home, so they were already dealing with a lot of trauma before they were abused on the job."

Cediel explained that rape cases are difficult to prosecute because the victims often have trouble recounting all of the details. Studies show that trauma severely affects the brain, often making it difficult for the victim to remember events in chronological order afterwards. The perceived unreliability of rape victims gives their offenders an advantage in discrediting their accounts of sexual assault.

The reporters who worked hard to tell the stories of the women presented in both films are now trying to use journalism to make a difference. After the release of "Rape in the Fields," the filmmakers held screenings of a Spanish-language version of the film at rape crisis centers and other venues in small agricultural towns in California's Central Valley. While publicly screening such sensitive material is difficult, Cediel said that many farmworkers who turned out to see the first film admitted afterwards that they had been victims, too. Showing the film in the farming communities where sexual violence often occurs also helped Cediel gain a better understanding of the extent to which these abuses permeate industries that rely on immigrants. Although the janitorial industry lacks the system of advocacy groups that exist in the agricultural sector, the reporters hope to connect with unions to show the new film.

"Rape on the Night Shift" is not the end of this reporting initiative, but one chapter in a longer arc. Bergman said that he has become interested in small contracting companies that supply workers to larger

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operations like ABM, a common practice in janitorial and other low-wage industries. These smaller companies, Bergman explained to the audience at the CLAS event, have a competitive advantage because they often commit wage theft or fail to pay taxes.

"We're hoping to explore this underground economy for our next story," Bergman said.

As the reporting team that produced these two films looks toward its next project, gaining access to the employees whose experience they seek to document remains one of the greatest challenges. Undocumented workers often fear that speaking publicly will lead to deportation or that their employer might retaliate against them after they expose abuses at the workplace. Likewise, unscrupulous employers don't want stories about subjects like rape in the workplace going public.

The filmmakers say that this long-term investigative work involves time, patience, and relationship building with sources. Daffodil Altan, a graduate of the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism and producer for "Rape on the Night Shift," described the experience of working on the film as a "roller coaster" while the team spent months searching for a victim who would speak with them. Ultimately, the women in the film had to make their own decisions about whether they wanted to share their stories through a medium as public as film. The journalists could not offer them protection, only that they would strive to tell their stories accurately.

For Altan, the experience of collaborating on the film became personal. Her mother had also been a janitor who worked the night shift. "I told my mother about this project," Altan said to the crowd at the CLAS event, "and she told me that she had been sexually harassed while working as a janitor herself."

"Rape on the Night Shift" was screened at an event co-sponsored by the Investigative Reporting Program of UC Berkeley's Graduate School of Journalism, the International Human Rights Law Clinic at Berkeley Law School, and the Center for Latin American Studies. After the film, CLAS chair Harley Shaiken moderated a discussion with Lowell Bergman, Andrés Cediel, and Daffodil Altan.

Levi Bridges is a student in the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley.

Custodial staff are often isolated and alone late at night.



Photo by Andrés Cediel.

Photo by Allison McKellar.

A young girl above the site of the El Mozote massacre.

ART

Horrors and Dreams

By Claudia Bernardi

As part of the peace accords signed in 1992 that ended 12 years of civil war in El Salvador, the United Nations Truth Commission nominated the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense, EAAF) to perform the exhumations of the massacre at El Mozote, Morazán. According to the sole survivor, Rufina Amaya Márquez, the Salvadoran Army had murdered more than 1,000 civilians on December 11, 1981. Rufina saw her husband being decapitated and could identify the voices and screams of her own children before they were shot.

My task was to create the archeological maps that would record the location and finding of human remains, associated objects, and the presence of ballistic evidence. After three months of investigation, the allegation of mass murder against the civilian population was confirmed. Inside a small building known as The Convent (Site #1), from a total of nine archeological sites marked within the hamlet, EAAF was able to differentiate the remains of 143 individuals, 136 of whom were children under age 12.

After the exhumation of El Mozote, I wondered: What might it be like to work in this place on art projects with children of the same age as those we were exhuming?

Four kilometers (2.5 miles) north of the location of that massacre, I founded the School of Art and Open Studio of Perquín, Walls of Hope, a community-based project of art, human rights, education, diplomacy, and community development using the strategies of art-making to rebuild regions torn apart by war. Since 2005, the Perquín model has been successfully reproduced in Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, Switzerland, Northern Ireland, Germany, and Serbia.

I am an artist, and my art is born from memory and loss. In parts of the world affected by war and violence, I design and facilitate art through community projects. In these efforts, the creation of collaborative and community-based murals painted by victims of violence offers a new

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Photo by iose/Wikimedia Commons.

The pink crosses of a memorial to the femicides of Ciudad Juárez.

model of art practice in which ethics, aesthetics, and politics merge.

"We Are Raised by Wolves"

The words of a Honduran boy, age 16, graphically capture the realities of Central American children who make the dangerous border crossing from Mexico into the United States, traveling without parents or guardians. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, in fiscal year 2014 alone, nearly 57,000 unaccompanied, undocumented minors were apprehended by federal immigration officers and transferred to the care of the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). In fiscal year 2015, this number was nearly 34,000, a dramatic increase from the 6,000 minors placed in ORR's care in 2011. Most of these youngsters are from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, and as many as 20 percent of them are under age 12. They crossed the U.S.–Mexico border fleeing extreme poverty, gang violence, and drug trafficking.

The border, *la frontera*, has become the most recent geographic epicenter where collaborative and community-based murals were painted by youth affected by the effects of violence. This visual investigation traces these youngsters' traumatic journeys from Ciudad Juárez through their crossing of the U.S.–Mexico border. The murals are oral histories made into visual representations; they trace whispers of unspoken words and follow fragile steps on sand.

Painting the Experience of Ciudad Juárez

After my flight landed in El Paso, Texas, I took a taxi from El Paso International Airport to the U.S.–Mexico border. In a ride of less than 20 minutes, I changed country, language, and currency, and I entered one of the most dangerous cities in the world.

While El Paso is among the safest cities in the United States, Ciudad Juárez has the sad reputation of being one of the most violent cities in Latin America. Between these antipodes, the incessant crossing — legally or illegally — from one side to the other of the U.S.–Mexico border impacts the lives of countless people.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) asked me to create a pilot mural project using the visual arts as a liaison among youth affected by violence. "Walls of Hope, Ciudad Juárez, Mexico," was a collaborative, community-based mural project developed June 8–16, 2013, involving 26 youths, ages 13 to 17. The ICRC, the Mexican Red Cross, and the psychological program Abriendo Espacios Humanitarios (Opening Humanitarian Spaces) worked in partnership with the School of Art of Perquín, El Salvador. Three artists/teachers also helped to facilitate the young people's art.

Over the course of the project, 26 Mexican teenagers designed and painted a mural on a canvas six feet high by 30 feet long. Through their creative efforts, they shared moving visual testimonies of a contemporary situation that is completely hidden or incorrectly and insufficiently known in the United States.

Tracing Past, Present, and Future

The Ciudad Juárez mural can be read from left to right, from past to present and into the future, starting with the vast desert opening to a cotton field. It evokes the region's past, early in the 20th century, when the Río Bravo crossing was full of life and the U.S.–Mexico border impacted the local economy. This prosperous agricultural commerce abruptly declined when the profitable drug trade replaced cotton production.

In the mural, a bus takes yet another migrant. People leave Ciudad Juárez seeking better working conditions. Others, fearing the drug wars, leave with no intention of returning. Nearly all the homicides in Ciudad Juárez can be considered "drug related." Hundreds of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans cross the U.S.–Mexico border every day, sometimes in a vehicle but most often on foot, running desperately and hoping that *la migra*, the border patrol, will not arrest them.

If they manage to cross the border, they will walk through an overwhelming extension of rock and sand, where there are no trees or shelter, where there will be no water for miles, where many have already perished trying to "make it." The summer is scorching, but the winter is no more benevolent. Temperatures can easily drop below zero. The remains of countless people are scattered throughout the desert. They died of hunger, dehydration, extreme heat, or punishing cold. They died in poverty, in fear, mistreated, brutalized, yet still hoping for a better future.

On the main road, an orange figure — someone not identified as male or female — curls in a fetal position, wrapped in fragility. Are they sleeping or dead? Are they waiting for this bus or for another one? Have they come from far away or are they lamenting their imminent departure? The desert is full of questions that no one dares ask and no one answers.

In the desert, a wounded woman with purple marks on her body and pain in her soul is trying to protect herself from further violence. It is hard to know whether she is facing an imminent death or if she recently survived a near-fatal threat. To her left, weapons, money, and fiery

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Participants start work on the Juárez mural.

Photo courtesy of Claudia Bernardi.

Photo courtesy of Claudia Bernardi.

A bruised woman forms one of the central images of the Juárez mural.

explosions chain her to a present where magenta crosses in the background identify the dead and disappeared women of Juárez.

The central part of the mural represents the present. It is illuminated by a shining full moon. A child is jailed behind bars within a watchful eye. The youth of Ciudad Juárez are forced to accept basic rules of "safety." They cannot go out at night; they should never be alone. They obey a curfew imposed by common sense as a tool of survival. This child cannot leave Ciudad Juárez. Not today, not alive.

The path from the present into the future is marked by a painter's pallet, each color showing what the young people from Juárez want: art, music, sports, community-based projects. A creative hand renders life and hope.

In the far-right section of the mural — the future — two hands meet in solidarity to celebrate sports, art, and the promotion of local industry that could lead to new jobs. The young artists from Ciudad Juárez know that the incommensurable profit of the drug industry exists not only because Mexico sells drugs, but because the United States buys them. The young muralists proposed that cotton plantations be prioritized over other crops to create a safe, sustainable local agriculture, connecting the past to the future.

By consensus, the mural was christened: "Juárez no es como lo pintan sino como lo vives" (Juárez is not what they've told you, but what you experience).

A Tree of Life Grows in Juvenile Detention

In March 2003, the care for and placement of undocumented, unaccompanied minors was assigned to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Since that time, the ORR has received more than 175,000 children under age 17 from Department of Homeland Security immigration officials. After they have suffered abuse and violence linked to poverty, gangs, and cartels in their homelands, these children struggle to survive crossing the U.S.–Mexico border. On this journey, they may become victims of human trafficking and exploitation; they may also end up in the U.S. justice system for a range of reasons.

In May 2015, a group of undocumented, unaccompanied Central American youths, age 13 to 17, who were being held in a Juvenile Detention Center in the United States, took part in this community-based, collaborative mural project. Using professional mural paint on canvas, the participating immigrant youth painted a mural six feet high and 30 feet long that narrated their personal and communal memories marked by violence and the threat of violence while crossing the U.S.–Mexico border. This unprecedented effort within the U.S. criminal justice system used art to allow the incarcerated youth to speak safely about the reasons they left their homelands and the brutality they suffered during the perilous crossing of the U.S.–Mexico border.

The 55 participating girls and boys drew images that contained a journalistic directness, with documentary starkness and facts that delivered an alarming message. Although no one dared to say it, while painting this mural we were hugely aware that at the end of the day, many of us would go "home" to meet friends and family and share dinner and lively conversation, while the youth identified as "illegal" would remain incarcerated.

At the end, one 16-year-old Nicaraguan girl said, "I want to thank you for this mural project that reminds me that I can still love. I made many new friends among you all. But now, I need to forget about love in order to survive."

Imagining a Bridge to a Dignified Life

On the far left of the mural, the young artists' testimony begins with a group of people initiating the perilous journey at night. Assisted only by an inflatable boat, they are hoping to not drown in the turbulent waters of the river. Many will not succeed. Some of the undocumented immigrants will disappear before reaching the United States. The river seems the last and final challenge. In reality, the crossing is just starting.

Crossing the desert is equally treacherous and unpredictable. Along the way, they will find organized crime and drug trafficking. In the foreground of the mural, amputated human remains appear adjacent to a barrel of acid. Towards the background, people run away to avoid becoming victims themselves or being forced to commit unspeakable crimes.

The mural's overarching narrative is echoed in smaller, surrounding panels that constitute a "border" of history. In one of these biographical snapshots, a

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A plea to end the violence in Honduras drawn by one of the young artists.



Photo courtesy of Claudia Bernardi.

16-year-old Honduran boy remembers the day that his father died. It was the boy's birthday. The following day, he left Honduras, driven by fear and sorrow.

In another small panel, a 14-year-old Guatemalan girl painted herself in a "secure facility" in the United States. Her story is brutal and untold. She is looking at us and crying. We are seeing her from far away. If the migrants manage to cross to the United States, they will be trapped within the labyrinth of immigration laws, undocumented status, jail, and deportation.

The centerpiece of the mural is "El Arbol de la Vida" (The Tree of Life). Bright, powerful, and generous, it expands to bridge the pain of crossing towards the possibility of dignified life in the United States. A *torogoz*, a Salvadoran bird of magnificent colors, flies to its nest in the Tree of Life. Its presence heals a hand that has been wounded and trapped. On the other side of the tree, the same hand appears to be in full bloom. Someone rests under the tree, reflecting on how to design one's life from now on.

Most murals have timelines from past to present to future, but "The Tree of Life" mural is narrated in a continuous present: present at the border; present when they face violence and brutality or when they are forced to commit crimes; present if they manage to make it to the United States.

Before starting the long journey to the North, the unaccompanied minors had dreams and hopes that now feel unreachable. Their past is filled with stories of poverty, threat, drug trafficking, and death. Their present is perilous, fragile. Many of them believe that being detained in a juvenile center may be safer than returning to their home countries. They hardly understand the U.S. justice system that identifies them not as victims, but as criminals.

Understanding the message of these murals leads us to an unavoidable question: How can we help you?

An Argentine painter, printmaker, and installation artist, Claudia Bernardi is a professor of community arts at California College of the Arts. She spoke for CLAS on September 21, 2015.

UC Berkeley's Multicultural Community Center exhibited "The Tree of Life," April 4–14, 2016.

"The Tree of Life."
(Photo by Miguel Oropeza Caballero.)

ART

Patterns of Life: The Works of Alfredo Arreguín

As part of the ongoing partnership between CLAS and the Mexican Museum, artist Alfredo Arreguín spoke on his life and work at Berkeley in November 2015. Famous for the use of patterns in his painting, Arreguín divides his time between the Pacific Northwest and Michoacán.

(All images courtesy of Alfredo Arreguín.)

Above: Alfredo Arreguín, "Michoacán" (1982), 60 x 48 in., private collection.

Left: Alfredo Arreguín, "Cenote" (1980), 48 x 48 in., private collection.

Above: Alfredo Arreguín, "Remolinos" (1974), 48 x 48 in., private collection.

Left: Alfredo Arreguín, "Chupamirtos" (1996), 48 x 32 in., Harborview Medical Center, Seattle, Washington.

Photo by hitchster.

Damage from the Napa earthquake of August 2014.

RESEARCH

A Few Seconds of Warning

By Margaret Hellweg

In the early morning hours of Sunday, August 24, 2014, people in the San Francisco Bay Area were jolted awake by an earthquake. Initially, nobody knew the size of the quake, where the epicenter was located, or what damage could be expected. Only a few people on watch in the offices of San Francisco's Department of Emergency Management, the Police Department of the University of California, Berkeley, and the control center for the Bay Area Rapid Transit's train system (BART) knew what was happening before they felt the shaking: an earthquake of magnitude 6.0 struck the city of Napa at 3:21 a.m., Pacific Time. These offices had the ShakeAlert User Display running on their computers and received its rapid alert prepared within five seconds of the start of the earthquake rupture and before the strong shaking started at their locations.

ShakeAlert — the earthquake early warning (EEW) system being developed and tested by UC Berkeley seismologists and their colleagues in California — is almost available as a prototype production system. With the exception of BART, current users in California are beta-testers of the system and do not yet base any actions on the alerts they receive. The prototype production system is now operational, and beta-testers will begin taking that next step.

Early Warnings in "Earthquake Country"

A similar earthquake early warning system would be of great value in Chile, one the world's most seismically active countries. Earthquakes of magnitude 8 and above strike its territory about every 10 years. These temblors and associated phenomena, such as tsunamis and landslides, have caused more than 99% of deaths and 98% of economic losses due to natural disaster since the early 1900s. As a result of the February 2010 earthquake and tsunami (Maule earthquake, magnitude 8.8), 521 people were killed, 56 remain missing, and economic losses amounted to approximately 14% of GDP.

The development of earthquake early warning in California over the past 10 years is based on data from the modern seismic and geodetic networks operated in real time in California. They have demonstrated that rapid processing can detect earthquakes when they happen and, to a great extent, not "cry wolf" by sending alerts when there is no local earthquake.

How does earthquake early warning work? Earthquakes produce two kinds of seismic waves that travel at different speeds. The primary waves (P-waves) are faster but less destructive. The secondary waves (S-waves) arrive later and produce a shearing, shaking movement that can destroy buildings and infrastructure. Both types of wave spread throughout a region, like ripples in a pond. Their amplitudes decrease with distance, although there may be secondary effects in soft sediments and basins that can result in great damage far from an earthquake's source. These effects were the cause of the considerable damage and deaths in Mexico City during the great earthquake that occurred off the country's southern coast in 1985.

If we can detect the P-waves radiating from an earthquake and determine its location and size within seconds, then we can alert people and organizations in the area that will be affected by damaging shaking before it starts. People can "drop, cover, and hold on" until the shaking stops, and automatic actions can help to prevent or reduce other problems. Take the example of BART, the Bay Area's train system. These trains are all run by a computer system overseen in BART's operations center. Since September 2013, the BART computers automatically slow all trains when triggered by an earthquake alert from ShakeAlert. The Berkeley Seismological Laboratory has been working with BART engineers for several years, first to implement the EEW feed to the operations center and then to determine which EEW alerts should trigger a train slowdown. During the 2014 South Napa earthquake, the BART systems worked effectively. Trains would have been slowed, if any had been running at 3:21 on that Sunday morning.

Most of the great earthquakes in Chile take place off the coast (see map). This location actually offers a benefit from an early warning point of view: since the time between P-waves and S-waves is longer, there is more time to prepare or take action to counter the shaking. However, these earthquakes also cause tsunamis, earthquake-generated waves that inundate the coast and damage or wash away boats, buildings, infrastructure, and also people. For distant locations — like California in the case of the Maule event — the tsunami arrives many hours after the quake, allowing considerable time to prepare. In a local event, however, the devastating wave may arrive within minutes of the shaking.



Image by Sergio Barrientos.

Chile's major earthquake history: Yellow areas are normal-faulting quakes; great thrust quakes inferred from historical records are pink; great thrust quakes instrumentally recorded from 1922 to 2007 are red, and since 2010, blue. Red triangles are active volcanoes.

Before the Maule earthquake in February 2010, the Chilean earthquake monitoring system was not capable of supporting earthquake early warning. Since then, the Chilean government has begun to modernize its earthquake monitoring system through the National Seismological Center (Centro Sismológico Nacional, CSN) at the Universidad de Chile. Data from the new stations will be able to support earthquake early warning. This project began a collaborative effort between seismologists in Berkeley and Chile to provide input and feedback on the implementation of the new network and to bring the earthquake early warning processing to Chile. When fully implemented, Chile's EEW system will be able to provide several seconds to a few minutes warning of shaking to most population centers.

Working Together to Improve Alerts

The collaboration began with a workshop at the CSN in Santiago, Chile, in early March 2015, which included participants from CSN and UC Berkeley, as well as from the German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ), the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service of the Chilean Navy (Servicio Hidrográfico y Oceanográfico de la Armada de Chile SHOA), the National Geology and Mining Service (Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería, Sernageomin), the Department of Geophysics at the Universidad de Chile, and a Fulbright scholar. Presentations on Chilean and California seismicity and monitoring networks were followed by a discussion of earthquake monitoring in



Image courtesy of Margaret Hellweg.

The ShakeAlert app shows the expected arrival time and intensity of ground movements.

general and advanced earthquake information products like the moment tensors and finite fault estimates produced at UC Berkeley. The Berkeley team then presented its algorithms based on both seismic data (ElarmS) and geodetic or GPS data (GlarmS), describing how they work and how they have performed in California.

The seismic data provides rapid information on location and magnitude. Unfortunately, experience has demonstrated that ElarmS saturates at large magnitude, which means that although an earthquake may be larger than magnitude 7, ElarmS will not be able to tell how much bigger it is. Data from GPS monitors can detect the large movements from great quakes and provide a better estimate of their magnitudes, but it takes a little more time.

The large quakes needed to test and improve the algorithms are fortunately extremely rare in California. Using data from Chile's great quakes will allow the Berkeley team to tune ElarmS and GlarmS. Having the algorithms running sooner rather than later in Chile will help the team at the CSN to gather experience with them and to work with SHOA, mentioned above, and Onemi (Chile's Office of Emergency Management) to develop operations plans that will use the early warnings to reduce both quake and tsunami damage in the next big earthquakes.

In the final session of the March workshop, we discussed instrumentation and station density requirements for an EEW system, as well as "next steps" for our project. This initial workshop was followed by individual visits to support the installation and implementation of the EEW software for ElarmS. Felipe Layton, a seismologist from CSN visited UC Berkeley in June. Ivan Henson, the seismologist in charge of the software package at UC Berkeley visited Chile in October. During these two visits, the teams exchanged information about the EEW codes, which were installed and configured on the CSN computers. For this project's final activity, UC Berkeley organized a workshop on "EEW and Subduction Zone Seismicity" in November 2015. The workshop included participation from U.S. partners, such as the United States Geological Survey, the University of Washington, and Central Washington University. The participants from these two universities are particularly interested in subduction zone earthquakes, since they are living on the Cascadia Subduction Zone.

Diego Melgar, a BSL researcher, has been particularly interested in using EEW and other data for very rapid tsunami assessment so that the population in the danger zones can be warned more quickly. The collaboration with the CSN team is extremely valuable for his work on tsunami alerting (TlarmS). Melgar has been able to access the seismic and geodetic data that has been collected from recent great earthquakes in Chile, including the Illapel earthquake that shook the coast near Santiago in September 2015. Tsunami warnings for local earthquakes are a particular challenge, as the wave may arrive within minutes of the event, and the people in the run-up zone may need to travel several kilometers to reach safety. Melgar's method uses any data rapidly available — seismic, GPS, or tide gauge — to estimate the size and location of a big quake and the expected run-up along the coast. The recent Illapel quake provided a good example: the TlarmS results produced accurate estimates that could have been used to issue warning maps in the first three minutes after the earthquake.

Reaping the Benefits for Chile & California

Both teams and countries are benefiting from the long-term collaboration initiated through this project. The Centro Sismológico Nacional of Chile is receiving support and expertise from the Berkeley Seismological Laboratory towards the implementation of earthquake and tsunami early warning systems in this extremely earthquake-prone country. ElarmS is already running in Chile. Soon, GlarmS and TlarmS also will be implemented. Experience with these tools will grow as the number of stations in Chile's seismic and geodetic networks increase, and the capacity to produce rapid earthquake and tsunami information will help warn and protect Chileans.

At the same time, the data from past and future large-to-great earthquakes in Chile will allow the Berkeley Seismological Laboratory to improve rapid estimation of earthquake parameters for large-to-great earthquakes for the operation of the EEW system in California and the West Coast of the United States.

We expect the demonstration of improvements — both in California and Chile — will encourage the investment of funds to continue the collaboration to the benefit of both partners and to continue improvements to earthquake monitoring and alerting in both countries.

The project's senior personnel are: Dr. Sergio Barrientos, Director of the Centro Sismológico Nacional of the Universidad de Chile; Professor Richard Allen, Director of UC Berkeley Seismological Laboratory; Professor Douglas Dreger, Associate Director of UC Berkeley Seismological Laboratory; and Dr. Margaret Hellweg, Operations Manager, UC Berkeley Seismological Laboratory. Seed funding for this collaboration came from a CLAS/Conicyt grant.

Photo by Miguel Oropeza Caballero.

Researchers bury sensors outside of California Memorial Stadium on the UC Berkeley campus.

IN MEMORIAM

"You're just transient in this world.
We're all just brief tenants on the planet."
— Douglas Tompkins (1943 – 2015)

Lago Blanco in Parque Pumalín, Chile, a project begun by Doug Tompkins in 1991.
(Photo by Fanny & Greg.)